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SCOPE MU PURPOSES OF THE STUDÏ 
Introduction. 
Banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System have access 
to the discount window for the purpose* of borrowing reserves. A banker 
in need of reserves can either rediscount short-term commercial, agri­
cultural, industrial or other business paper or he can give his own 
promissory note secured by Government securities or other eligible paper. 
Both forms of borrowing have come to be called discounting and the rate 
at which the borrowing is made the discount rate. 
: Unlike the direct and predictable effects of open market opera­
tions or reserve requirement changes on the quantity of reserves held by 
the banking system, discounting has imprecise effects. Policy makers can 
achieve direct and specific quantity changes in reserves by buying or 
selling Government securities in the open market, or lowering or raising 
the reserve requirement. With discounting, the policy tool is the dis­
count rate, and it is the response of bankers to changes in the rate 
which determines the effectiveness of rate changes. When using the dis­
count rate as the tool in effectuating policy, direct control over total 
reserves is lost since the quantity of reserves actually borrowed must be 
initiated by the bankers themselves. 
Much of the current interest in member bank borrowing centers 
around this imprecision because of its implications about the effective­
ness of monetary policy. The relative importance of its imprecision or 
its relative importance as a'policy tool depends on the linkage between 
the monetary sector and the real sector of the economy. Regardless of 
this question, the effectiveness of any monetary policy action rests 
first with its impact on the monetary sector of the economy. 
If bankers themselves determine the quantity of borrowings, then 
the impact of changes in the discount rate on the monetary sector of the 
economy must be evaluated from the bankers' point of view. The atten­
tion of this paper is focused on the determinants of borrowing in an 
attempt to discover what vdriuulea irifluenee bankers in their borrowing 
decisions. Knowledge of these variables and the way bankers respond to 
changes in them will provide implications about the effectiveness of the. 
discount rate as a tool of monetary policy. 
Overview :' 
Early writings on member bank borrowing suggest two basic motives 
for borrowing: need and profit. According to the need thesis, bankers 
are reluctant to borrow and look to the discount window as a source of 
funds only when necessary in meeting normal customer demands for loans 
and deposits. Bankers borrow "only in case of necessity and endeavor to 
repay their borrowing as soon as possible (29, p. 20)." Such behavior 
suggests that interest rates are not a particularly influential factor 
in the decision to borrow and, specifically, that changes in the discount 
rate have little effect on the volume of borrowings. Within the context 
of the need thesis the direction of causation runs the other way. The 
volume of borrowings determines interest rates. Given a reluctance to 
borrow, bankers try to reduce their level of indebtedness as their volume 
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of borrowing increases. They do so by. raising loan rates in an effort 
to reduce the quantity of loans demanded and by selling assets to acquire 
needed reserves. 
At the other extreme, the profit thesis holds that the discount : 
rate is important in determining the volume of borrowing. Bankers borrow 
in order to profit from rate differences which they can do if the dis­
count rate is below open market and customer loan rates. Even if a need 
for funds ai-ises from normal customer demands, it is argued that as long 
as interest rates arc above the discount rate, banks stand to profit from 
borrowing (ll, p. 26l). The word "need," as used in conjunction with the 
profit thesis of borrowing, has a somewhat different meaning than when 
used in conjuction with the need thesis. It can be argued, for example, 
that any time a deficiency in reserves is present, the banker is in need 
of reserves. The relevant question is whether the need was artificially 
created by the potential profit or whether there would have been a need 
even in the absence of rate differences. Those who hold the need thesis 
of borrowing intend the word to mean that bankers borrow only when there 
is no other source, and when the deficiency in reserves is a result of 
normal day-to-day banking operations. 
From more recent writings, the consensus which seems to emerge 
is that both profit and need influence borrowing behavior. Turner argues 
that the amount a bank will be willing to borrow is 
. . . determined by the attitudes of the bankers themselves, 
and by the circumstances in which they work, including business 
conditions, both National and local, the condition of the indi­
vidual banks, the needs of their portfolios and the available 
opportunities, and the relative profitability of borrowing 
(36, p. 152). 
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He also argues that tradition "aRainst borrowing "is a factor principally 
to the extent that it sets limits . . .to the amount of borrowing . . . 
(36, p. 152)." 
The works of Polakoff (27) and of Goldfeld and Kane (9) are 
notable examples of recent attempts to answer the question: Given profit 
and need as motives for borrowing and reluctance as a deterrent, what 
role does each play in determining the volume of borrowing? 
In Polakoffs "integration thesis," borrowing is viewed from the 
standpoint of the two opposing forces—profits and reluctance. He USOB 
the term "profits" to mean the difference between the discount rate and 
the Treasury bill rate or the "least cost" method of obtaining additional 
reserves for the individual bank. His hypothesis is that the greater 
this spread, the more likely a bank is to borrow. As the spread becomes 
larger and larger, however, the banker restrains from additional borrow­
ing and inay repay Some of his former borrowings. He does this even though 
a profit is available because his reluctance to borrow increases as the 
volume of borrowing grows. An increasingly rapid increase in profits is 
required to overcome this increasing reluctance. At a given spread, the 
banker adjusts his borrowing in such a way that the marginal disutility 
of borrowing divided by the marginal utility of profits equals the nega­
tive of the spread. This is the necessary condition for the banker to 
maximize utility. 
To test his hypothesis, Polakoff charts the difference between 
the discount rate and the Treasury bill rate in class intervals of 0.1 
precent on the horizontal axis and aggregate borrowings on the vertical 
axis. If his hypothesis is cforrect, then a relatively smaller quantity 
of borrowings should correspond with a relatively smaller spread. And, 
if the spread gets sufficiently large, borrowings should decrease as 
reluctance to borrow overrides profitability in the bankers decision. 
Polakoff finds for a 5 1/2 year period begining in July, 1953» and ending 
in January, 1959J that both weekly and monthly data suggest a curve in 
which borrowings show a tendency to flatten out with increasing spreads 
until some point is reached beyond which there is a downturn (27, p. 1?)." 
This is consistent with his theoretical argument and he therofore accepts 
his hypothesis. 
Goldfeld and Kane use regression analysis to test their theoret­
ical hypotheses. In addition to the spread between the discount rate and 
Treasury bill rate, their theory indicates that both lagged borrowings 
and unborrowed reserves should be included as independent variables ex­
plaining current borrowings. Borrowings in previous periods account for 
transaction costs which may increase as a result of continuing indebted­
ness due to Federal Reserve "harrassment." This is more a result of the 
length of time in debt than the absolute amount of debt currently out­
standing, and thus current borrowing should be, in part, a function of 
past borrowing. Lagged unborrowed reserves are used as an indication of 
the bank's competitive position in the industry. A bank which continually 
gains reserves through the normal clearing process is in a better position 
than one which continually loses reserves. Those that gain reserves are 
less likely to turn to the discount window to obtain additional reserves. 
Several equations for each of four classes of banks—New York, 
Chicago, other Reserve city and country—are estimated. The equations 
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differ only in the number of ^Lags and powers of variables included. For 
example, the three equations for the New York class of banks each have 
weekly averages of daily borrowings as their dependent variable, and 
various forms of the Treasxiry bill rate minus the discount rate, the 
change in unborrowed reserves and lagged borrowings; as dependent vari­
ables. Goldfeld and Kane find that these variables explain at least 
75 percent of the variation in borrowings for each class of banks (9» 
p. 511). 
Form and Scope of the Model 
The theoretical model in this study derives from the work of 
Luckett (18) and encompasses that of Goldfeld and Kane. Luckett's pri­
mary concern is with the availability doctrine as evidenced by banks 
not only raising loan rates but also engaging in nbnprice credit ration­
ing during periods of monetary restraint. In developing his hypotheses, 
Luckett presents a model of the individual bank. Tlie model of the indi­
vidual bank presented in this study is an extension of Luckett*s original 
one. 
In their article, Goldfeld and Kane state that "Since the ob­
jective functions . . . are likely to vary from bank to bank, a proper 
test of the thoery . . . would make use of data recording the responses 
of individual banks. Unfortunately, such data are not available (9, 
p. 507)." The theoretical part of this study is not closely akin to 
Goldfeld and Kane's but the variables which they find to be inportant 
in the banker's borrowing decision are included in the variables found 
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here. Since individual bank data are used to estimate various forms of 
. » 
the borrowing equation, three of these equations oi-e those of Goldfeld 
and Kane. A more detailed discussion of similiarities and differences 
between .the tv;o models appears in Chapter III. 
The model in this study begins by assuming that bankers possess, 
at any point in time, a desired level of borrowings or that level which 
the banker would choose given his utility function and complete knowledge 
of fluctuations in his reserve needs. There also exists an actual level 
of borrowings or that level which would prevail in the absence of any 
borrowing activity. The banker responds to any difference in these two 
levels either by borrowing or repaying former borrowings depending on 
whether his desired level is above or below his actual level of borrow­
ings. The banker is assumed to be further influenced in his decision to 
borrow by Federal Reserve surveillance. This is intended to account for 
any deterrent to borrowing that Reserve officials may impose on the 
borrowing banks. Thus, the principal hypothesis of this study is that 
the individual bank takes action during a given time interval to remove 
any discrepancy between its desired level of borrowing at the end of an 
interval and the position that would prevail in the absense of action. 
In addition, the banker's behavior is, in part, a function of Federal 
Reserve surveillance. 
The banker's desired level of borrowings is not an observable 
quantity and it must be estimated. This is accomplished by deriving the 
desired level of borrowings from the extended model of the individual 
bank developed by Luckett. 
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Pian of the Study 
In Chapter II the theoretical model,is developed along with hy­
potheses concerning specific parameters of the regression equations. The 
statistical results are presented in Chapter III . and the conclusions and 
policy implications in Chapter IV, 
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THE THEORETICAL DETERMINANTS OF BORROWING 
The Basic Behavioral Hypothesis 
The objective of this chapter is to develop a model of an individ­
ual banker's behavior at the discount window. The underlying hypothesis 
of the model postulates two basic elements which determine this behavior. 
These are (l) any discrepancy between the banker's desired and actual 
levels of borrowing and (2) the influence of Federal Reserve curveillance. 
These variables interact in the following way. During a particular time 
interval, say t-1 to t, the banker has experienced a change in his reserve 
position. On the basis of this experience, he formulates a "desired" 
level of borrowings at t, B|. To be in static equilibrium, his borrowings 
at t must be B^ , and hence his change in borrowings, AB, between t-1 and t 
will eq.ual B^  - B^ ^^ * Depending upon his ability to achieve equilibrium, 
his actual change in borrowings between t-1 and t may be a fraction of 
Furthermore, AB will be modified by any change in Federal Re­
serve surveillance between t-1 and t since B^  depends on a constant amount 
of surveillance. 
It is thus specified that: 
(1) AB = 6(B2 - BT_I, FS) 
where: AB = change in borrowing between t-1 and t; 
B* = desired level of borrowings; 
B = actual level of borrowings; 
PS = measure of Federal Reserve surveillance; 
t = time subscript. 
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Changes in "borrowings are thus a function, 6, of the difference 
between the desired and actual level of borrowings and Federal Reserve 
surveillance. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to specifying 
these variables. 
A Model of the Individual Bank 
The determinants of the desired level of borrowing are derived 
from a model of the individual bank. A simplified bank balance sheet 
identity can be written as: 
(2)R+ G + L = D + S + T + F + B  
where: R = reserves; 
G = government securities; 
L = loans; 
D = demand deposits; 
S = time and savings deposits; 
T = time certificates of deposit; 
F = federal funds; 
B = borrowings; and R, G, L, D, S, T, B>0; F|O. 
If it is assumed that required reserves on demand deposits, time 
and savings deposits, and time certificates of deposit are fixed percen­
tages of their total, then required reserves are 
(3) R = (1 - v)D + (1 - w)(S + T) 
where v and w are one minus the reserve requirements on demand deposits 
and on time and savings deposits and time certificates of deposit, respec 
tively. If the bank's reserves are equal to its required reserves then R 
can be eliminated from (2) by substituting R from (3) into (2). 
(K) (1 - V)D + (1 - w) ( S  + T )  + G + L = D + S + T + F + B .  
Simplifying this expression results in 
(5) G + L = vD + w(S + T) + F + B. 
11 
It is assumed that the banker wishes to maximize the utility 
function, . 
(6) U = u(n, A, T, B), 
containing profits (TT), liquidity (A), soundness (T), and borrowing (B). 
The task in this section is to specify these arguments. 
Profits 
A bank's profit function can be written as the sura of returns on 
its earning assets minus its costs. If it is asswried that costs of ser­
vicing deposits and loans are fixed, then the principal /ariable costs are 
those associated with interest paid on time and savings deposits aiid;time 
certificates of deposit. Thus, 
(7) TT = rG + oL - dB - fF - eS - gT - K 
where r, a, d, f, e, and g are the rates on government securities, loans, 
borrowings, federal funds, time and savings deposits, and time certifi­
cates of deposit respectively and K is fixed costs. 
Liquidity 
The banker's primary concern with liquidity ai'ises from his desire 
to meet future deposit withdrawals and customer loan demands. He is, in 
fact, legally liable for deposits and desirous of accommodating customer 
loan requests due to past or possible future customer relations (lU). 
Certain other obligations which will come due between now and his planning 
horizon must also be accounted for. These are his borrowings from the 
Federal Reserve, and his purchases of federal funds. That is, at any 
given point in time, the banker expects future changes in both deposits 
and loan requests and the necessity of repaying any debt he has incurred 
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through purchasing federal funds or discounting. The formulation of ex­
pectations and preparation for these future developments determine his 
liquidity position. 
Consider first the possibility of preparing for necessary future 
uses of funds hy asset management. The "banker at time t manages his asset 
portfolio "based on his experience vith the seasonal and qrcIleal peculi­
arities of his bank. He has some set of subjective expectations concern­
ing the value of deposits and depositor loan demand, and a knowledge of 
any debt that must be repaid at some time in the future, say t + u. He 
prepares for the accommodation of these by selecting the level of those 
items in his balance sheet over vhich he has control. 
As an example, consider a loan request at t. The banker not only 
considers the profitability of granting the loan but also his future need 
for funds between t and the time the present loan, if granted, would ma­
ture. The granting of the loan at t reduces the bank's resources for the 
maturity of the loan. This future need for funds is what the banker must 
prepare for at t and he does so, in part, by either granting or refusing 
the loan request. And, since the loan is requested for a given maturity, 
the banker must consider his need for funds during the entire term of the 
loan. The time horizon, u, is thus determined when a loan of a given ma­
turity is requested. The probability that an additional loan will be re­
quested, or a deposit paydown will occur before the current loan has ma­
tured, is based on the expectations of the banker and is a determining 
factor in the decision to grant or refuse th? present loan request. 
The liquidity position of the bank depends not only upon the asset 
side of the balance sheet, but also on liability items. The banker has 
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some control over the level of'particular liabilities and may take action 
to increase these, given a deposit paydovm or the necessity of his own 
debt repayment. His efforts in so doing are directed at maintaining or 
increasing the aggregate level of these liabilities. It is possible, for 
example, for the banker to repay federal funds he may have purchased prior 
to a particular point in time and at the same time buy more. Based on his 
decision as to the quantity he will buy, this particular liability will 
increase, decrease or remain the same. This is also true vhen borrowing 
from the Federal Reserve. At any time t, the banker's borrowings will be 
at a level deteiniined by his action prior to that time. If he expects de-
posit withdrawals or increased customer loan demand during a given time 
interval, he must provide not only for accommodating these but elso for 
those borrowings which come due during the interval. Again the possibility 
exists for the banker to keep borrowings at the level of time t or to 
increase them. 
This type of action is especially true for large banks. Deposit 
outflows can be met on the liability side of the bank's balance sheet by 
selling time certificates of deposit. This has the effect of offsetting 
uncontrolled deposit outflows by creating new deposits. The banker can 
command these deposits by varying the rate of return offered. A banker 
may thus view the creation of deposits through the issuance of time cer­
tificates of deposit as a source of funds, and hence, as an instrument to 
be used in adjusting the bank's position. 
In defining the banker's expectations about future deposit behav­
ior, gaining deposits through issuing time certificates of deposit, and at 
the same time meeting his legal obligations in paying other deposit holders 
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on demand, could be included. For the purpose of examining reserve period 
adjustments, the distinction between the types of deposit change is neces­
sary. A clearer distinction is between sources and uses of funds. Time 
certificates of deposit are a source; other deposits are a use. Of 
course, a source is a negative use, but in general, the distinction is 
between those items over which the banker has control (source) and those 
over which he does not (use). In this context, the subjective expecta­
tions formulate<3. by a- banker about future changes in deposits refer only 
to those deposits which are outside the control of the banker. Also, 
since loan requests are not determined by the banker and therefore not 
under his control, it is talcen as given that he arranges those items which 
he can control in a sensible fashion so that he can acccaunodate expected 
loan requests. 
The levels of the three "controlled liabilities"—time certificates 
of deposit, borrowing, and federal funds—are determined by decisions of 
the banker prior to any particular point in time that the bank's balance 
sheet is examined. If they have been used as a means of adjusting to 
short-run reserve needs, they are potential uses of the bank's funds at 
each point in time thereafter. The time interval t to t + u, is assumed 
to be sufficiently long so that the total of current amounts of borrowings, 
federal funds and time certificates of deposit are due during the interval. 
This assumption is not eis imposing as it might at first appear. 
The fact that the bank's outstanding issue of time certificates of deposit 
and its current debt either with the Federal Reserve or other banks come 
due between t and t + u does not negate the possibility of the banker ob­
taining funds from these three sources during the time interval. He can 
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sell a new issue of time certificates of deposit and enter a new borrowing 
agreement with the Federal Reserve or with other banks. 
Kius in considering a loan of. say, six months' maturity at time t, 
the banker must provide for repayment of these three liability items which 
come due between t and six months hence. If the banker elects to keep 
these at their present level, they have exactly the game effect on liqui­
dity during the time interval, t to t + u, as they did at t. 
Assume, then, that the banker at time t has some set of subjective 
expectations concerning the value at time t + u of those deposits over 
which he has no control, and of depositor loan demand. The distribution 
of changes in deposits and changes in customer loan demand is assumed nor­
mal with mean and variance known. To get a measure of bank liquidity, 
sources of funds ere contrasted with expected uses. According to the 
measure of liquidity used here, the banker Judges the barJc's liquidity in 
» 
terms of his subjective probability that the bank will not be able to 
accommodate the demands of depositors and borrowers at t + u. 
Sources of a bank's liquidity are its liquid assets plus those 
reserves released by the withdrawal of deposits. Uses are its short-term 
liability items and loan increases. Specifically, liquidity is defined in 
the following manner: 
(8) Gj. — T^  — — E(AL^  — VAD) — Ao — 0 
where: t = time subscript; 
G = government securities; 
T = the level of time certificates of deposit; 
B = the level of borrowings; 
P = the level of federal funds purchased; 
. L\P - the change in depositor loan demand between t and t + u; 
AD = the change in deposits between t and t + u; 
E = expected value operator; 
a = the standard deviation of the difference (AL® - vAD); 
A = the measure of bank liquidity. 
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Equation (8) gives an Expression of liquidity in terms of available 
sources of funds and potential uses. Since the distribution of expecta­
tions is assumed normal with given mean and variance, (8) has as its only 
unknown, A. This is the number of standard deviations from the mean esti­
mate of (AL - vAD) by which the banker may err and still meet customer 
demands from available sources of funds. The banker determines A when he 
decides i^ on the mix of governments and loans and upon the levels of T, B, 
and F at time t; 
To get a better understanding of this measure of liquidity, con­
sider a banker who chooses to hold at time t that quantity of government 
securities which just equals his mean estimate of (AL^  - vAD). Also assume 
that T, B, and F are zero. The only source of reserves is G, and the 
probability that the actual (AL^  - vAD) is greater than its expected value 
is equal to 1/2. If the actual value of (AL^  - vAD) is greater than its 
expected value, the holdings of government securities will not be suffi­
cient to meet these actual demands. 
If T, B, and F are not zero at time t, and the banker still choosds 
to hold that quantity of governments which equals E(AL® - VAD) then the 
probability that he will be able to accommodate customer demands and repay 
his own debt in an orderly and normal fashion between t and t + u is re­
duced. If the banker takes action to keep T, B, and F at the same level 
between t and t + u they have no net effect on liquidity. If he increases 
or decreases them, liq'oidity decreases or increases respectively. 
Three relationships among the variables in expression (8) and the 
associated probabilities of sources being less than potential uses are: 
IT 
(9)'A = -1 < E(AL^  - vAD) P(Gt-Tt-Bt-Pt < ALP - v6D) A 5/6; 
(10) A = 0 = E(AL^  - VAD) P(Gt-Tt-Br^ t " ^AD) =1/2; 
(11) A = 1 GT-T^ -BT-FT < E(ûL^  - YAD) P(GT-TT-BT-FT < AL^  - VAD) L 1/6. 
Clearly, the larger is A, the smaller is the probability that the bank 
will not be able to meet the demands of its customers at t + u. 
Soundness 
Bank soundness, as oppogod to liquidity» is designed to be a mea­
sure of the bank's position under conditions of unexpected changes in the 
bank's liabilities and unexpected changes in the value of the bank's 
assets. It is the bank's position under conditions of forced liquidation 
and is reckoned by contrasting an assumed maximum decline in each of the 
bank's liabilities with an assumed realisable value of each of its assets. 
Since the possibility of such occurrences is dismissed by the banker, he 
does not make provision for them in his consideration of liquidity. 
This is not to say that the banker does not take into account the 
possibility of unexpected events occurring. The subjective probability 
assigned to a particular future event by a banker may be very small, and 
yet circumstances may change to such an extent that the event actually hap­
pens. The idea behind the soundness provision is to assure the continued 
existence of the bank in the event of an unexpected, but possible, national 
or local contraction beyond the banker's expectation. 
Bank examiners are concerned with protecting depositors in the 
event of a forced liquidation of the bank. They are interested in the 
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condition of a bank under conditions of unexpected "but possible contrac­
tions of the local or national economy. To evaluate the bank under such 
conditions, bank examiners use the Federal Reserve's Fonn for Analyzing 
Bank Capital vhich requires capital sufficient to cover a weighted differ 
ence of liabilities and assets. Even though capital adequacy is the pri­
mary concern of examiners in using this form, bankers tend to adjust 
their asset structure to make their capital adequate rather than altering 
their capital structure to conform to their assets t I'he GalciîlQtion of 
capital adequacy and the weights used in the Form are supposedly those 
that give the position of banks in general under conditions of distress., 
If the weights are not the ones that a banker himself would choose, and 
yet he adjusts his asset structure to conform to this capital structure, 
then he is behaving as though the weights implied by the Form are true 
weights. 
The measure of soundness used here derives from the Federal Re­
serve's Form, It is written as the difference between the realizable 
value of assets under conditions of distress and an assumed maximum de­
cline of liabilities. 
(12) T — cR + aC + bL — hT — kS — B — F — mD 
where x is the measure of bank soundness and c, a, b, h, k, and m are 
weights, i.e., percentages of the total quantities of assets R, G, and L, 
held by the bank and obtainable by selling these assets, and percentages 
of the total quantities of liabilities, T, S, B, F, and D, which the bank 
may lose under conditions of distress. 
Since R is a linear function of D, T, and S it can be eliminated 
from (12) by defining c, such that: 
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(13) cR = m(l - V)D + h(l - v)T + k(l - W)S. 
Substituting (13) into (12) and sirapliiying results in; 
(14) T = aG + TdL - mvD - hvT - kwS - B - F. 
% design, soundness measures the impact of remote but possible events on 
the bank's position at the present time. 
Borrowing 
Member bank borrowing enters the utility function as an explicit 
variable and not solely as a determinant of profits, liquidity and sound­
ness, although it will affect these. It is assumed to be unique among the 
other variables in the bank's balance sheet in that bankers attach a sig­
nificance to borrowing per se, and not just because of its influence on 
IT, T, and A. This is due to the "tradition against borrowing" or the "re­
luctance to borrow" generally attributed to bankers. Thus, a banker's de­
cision to borrow is not solely based on profit,liquidity, and soundness 
considerations, but also on the pure disutility of borrowing. It must 
therefore be included in the utility function as an explicit variable. 
Determinants of the Desired Level of Borrowings 
Having specified the model as one in which the banker maximizes 
utility and defined each argument in the utility function, the next step 
is to derive from this model the banker's desired or equilibrium level of 
borrowings. This is done under the assumptions that the banker has exact 
knowledge of his resei-ve needs, that these reserve needs are a result of 
changes in two particular items of his balance sheet, and that he has four 
ways to adjust to his needs. Also, differential calculus is used in the 
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derivation so that changes in balance sheet items are infinitesimally 
small. This last assumption is relaxed in a later section. 
The two situations in which reserve period adjustments are neces-
sary are à result of the banker's increasing his loans or the necessity to 
meet deposit withdrawals. To meet the need for additional reserves, the 
banker is assumed to have four available sources. He can acquire addi­
tional reserves through asset adjustment by selling government securities 
or he Qm inoreese those liability items over which be has control by bor­
rowing, buying federal funds or selling time certificates of deposit. 
Given thé need for additional reserves and these four means of adjustment, 
the problem here is to derive a relationship which yields the variables 
the banker considers in making his decision as to how to adjust to his 
needs. 
The change in utility to a bank given a change in one or all of 
the arguments in the utility function may be expressed as: 
(15) du = dir + |y dA + ~ dT + Il dB. 
OÏÏ oA oT OD 
Assuming K, E(AL^  - vAD), and a constants, dir, dA, and di can be expressed 
in 8, similar manner: 
<16) a, = |ldo*|laL.|iaB^ |ldF^ ||ds<-|idii 
(IT) dA = H as + II dB + II dF + H 4T. 
(18) dT + |§ as + 1^ dl + If dl + H dS + dB • If dF + |i dD. 
Using expressions (7), (8), and (lU), each of the partial derivatives in 
(l6), (IT), and (18) may be evaluated; 
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(19) dit = rdG + adL - ddB - fdP - edS— gdT; 
(20) dA = - dG - - dB - - dP - - dT; 
• a •• • a : a • a •, 
(21) dt = adO = BdL - vhdT - vkdS - dB - dF - mvdD. 
Substitution ôf dir, dA and dï frcâû (19), (20), and (21) into (15) gives an 
expression for the change in total utility as a resuit of a change in any 
or ail the variables in the bank's balance sheet: 
(22) du = ^  (rdG + adL ~ ddB - fdF - edS - gdT) 
Oïï 
+ iH. (i dG - i dB - i dF - i dT) 
dA a a a o 
+ (adG + bdL - vhdT - wkdS - dB - dF - mvdD) 
oT 
By factoring dG, dL, dD, dB, dP, dS, and dT, expression (22) can. be 
written as: 
(23) du = (|ii- r + 1^  i + 1^  a) dG + (|!i a + 1^ - b) dL 
OIT 3A O OT OIT OT 
^  I f  ^  l î ' ^  ^ I f  '  -  I f  M T' ^  
M-|fc-|Hw.)dS.(-|fg-|Hi-|Svh)dT 
+ (_ iH. mv) dD. 
OT 
The necessary condition for utility to be a maximum subject to the condi­
tion of the balance sheet identity is that du = 0 for all variations which 
satisfy 
(2k) dG + dL = vdD + wdS + vdT + dF + dB. 
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Taking dB as the dependent variable given "by expression (2U), it can be 
eliminated from (23) obtaining 
(25) du = (|H r + 1^  i + 1^  a) dG + (|3i a + b) dL 
+ (_ d - i + ^ ) (dG + dL - vdD - wdS - wdT - dP) 
% 3IT • . ÔA 0 3% •: 3B 
ÊEf _  
Sir 
8u 
3A 
1 _  
0 
e -. wk j as 
OT 
9u 8u 
3A 
1 _ 
0 
vh) dT + (-
3T 
3u 
3T 
mv) dD. 
This can be written as 
(26) du = [|^  (r-d) + IY (a-1) + 1^ ] dG 
+ [|H. (d-f) - |H] dF 
Qir oB 
+ [|E („d-e) + |H 1 (v) + |}i (v^ wk) - (v)] dS 
on oA O oT do 
+ [|^  (wd-g) + Ix ~ (w-1) + (w-vh) - (w)] dT 
oir oA O oX oU 
+ [|^  (vd) + |-r - (v) + |— (v-mv) - (v)] dD. 
d1T oA O oT 00 
Since du must be zero for all variations in the independent variables, 
each quantity in brackets in (26) must equal zero, i.e., 
(r-d) . |H (e-1) . II = 0 
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~ (vrd-e) 
? Sn/. y.v 
+ 3u 
3? 
(w-wk) 9u 
" 3B 
(v) = 0 
|H(vd-g) + + 3u 
3T 
(w-wh) 3u 
" 3B 
(v) = 0 
+ 3u 
3T 
(v-mv) 3u 
' 3B 
(v) = 0 
These relationships are those vhich must hold in the completely 
general case when any change in the banker's portfolio is made. It is the 
set of first order conditions for the maximization of utility and, as such, 
is the general equilibrium position implied by the model. 
Of interest here is the much more specific aspect of a banker's 
behavior, namely, his borrowing behavior when faced with desired increases 
in loans or deposit withdrawals. Alternative restrictions on the means of 
adjustment available to the banker are imposed to permit the determination 
of what the banker considers in deciding between adjusting his reserve 
position by borrowing versus the other means available to him. 
A banker in increasing his loans or who is faced with deposit 
withdrawals may choose to obtain all necessary additional reserves from 
one source. He can, for example, adjust his position by borrowing, and 
not look to any other source for additional reserves. 
Assume that the banker experiences deposit withdrawals, dD, and 
chooses to adjust entirely by borrowing, dB. In so doing he equates one 
minus the reserve requirement times the decrease in deposits with a change 
in borrowing, i.e., dB = - vdD. From (23) and the necessary conditions 
for utility maximization, a relationship among the variables can be de­
rived by assuming only this source of additional reserves available. If, 
2k 
for example, a banker adjusted his position entirely by borrowing from the 
Federal Reserve when faced with deposit withdrawals and in so doing maxi­
mized utility, the expressions vrhich necessarily hold are: 
(27) au . (. 22 a _ 2a 1 _ 3% + |%) aa + (_ an 
oTT 3A 0 3t 3B 3T 
and since dB =- vdD; 
For utility to be a maximum 
Similar expressions can be written for the situations in which the 
banker chooses to adjust his position using each of the other possible 
sources open to him, namely, dF = -v dD, dT = - vdD, and dC = vdD. These 
are respectively: 
_ 3u f _ 3u 1 _ 3u + m = 0 3T SIT 3A a 3T 
3u g - 3u 1 _ 3u wh + m = 0 3T " 3TI 3A a 3T 
3u 
3ïï r + 
3u 
3A a + 
3u 
3T 
3u . 
a - g^ m = 0 (32) 
Expressions (30), (31), and (32) are the conditions which hold 
when dB = 0 and the total adjustment is made in one of the other sources 
available to the banker. If, however, the entire adjustment is made by 
borrowing, then the banker is behaving as though the conditions of (29) 
hold true. The imposition of the restriction that bankers can choose 
only one means of adjustment is critical since no choice is involved. In 
reality he can choose any combination of available sources. 
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In relaxing this assumption, alternative restrictions are again 
imposed on the banker's behavior. In this case the restrictions allow the 
banker to choose between borrowing and each other means of adjustment. 
First, consider the banker as being able to adjust to deposit withdrawals 
by borrowing or "buying federal funds. The relationship among the variables 
as given by the balance sheet identity is dB + dP = -'vdD. From (23) the 
relationship that must hold for utility maximization can be determined: 
(33) - If  ^ 5T> 
+ (- mv) dD, 
and since dB + dF = - vdD: 
(3U) du = (-|H d - |H i .. . ||, dB . f - d. 
+ ~m (dB + dF), 
OT 
For utility to be a maximum, du must equal zero for all variations in B 
and F which implies: 
(36) _ 
= 0 
therefore. 
3u d 1 lE + 3u 
3TT " 3A a " 37 3B 
du f 3u 1 IN + 3u 
3ïï 3A a " 37"^  3T 
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,and;„ /. ''V" , 
(39) (f-d) + fu = 0. 
9IT 3B 
Since the level of "borrowings and federal funds have exactly the 
same effect on liquidity end somidnesB as stated in expressions (8) and 
(lit), they do not enter into a decision when choosing "between them. The 
decision turns only on profitability and reluctance to borrow. The deci­
sion between borrowing or buying federal funds in accommodating deposit 
withdrawals is based on their rate difference and their marginal utilities. 
Similar expressions can be derived when the restrictions imposed 
allow the banker to choose either borrowing and government securities or 
borrowing and time certificates of deposit as a means of adjustment. The 
relationships among the variables under these two restrictions as given 
by the balance sheet identity are dB - dG = - vdD and dB + dT = - vdD 
respectively. Using dB - d6 = - vdD, expression (23) can be written as 
(^0) du=(-|fr.|Hi.|H.) (.ao) 
or; 
(Ul) du = (- |H r - i . |S a + I» m) (- do) 
OH oA a 9T 3T 
+  ( _ 3 u a _ 3 u l _ 3 u  +  i u  +  2 * m ) d B  
 ^ air 9A 0 3T 3B 3t 
For utility to be a maximum: 
f 1^  m = 0, and 
3T r 
3u 1 _ 3u 
3H ~ 3A a 3T 
A 3u 1 _ 3u 
3ir " 3A a 3T 
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Therefore, 
(44) - Ma - lu i-l5+  ^r - ^  i - a + m, 
5ïï 9A a 3t SB 3t 3ÏÏ 3A 0 3t 3t 
end 
Again, equal hut opposite changes in the level of borrowings and 
government securities have exactly the same effect on liquidity and the 
decision between liquidating; government securities or borrowing doer, not 
depend on liquidity. However, in addition to profitability and reluctance, 
soundness influences the decision. This is because of the different 
effect that borrowing versus liquidating government securities has on 
bank soundness as given in expression (14). A decision to borrow rather 
than liquidate government securities reduces soundness, and thus depends 
on their differential effect. Thus, along with the difference in the 
discount rate and the rate on government securities and the marginal util­
ities of profits and borrowing, soundness enters as a decision variable. 
Using dB + dT = - vdD, (23) can be written as 
(W) du=(.|Hd-|ai.|ï.||)aB 
+ (- g - wh) dT + m (dB + dT), 
on oA 0 oT oT 
or, 
(47) du= (-ÎEd-Ê5l-Êll+Ê5+iUm) dB 
3ir 3A 0 3T 3B 3T 
3u v\ J. 3u 
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For utility to be a maximum: 
Therefore,-
(50) ~5ïd - - 2»+ iH + IHb = . iHg'. 2ïi. ?>lvh + '" 
3IT ~ 3A a 3T 3B ' 3T STT ° 3A a 3T 3T ^  
and 
(51) jaw +|a(vh-i) =0. 
The decision between borroving and selling time certificates of 
deposit in accommodating deposit withdrawals is based on profitability, 
soundness, and reluctance. Again, this is because of the different effect 
that borrowing versus selling time certificates of deposit has on these 
three arguments in the utility function. Their effect on liquidity is 
the same end liquidity does not enter the decision. 
Taken together, expressions (39)» (^ 5), and (5l) include all pos­
sible means of adjustments assumed available to the banker. According to 
the model, given a deposit withdrawal, a banker who decides to make the 
adjustment entirely by borrowing does so while satisfying all three ex­
pressions. Given a necessary adjustment, the banker would adjust entirely 
(52) 
if: 
3u 3u 
3B 3ir 
3u > 3u 
33 3ir 
3u 3u 
3B 3ïï 
3T 
3u 
3T 
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Similar expressions can be written for other means the banker 
might vise to adjust. If federal funds ore used for the entire adjustment, 
then from (39) . 
oii••• •, 3B 
end therefore from (53) and (5k) 
(56) p- (d-f) > 1^  Cd-r) + 1^  (l-a), and 
oir otr 9T 
(57)  ^(d-f) > liL (d=g) + iîi (l.vh). 
ÔTT 3IT 3T 
Since the marginal utilities in this analysis are not assumed con­
stant, care must be taken in writing and interpreting expressions such as 
(52) through (57). Each term on the left-hand side of the incquaO-ities 
may decrease as the adjustment is made using the particular means implicit 
in that term. The difference between the left- and right-hand sides must 
be great enough to allow the adjustment. They can change only until the 
two sides are equal or the inequality still holds. For example, if an 
adjustment is made by borrowing, and after it has been made the inequalities 
still hold for (52), (53), and (5^ )» then for the same values of the vari­
ables a subsequent adjustment would again be made by borrowing. 
Since expressions (39), (45), and (51) are sufficiently general to 
describe a banker's behavior when borrowing, federal funds, time certifi­
cates of deposit and government securities are available simultaneously, 
they are left as the theoretical determinants of borrowing given a decrease 
in deposits. 
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The remainder of this flection is devoted to the development of the 
relationship which depicts the hanker's adjustments given a changé in 
loans. The derivation is similer to that ahove in that the same restric-
must be made to accommodate loans instead of deposit changes. The first 
of three restrictions imposed is that additional loans must be accommodated 
either by borrowing or buying federal funds. The relationship cunong the 
variables in the balance sheet identity is then dB + dF = dL. Expression 
(23) becomes; 
tions are imposed on the banker's behavior with respect to the means of 
adjustment available. The essential difference is that the adjustment 
+ (|H a + |ii b) (dB + dF) 
OÏÏ oT 
or. 
+  ( _ i E f _ l u l _ 3 u  +  
3IT 3A a 3T 
For utility to be a maximum 
Therefore 
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(63) B & = °' 
Similarly, under the imposition that additional loans must "be met by 
borrowing or selling government securities the balance sheet identity 
becomes dB - dG =dL. Expression (23) becomes 
(6k) du = ( .fjd-f i-+ .  (fHrVff i .  I^a) dG 
+ a + ^  b) (dB - dG) 
dir 9T 
or, 
+ (- i!» r - i - is a + iBo + Jït) (- do), 
dïï 3A 0 3T 3IT 9T 
For utility to be a maximum, 
3T 
I!I D - 3u 1 _ 3u 
3TI 3A a 3T 
R - 3u 1 _ 3Ù 
3A 0 3T 
a + ^ a + ^ b =0. 
Sir 3T 
Therefore, 
d - 3u 1 _ lE + 
DLT 3A 0 3t 
^ r -
3u 1 _ IU a 
37 3A 0 3T ^ 
3 3IT 3T 
a + b, and 
3? 3T 
(69) IH (r-d) + (a-1) +12 =0. 
Sir dx dB 
When the two alternatives available for adjustment are borrowing 
end time certificates of deposit, the relationship for changes in the 
variables of the balance sheet is dB + dT = dL. Expression (23) becomes: 
32 
+ (^  a + 1^  b) (dB - dO) 
9% 9? 
or, 
+ (- k g - la i - wh - ÎH a + iH b) dL. 
3ir 9A 0 3T 9IT ÔT 
For utility to bo a maximum, 
Therefore, 
(TW .|Ha-|Hl-|H.||.|Ha.|H,= 
(75) (g-d) + (wh-l) +1^  = 0" 
Expressions (63), (69), and (75) provide the relevant variables a 
banker considers when making his decision between borrowing and any alter­
nate means of adjustment given an increase in loans. These expressions are 
identical to those obtained when the need for adjustment was due to deposit 
changes. Thus, the theory provided here implies that the distinction be­
tween loan changes and deposit changes as a cause for the necessary adjust­
ment does not change the relevant variables on which the borrowing decision 
is made. 
Thus far, the theory provides general implications about the vari­
ables which determine the desired level of borrowings, B|, in expression 
(l). The first order conditions for utility maximization derived from the 
model of the individual bank indicate that the desired level of borrowings 
is a function of interest rate spreads, the maturity structure of thé gov­
ernment securities portfolio and of time certificates of deposit; and the 
marginal utilities of profits, soundness, and borrowing. In general 
(76) E| = B*(r-d, f-d, g-d, a-1, vh^ l, 
^ 3ÏÏ 3T dii 
The second order conditions for utility maximization are novr used to deter­
mine the various forms of (76) that are permissible. 
To this point, no assumption has been made about the form of the 
banker's utility function. Exactly what form that function takes which 
best describes banker's behavior must be determined empirically. There 
are, hovrever, certain implications which can be drawn from the theory 
already presented and from the second order conditions for the maximization 
of utility. 
Expressions (39)» (42), and (5I) or (63), (69), and (75) are the 
first order conditions for utility maximization given the particular 
assumptions about available means of adjusting to deposit decreases or 
loan increases. One obvious implication from these is that all the mar­
ginal utilities in the expressions cannot be constant. This is apparent 
when considering the following example. If in expression (39) it is 
assumed that |^  = c^  and fg ~ ®2» ^ here c^  and C2 are constants, then in 
equilibrium c^  (f-d) + C2 = 0. For this to hold, the only "variable" in 
the expression, (f-d), must be the constant which equates the expression. 
3k 
Neither the federal funds rate, f, nor the discount rate, d, can "be con­
trolled by the individual banker so that if the expression held, it would 
be only accidentally vhen (f-d) happened to equal - g—. 
• , • • 2 : 
This conclusion is also derived from the second order conditions 
for utility maximization. In words, these:conditions insure that the solu­
tion to the first order conditions maximizes the utility function rather 
than minimizes it. Their use, however, is somewhat limited. In their 
general form they will not dictate the exact form the utility function 
must have. For the purposes here, their implications can be most effec­
tively achieved by stating them in words rather than going through the 
long and tedious process of deriving them mathematically. They are to be 
used in selecting that form or those forms of the utility fiuiction which 
seem most logical on a priori grounds without violating the restrictions 
which insure that utility is maximized. 
The sumption usually made is that the marginal utility of each 
argument in the utility function is decreasing. While this assumption 
could be used here, it is too restrictive. Again, this can be seen by 
assuming in expression (39) that the marginal utility of borrowing is 
decreasing and the marginal utility of profits is a constant, c^ . Then 
C2 (f-d) + lîi = 0. If the banker has only the two means of adjustment 
9B 
assumed available to him in deriving this expression, namely buying federal 
funds and borrowing, then he is in equilibrium when this expression holds. 
Starting from an initial equilibrium position and given the assumption of 
marginal utility of borrowing, a change in (f-d) will cause a change in 
borrowings. If (f-d) Increases, the marginal utility of borrowing must 
decrease. For the marginal utility of borrowing to decrease, their level 
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must increase. The banker vi11 continue to adjust until he is again 
in equilibrium. 
The second order conditions are not violated in the above ex­
ample if there exists a mix between borrowings and profits such that 
(f-d) <- Ig. This is made obvious by the fact that if the marginal 
utility of profits times the relative profitability of the means of ad­
justment, — (f-d), were everywhere greater than the marginal disutility ÔTT 
of borrowing, (- , then the banker would maximize utility by never 
dii 
borrowing. The marginal additions to utility because of its relative 
profitability would never be greater than the marginal reductions in 
utility due to borrowing. 
Similar examples can be constructed for the other expressions 
which comprise the first order conditions. The general conclusions 
are that (l) some of the marginal utilities must be decreasing while 
others can be constant and (2) the marginal utilities that are constant 
must be somewhere less than those that are decreasing multiplied by 
their respective variables. The second conclusion is assumed for the 
remainder of this study. 
Given these restrictions, there still remains an infinite num­
ber of possible forms for the utility function. One possible version is 
presented in this section and estimated in the next chapter. The other 
versions estimated can be derived in a similar manner. 
First assume that the marginal utility of borrowing is decreasing. 
The tradition against borrowing or the reluctance to borrow generally 
attributed to bankers indicates that not only is the marginal utility of 
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borrowing itself negative, but also that as borrowing increases, this 
marginal disutility increases. Secondly, assumé that the marginal utility 
of soundness is constant. As defined, soundness is a long-run considera­
tion of the banker. Since of interest here are short-run adjustments, 
the assumption that soundness has a constant influence on short-run deci­
sions seems very reasonable. Thirdly, assume that the marginal utility of 
profits is constant over the relevant range. Again, if the banker is 
primarily concerned with long-run profits caid if changes in the relative 
profitability of available means of adjustment are slight, then constant 
marginal utility of profits may accurately describe the banker's evaluation 
of profits. 
Using these assumptions and the first order conditions, the 
desired level of borrowings can be written as an explicit function of 
the independent variables. If the marginal utility of borrowing is 
decreasing, it must be that the utility function is twice differentiable 
vith respect to borrovring, i.e., must contain (B) in one form or 
another. Since this form is unknown it is assumed to be linear, i.e., 
1^  = - ©2 - ©2®» where 6^  and Gg are positive constants. The marginal 
utilities of profits and soundness are assumed constant so that |^  ~ 
and = 0ij where 63 and 0^  are constants. 
We now substitute into the first order conditions the forms of 
the marginal utilities assumed above. From expressions (39), (%$), and 
(51) we get. 
(77) 03(F-D) + 01 - OGB =0 
(78) ©^ (r—d) + 0i|(a—1) + ©2 — ©2B — 0 
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(79) 03(e-<i) + 0U(vh-l) + 01 - 02B = 0. 
These can "be written as: 
(80) B -
02 
&f.cl) 
®2 
(81) B = !i + 
®2 
+ &a-l) 
(82) B = 
02 
+ î&(vh-l) 
02 
Underlying expressions (80), (8l), and (62) remain the respective 
assumptions about available means of adjustment. In reality, the desired 
levels of borrowing given by each Influence the general desired level when 
all means are simultaneously available. Denoting (B) in expression (8O) 
as B|, (B) in expression (8l) as B|,(B) in expression (82) as B|, and the 
general desired level of borrowings as B|, 
(83) B* = + 0GB* + 0^B| 
where 0^ , 05 and 0^  are constants and 0^  + 0^ 5 + 0^  = 1. Substituting (80), 
(81), and (82) into (83) results in the final expression for the general, 
desired level of borrowings. 
(84) M (f-d) (r-d) 
02 02 02 ®2 
+ (e-i). (g.d) ^  
02 02 ®2 2 
The 0j^ 's are constants and expression (8k) can be more simply written as: 
(85) B* = 0^  + 0^ (f-d) + Q^ (r-d) + 0^ (g-d) + 0^ (a-l) + 0^ (wh-l). 
Expression (85) is one possible form that the function for the desired 
level of borrowings can take. The one presented is linear in the rate 
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spreads, (f-d), (r-d), and (g-d), and maturity distribution of government 
securities (a-l) and time certificates of deposit (wh-l). 
The Effect of Federal Reserve Svirvaillance 
The derivation of the first order conditions in the previous 
" - ... •• . . 
section centered on the determinants for borrowed funds exclusively 
from the banker's point of view. The banker's attitude toward borrow­
ing may be influenced by Federal Reserve action. The infinitely elastic 
supply curve implied by the fact that all borrowings are made at the 
discount rate, and the lack of evidence that the Federal Reserve has 
ever refused to make a loan once proper application has been made, leads 
to the conclusion that Federal Reserve surveillance must affect the 
demand for borrowings if it is at all effective in controlling the use 
of the discount vindow. 
Federal Reserve officials emphasize that borrowing is a privi­
lege of Federal Reserve membership and not a right. This privilege is 
extended to those member banks that make proper application and conform 
to certain regulations as defined by the Federal Reserve. 
Each Federal Reserve Bank is required by law to keep itself 
informed of the general character and amount of the loans and 
investments of its member banks with a view to ascertaining 
whether undue use is being made of bank credit for the specu­
lative carrying of or trading in securities, real estate, or 
commodities for any other purpose inconsistent with the main­
tenance of sound credit conditions; and, in determining whether 
to grant or refuse advance or discounts, the Federal Reserve 
Bank is required to give consideration to such information. 
Each Federal Reserve Bank may require such information from 
its member banks as it may deem necessary in order to deter­
mine whether such undue use of bank credit is being made and 
whether the granting of any requested credit accommodation 
would be consistent with the general principle application to 
extension of credit. . . (37, p. 8). 
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Thus, Regulation A requires that lending decisions te based on thé 
borrowing bank's records. The Regulation also states that .continuous 
use of Federal Reserve credit by a member baiik over a considerable period 
of time is not regarded as appropriate (37, p« !)• For surveillance to 
affect the demand for borrowings it must do so through decreasing the quan­
tity demanded by changing the effective rate paid on borrowings (due to 
costs of preparing and submitting records to the discount officer) or 
shiftins tho denmnd ourvo by increasing the reluctance on the po,rt of the 
banker to borrow. 
The several factors which are mentioned in the quotation from 
Regulation A above and which "each Federal Reserve Bank is required by 
law to keep itself informed of (37, p. 8)," indicate that the general 
element that Federal Reserve officials must consider in their appraisal 
of a loan request is the purpose of borrowing. It seems that the intensity 
of Federal Reserve surveillance depends on how Federal Reserve officials 
view the individual bank's purpose for borrowing. A sudden large with­
drawal of deposits or a crop failure in an agriciO.tural area would likely 
be an appropriate reason for borrowing under the regulation. Also, con­
tinued indebtedness to the Federal Reserve "is not regarded as appropriate 
(37, p. 1)" even though the initial reason for borrowing is legitimate 
under the regulation. Once in debt, the banker must take action to get 
out of debt. Regulation A thus implies that the initial reason for borrow­
ing may become less and less legitimate as it becomes more remote in time. 
From the above discussion, three elements emerge as possible re­
sults of surveillance: the effective cost of borrowing may not be the 
1*0 
stated discount rate; the demand curve for borrowings may shift because of 
Increasing surveillance as the length of timg any particular banker re­
mains in debt; a regard for an overall policy objective on the part of 
Reserve officials may cause their surveillance to increase irregardless of 
the histoiy of borrowing of any particular bank. 
The Effective Cost of Borrowing 
In determining the legitimacy of the reason for borrowing in re­
serve periods subsequent to the one in which the initial request vms made, 
Reserve officials may require such infoimation from the borrowing bank 
that will permit them to determine whether vindue use is being made of 
Reserve Bank credit. Any cost of preparing and submitting this informa­
tion causes the effective discount rate to increase. The request of in­
formation depends on the appropriateness of the initial reason for borrow­
ing wider the regulation and the length of time in debt. 
This actual increase in the cost of borrowing is extremely diffi­
cult if not impossible to measure. The effect of any such increase will 
be a lesser quantity or less frequent borrowing by the individual banker. 
Thus, rather than try to estimate the additional costs of borrowing caused 
by surveillance, the indirect route of using a variable which measures the 
impact of these additional costs directly on the quantity borrowed is 
used. Since borrowings in previous periods give rise to surveillance in 
the current period. Federal Reserve surveillance which causes the effective 
rate to be above the stated rate is defined to be a function of past bor­
rowings. Thus, FS^  = B^ .g»...), where surveillance that increases 
, • kl 
the effective cost of borrowing, FS^ , is a function, PS', of past borrowings, 
%;_1, Bt_2. 
Banker's Reluctance 
In addition to costs which may arise from Federal Reserve surveil­
lance, bankers themselves are traditionally reluctant to borrow. As a par­
ticular banker remains in debt, surveillance may cause this reluctance to 
increase regardless of cost. The length of time in debt or the frequency 
of being in debt may cause surveillance to change and to the extent that 
bankers respond to this, their behavior at the discount window will change. 
A statistic that discount officials keep on borrowing banks is the number 
of reserve periods that any particular bank has been in debt out of the 
last 13 weeks. Thus, the response by bankers in their reluctance to bor­
row because of a change in surveillance which is brought on by the relative 
frequency of borrowing is denoted by FSg. And, FSg = FS^ (N). That is, 
this type of Federal Reserve surveillance is a function, FS^ , of the number 
of weeks the bank has been in debt, N, in the last 13. 
General Policy Objectives 
For monetary policy to be effective in changing the level of bank 
reserves, discounting must be carried out in recognition of the fact that 
borrowing could offset any desired decrease in reserves. Borrowing in­
creases during periods of monetary restraint and a greater use of open 
market operations is necessary to achieve a particular reduction in re­
serves. If administrative action by discounting officials is carried out 
in recognition of an overall policy objective then an increasing aggregate 
level of borrowing may also cause surveillance to intensify. The impact 
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of this on borrowing at the individual bank level is the same as when sur­
veillance is brought about by a particular bank's borrowing history. The 
reason that surveillance intensifies is different and thus an additional 
variable is used to denote variable changes in surveillance because of gen­
eral policy objectives. FS3 = FS^ (I). That is, this type of Federal Re­
serve surveillance is a function, FS^ , of the aggregate level of borrowings, I. 
The Final Determinants of Borrowing 
In dorivlng the deteminants of the desired level of borrowings 
four assumptions were made: The banker has exact knowledge of his reserve 
needs ; these reserve needs are a result of changes in two particulai' items 
of his balance sheet, namely, loans and deposits; the changes in loans and 
deposits are infinitesimally small; and the banker has four ways to adjust 
to his needs. The one assumption least likely to be satisfied is that 
the change in loans and deposits are infinitesimally small» 
At the end of the reserve settlement period bankers have informa­
tion on deposit and loan changes and know whether they are running a deficit 
or surplus in their reserve balance. The cause of fluctuations in their -
reserve balances is closely tied to deposit changes since a check drawn on 
a particular bank is cleared by debiting the reserve balance of the paying 
bank. Also, when a banker makes a loan, he creates a deposit for the per­
son to whom the loan is granted and must have sufficient reserves to back 
this deposit. The four means of adjustment assumed available to the banker 
(with the exception of time certificates of deposit) are accessible on the 
same day in which the need for reserves is present and thus are the most 
reasonable choices for uses in reserve period-to-reserve period adjustments. 
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To account for the poseibility of vide changes in deposits and 
loans between reserve periods or changes that would create additional re-
iserves rather than a need for reserves, the actual changes in deposits and 
loans are included as determinants of the desired level of borrowings. 
The desired level is thus a function of the variables in (T9) and the 
changes in deposits and loans that were assumed in deriving the expression. 
Deposits and loans were selected as the variables in determining 
the desired level of borrowing for the obvious reason that changes in thorn 
are linked to changes in the reserve needs of the bank. Thus far, it has 
been accepted that decreases in deposits and increases in loans create a 
need for reserves. It is important here to note what the linkage is be­
tween deposits, loans, and reserves and hence the best way to measure their 
changes empirically. 
The distinction is first made between primary deposit changes and 
secondary deposit changes. A primary deposit change for the individual 
banker arises from a net deposit outflow or inflow between his bank and 
the rest of the banking system. For example, a $100 check written on 
bank A to a person with an account at bank B is a primary deposit outflow 
for bank A and inflow for beink B. The check is cleared through the Federal 
Reserve System by debiting bank A's reserve account and crediting bank B's. 
If bank A had no excess reserves it would have to obtain $100 (less the 
amount of reserves backing the deposit that is now gone) for its reserve 
account. Thus, the entire primary deposit outflow (less the reserves that 
backed the deposit) is the reserve deficiency. 
A secondary deposit change is one created by the banker himself. 
He does so in making a loan. In granting a loan of, say $100, the banker 
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creates a deposit in the customer's account for $100, Since reserves must 
be held against deposits, the "banker must have sufficient reserves to 
cover the newly created deposit. If the reserve requirement is l6 1/2 
percent of deposits, then for the $100 deposit, reserves of $16.56 must 
be held. If the bank had no excess reserves prior to the granting of the 
loan, the reserve requirement times the amount of the loan is the deficiency 
created. 
The impact of primary versus secondary deposit changes on the re­
serve position of the bank is obviously quite different. In primary de­
posit outflows the reserve loss is one minus tne reserve requirement or 
currently .835 times the deposit outflow. For secondary increases in 
deposits the reserve need created is the reserve requirement or .165 times 
the deposit. 
Primary deposit change cannot be distinguished from secondary de­
posit changes or loans by looking at a deposit series taken from a bank's 
balance sheets over time. It is possible for a reserve need to be created 
when no change in deposits appears on the balance sheet between two re­
serve periods. For example, a banker may experience a primary deposit 
loss of $100 between t and t+1 and over the same interval grant a loan and 
thereby create a deposit of $100. Deposits have not changed but the banker 
ha^  experienced a definite deterioration in his reserve position. The 
primary deposit loss results in an $83.50 reserve deficiency and the loan 
or secondary deposit increase results in a need for $16.50 in reserves. 
Thus, it seems that the proper measure for the impact of changes 
in primary deposits on the reserve position of the bank from t to t+1 is 
one minus the reserve requirement times the change in total reserves, 
vATR; and the proper measure for changes in loans is the reserve require­
ment on deposits times the change in loans » (l-v)AL. These two variables 
are included in (76) as additional determinants of the desired level of 
torrewings. / 
(86) B* = B*[r-d, f-d, g-d, a-1, wh-1, illV iii, vATR, (l-v)6L] . 
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Expression (86) is the final, general expression for the desired 
level of borrowings. All that remains is to substitute (66) and the sur­
veillance variables into (l) to obtain 
(87) AB = 6{B*[r-d, f-d, g-d, a-1, wh-1, vûTR, (l-v)AL] 
on oT 3B 
- Bt-i, FSi, FS2, FS3}. 
The change in borrowings between t and t-1 is determined by the difference 
between the desired level of borrowings (as a function, B*, of its deter­
minants) and the actual level and by Federal Reserve surveillance. 
The functions 6, FS^ , FS^ , and FS^  are now ass'jmed to be linear 
and the two variables vATR and (I-V)AL assumed to enter B| linearly. If 
(85) is used as the form for the remaining variables that determine B^ , 
then (87) can be written explicitly as 
(88) AB = ÔQ + + 62(r-d) + ^^(g-d) + 5^(a-l) + ë^^wh-l) 
+ 6g(vATR) + ôyE(l-v) L] + 68(Bt_l) + GgfE^ .g) 
+ 610(1) + <Sii(N). 
This expression can be further simplified by noting: AB = Bt - Bt-i 
V, V = constants; TR = unborrowed reserves, u, plus borrowed reserves, B, 
and hence ATR = AU + AB. 
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Substituting these into (88) 
(89) = (Q + * ëgfg-ë) + &%(&) - 61* 
+ ôjvCL) - 65+ 6gY(AU + Bt - Bt_i) + «Y(l-v)(6L)-
+ ^ 8(^ -1) + ^ 9(^ -2) + l^l(N). 
By collecting like terms and redefining the constants, (89) becomes 
(90) B^  - WQ + (^ (f-d) + wgCr-d) + wg(g-d) + w^ (a) + w^ (h) 
+ tog(AU) + tù-jrCAL) + a)0(B^ „2.) •*" 
This is the final theoretical expression in explanation of member 
bank borrowing. In words, borrowing at time t is a function of interest 
rate spreads (f-d), (r-d)» and (g-d); the maturity structure of the govern­
ment securities portfolio and of time certificates of deposit outstanding, 
a and h; the change in unborrowed reserves AU; the change in loans AL; the 
level of borrowings in previous periods Bt^ i and and two proxies for 
Federal Reserve surveillance. Various forms of equations containing al]. 
or some of the variables of (90) are estimated and presented in the 
Appendix. 
The Expected Signs for Coefficients 
Proposition I 
In developing expression (90), the marginal utility of profits was 
assumed constant and greater than zero. This implies that as the profit­
ability of a particular adjustment grows the greater is its use. The 
process of adjusting involves either sales of earning assets or purchases 
of additional liabilities. These are both costs to the banker. The sale 
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of government securities reduces the quantity of earning assets held by the 
bank and is thus an opportunity cost. Interest must be paid on borrbi/ings, 
federal funds, and time certificates of denosit which are direct costs. 
Profitability is still a meaningful concept in this context. If a banker 
prefers more profits to less then a necessary adjustment in his reserve po­
sition using one of these insti'unients would be made in the least costly 
way. 
Given borrowing as the dependent variable in expression (90) and 
the rate spreads (f-d), (r-d), and (g-d) as the co&tlincGG of borrowing 
relative to buying federal funds, selling government securities, and selling 
time certificates of deposit, the assumption of a constant and positive 
marginal utility of profits implies that borrowings vary directly with the 
rate spreads. For example, the higher the federal funds rate relative to 
the effective discount rate the more likely a banker is to choose borrowing 
rather than buying federal funds in adjusting. For borrcirings to be posi­
tively related to the rate spreads it must be that W2, and are 
greater than zero. 
Proposition II 
The marginal utility of soundness was also assumed constant and 
positive in developing expression (90). This implies that is less than 
zero and is greater than zero, i.e., borrowing is negatively related to 
(a) and positively related to (h). 
(a) is the percentage of the total quantity of government securi­
ties held by the bank that is obtainable by selling them under conditions 
of distress". Since the behavior of the banker on a reserve period to 
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reserve period basis is of interest here, conditions of distress include 
the mere need of reserves during a reserve period. Prom reserve period-to-
reserve period (a) may change. The direction and magnitude of the change 
depends upon changes in interest rates on the various maturities of gov­
ernment securities held and UDon the particular maturity distribution of 
the banker's government secui-ities portfolio. For example, if interest 
rates increase then market prices of securities decrease and the longer 
the maturity of a security the greater the price decrease. 
As (a) changes because of interest rate chcin^ e^s or the maturity 
distribution of the banker's government securities portfolio, 3+ is ex-
pected to change in the opposite direction. Bankers would rather adjust 
by borrowing than selling governments when their price is low. A negative 
sign is thus expected for 
(h) is the percentage of outstanding time certificates of deposit 
that mature during the reserve period in which the borrowing decision is 
made. The higher this percentage the greater the need for reserves. Time 
certificates of deposit are themselves instruments that can be used to 
adjust and that quantity maturing could be offset by selling new issues. 
As the quantity maturing increases selling must also increase. If sales 
do not keep pace with those maturing then borrowing may be used to obtain 
the necessary reserves. For borrowing to respond positively to changes in 
(h), wg must be greater than zero. 
Proposition III 
Changes in unborrowed reserves are expected to be negatively related 
to A negative AU indicates an outflow of reserves between two reserve 
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periods and thus a need for reserves. A positive AU indicates an inflow 
of reserves. A greater amount of borrovings is expected to correspond to 
greater reserve outflows and thus a negative sign is expected for œg. 
Proposition IV 
Borrowing is expected to "be positively related to changes in loans. 
Loans are made by creating deposits and reserves must be held against 
deposits. V/hen loans increase, a need for reserves is created and thus 
a positive sign is expccted for 
Proposition V 
Borrowing at time t is expected to be positively related to past 
borrowings. This is because of what might be called the cost of changing. 
The banker may be hard pressed to eliminate à reserve deficiency that 
existed in past reserve periods and that was financed by borrowing. In 
short, it is costly to make instantaneous adjustments in a portfolio. 
While it is expected that the relationship will be positive it is also 
expected that the coefficients on past borrowings will be less than one 
and decrease as the length of time increases. That is, B^  is expected 
to be positively related to both Bt_i and B^ g^ also that the coeffi­
cient of Bt_i be greater than that of B^ _2' Thus, it is expected that 
1 > Wg ) Wg > 0. 
Proposition VI 
As surveillance increases, borrowing is expected to decrease. 
Thus, and w^ i ^ re expected to be less than zero. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The Sample : : 
The variables needed to estimate the various forms of the borrow­
ing equation are of tvo types: variables pertaining to each bank individ­
ually and variables pertaining to all banks collectively. The individual 
bank data ore from weekly reporting banks in the Seventh Federal Reserve 
District. These data were supplied by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
from weekly call reports which give the condition of the reporting banks 
at the close of business on Wednesday. Thirty-eight of the 55 banks cvu'-
reutly making veekly reports are used in this study. On June 20, 1966, 
banks asked to make weekly reports vere all banks in the Seventh District 
with deposits of $100 million or more as of December 30, 1965. Some of 
the banks making weekly reports at that time did not meet this criterion. 
Since a constant sample of banks for the entire time period is necessary 
for time series analysis at the individual bank level, only those banks 
that were weekly reporters before June 1966 and remained after the revision 
are used in this study. 
The Data 
The variables pertaining to each bank individually are from the 
weekly reports of the 38 banks mentioned above. For these banks, time 
series of total loans, demand deposits. Treasury securities by maturity 
classification and total reserves are obtained. These are single day 
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figures QB reported at the close of business on 207 Wednesdays from 
January 1963 through December Single day figures are used, despite 
limitationB arisinR from possible vide daily fluctuations, because of 
their availability. 
Borrowings, the relative frequency of borrowing and aggregate bor­
rowings for the Seventh Federal Reserve District are-from the data file 
of the research library at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. Borrow­
ings for individual banks and axgregate borrowings are available as reserve 
period averages of daily borrowing;; and are uaed rather than single day 
figures because of several advantages. First, reserves borrowed on any 
day during the reserve period affect the reserve position for the entire 
period. That is, if a banker borrows on the first day of the reserve 
period, it has the same effect on his reserve position for the entire 
period as borrowing on the last day. Because of this, bankers might be 
expected to do all their borrowing on the final day of the period since 
on the final day they would have complete knowledge of their needs. The 
borrowing data do not substantiate this. The final day of the reserve 
settlement period has heaviest borrowings in the Seventh District approxi­
mately 60 percent of the time. No other day of the reserve period can be 
singled out as having a substantial part of the borrowings. Since bankers 
do borrow on days other than Wednesdays, they may not show indebtedness to 
the Federal Reserve System on the Wednesday call reports and yet have ac­
quired part of their reserves for the reserve period at the discount win­
dow. Also, the interest rate variables are weekly averages of daily 
figures so that using averages of daily borrowings makes the two sets of 
data more compatible. 
The two remaining variables that come from the library data file 
are the relative frequency of borrowing, N, and the aggregate level of 
borrowings for the Seventh District, I. N varies from bank to bank, de­
pending on the borrowing history of cach particular bank. I applies to 
all banks collectively^  
Other than I, the variables which apply to all banks are interest 
rates. These are the federal funds rate as reported by the Market Sta­
tistics Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; the weekly 
average of dally market yields on 3-Month U. S. Government bills, 3-5 year 
issues and lon^ -term bonds taken from Banking and Monetary Statistics; 
the secondary market rate on 3-month time certificates of deposit taken 
from Solomon Brothers and Hutzler's Bond Market Roundup; and the discount 
rate for the Seventh Federal Reserve District as reported in various issues 
of the Federal Reserve Bulletin. Dollar variables ai-e measured in thou­
sands and interest rate variables in percent. 
Misspecifications 
The estimated equations are misspecified in two ways. First, (h), 
the percentage paydown of negotiable time certificates of deposit is not 
included in any of the equations. Data on their maturity structure are 
not available on a weekly basis and monthly data are available for only 
the last three months covered in the study. Because of the small number 
of observations and the necessity of using some arbitrary method of con­
verting the monthly data to weekly, (h) is excluded from the equations. 
Also, time certificates of deposit are a type of deposit and a net paydown 
in them is a primary deposit loss. Thus, while the impact of changes in 
this particular variable is not identified, it is included in AU. 
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The second misspecification concerns the variable (a). The call 
reports have government securities broken into three maturity classifica­
tions: those maturing vithin one year, one to five years, and after five 
years. To get a measure of the value of the government securities portfo­
lio, it is assumed that all securities with zero to one, one to five, and 
after five years maturity have three months, three years, and seven years 
to maturity respectively. A simplified present value formula is then 
applied so that 
a = ^ . — + — 7 — + — 7f 
(l+rn G (l+rg)] G (l+r?)' G 
G]_, G3, and Gy are the quantities of government securities maturing in 
three months, three years, and seven years and G^  + G3 + Gj = G where G 
is the total quantity of governments held; r, rg, and r^  are interest 
rates for Treasury bills, intermediate-term government securities and 
long-term government bonds. Thus, (a) is the weighted average of three 
present value coefficients. 
The Equations 
Ten equations are estimated for each of 36 banks by ordinary least 
squares. Two banks in the sample did not borrow during the four years 
covered and hence, no estimates of the coefficients for these banks are 
obtained. 
The first three equations are the three that Goldfeld and Kane 
(9, p. 511) estimated for the New York class of banks. As such, they in­
clude borrowings in previous period, changes in unborrowed reserves both 
current and one period lagged and three forms of the Treasury bill rate 
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minus the discount rate, r-d,'(r-d)^ , and (r-d)^ . With the exception of 
(r-d)^ , these variables appear again in expressions (1+) through ( 10) along 
with the other variables implied by the theory of the previous chapter. 
The purpose of estimating ten equations for each bank is to deter­
mine which of the variables implied by the theory are most influential in 
bankers' borrowing decisions. This is done by including various forms of 
the variables in different equations and examining the standard errors or 
t statistics of each estimated coefficient. 
The Estimated Coefficients 
Tables 1 and 2 are summary tables which give the number of times 
in each equation a particular variable is significantly positive or nega­
tive respectively. Also included in these two tables are the number of 
times each variable is positive or negative without regard to significance. 
For example, the entry corresponding to B-1 and equation (l) in the first 
table is 32. This indicates that for the 36 banks, B-1 is significantly 
positive at the .10 level 32 times when estimated in equation (l). The 
number in parentheses indicates that B-1 is positive 33 times without re­
gard to significance. 
Tables 3 through 38 present the coefficients for each equation and 
bank. The banks are numbered according to the number of weeks they were 
in debt during the 20T weeks covered. Thus, bank 1 in Table 1 had 102 
weeks of indebtedness and bank 36 in Table 38 was in debt only two weeks. 
One of the first noticeable differences in the estimated coeffi­
cients among banks for each equation is the difference in their absolute 
sizes. For example, the coefficient of r-d in equation (l) and bank 1 is 
2^ 70.2. For bank 2 this coefficient is 582.06. The major source of such 
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differences is simply the difference in the sizes of bsjiks in the scnplc. 
None of the data are adjusted for bank size and this is reflected in some 
of the estimated coefficients. 
Of greater interest in the context of this study are the signs and 
significance of the variables in each equation. The five propositions con-
cerning the signs of particular coefficients that were presented in the 
preceding chapter are now examined to determine whether the estimated coef­
ficients conform to the theoretical expectations. 
Proposition I 
The estimated coefficients for the cost variables r-d, f-d, g-d, 
(r-d)^ , (f-d)^ , (g-d)2, and (r-d)3 vary in sign from equation to equation 
and bank to bank. As shora in Table 1, the coefficient for r-d is signifi­
cantly positive less than one-third of the time in eveiy equation. In 
equations (l), (2), and (3), r-d is positive 25, 22, and 27 times respec­
tively but in each case significantly positive nine times. In the remain­
ing seven equations the number of times r-d appears positive ranges from 
19 in equation (5) to 13 in equation (8) and the number of times it is 
significantly positive ranges from five in equation (5) to one in equations 
(7) and (9). When r-d is negative it is significant only once in equations 
(l), (2), and (3). It is significantly negative nine times in equations 
(6), (8), and (9). 
f-d is included in equations (1») through (10). Positive values 
for its coefficients range from 22 in equation (6) and (7) to 28 in equa­
tion (5). And, the number of times it is significantly positive ranges 
from five in equations (6) and (7) to eight in equation (4). When f-d is 
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negative it is significantly negative a maximum of four times and this is 
in equation (8). 
g-d is included in equations (6) through (10). The number of 
times it has a positive coefficient ranges from 20 in equation (10) to 25 
in equation (6). It is significantly positive a maximum of niné times in 
equation (6)'. Negative coefficients for g-d range from 11 in equation (6) 
to l6 in equation (lO). It is significantly negative only twice in 
equations (6), (7). (8), and (10) and once in equation (13). 
While no specific predictions for the signs of (r-d)^ , (f-d)^ , 
(g-d)^ , and (r-d)^  were made, their signs are of interest because of possi­
ble nonlinear borrowing responses by bankers to changes in its profitability. 
For example, if bankers respond nonlinearly to changes in the difference 
between the Treasury bill rate and the discount rate then the higher order 
terms in r-d should be significantly different from zero. The change in 
borrowing given a change in r-d and holding all other variables constant 
is given by the partial derivative of the particular equation in question. 
For equation (3) this would be: g^ r^ d) ~ ^ 1 2^^ "^*^  ^+ 2fi3(r-d)2; where 
0]^ , 02» GJid Og are the estimated coefficients for (r-d), (r-d)^ , and (r-d)^  
respectively. Assuming 0^  positive and O2 8-nd Og negative, there is some 
value of r-d at which borrowing will respond negatively to an increase in 
r-d. At what r-d this will happen depends on the relative sizes of 0^ , 
O2, end O3. This is the method that Goldfeld and Kane (9, p. 513) use to 
test Polakoff's statement that at "still greater spreads, the disutility 
of borrowing relative to the utility of profit will eventually become so 
great that member banks will no longer borrow and may even go so far as 
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to repay part of their outstanding indebtedness to the central bank (27, 
The evidence from the equations estimated in this study is that ^ 
in general, the coefficients of the second order cost variables are not 
significantly different from zero, (r-d)^  has a significantly positive 
coefficient five times in equation (3) and one, three, and two times in 
equations (5), (7), and (lO) respectively. It is significantly negative 
five times in equation (5) and one, two, and three timon in oquatinns (3). 
(7), and (10). (f-d)2 is significantly positive foui*, two, and two times 
in equations (5), (7), and (10) and significantly negative, one, two, and 
three times in equations (5), (7), and (lO). (g-d)^  is significantly 
positive once in each of the equations in which it is included and signifi­
cantly negative one and three times. (r-d)3 has one significantly positive 
coefficient and eight significantly negative coefficients in equation (3). 
It is of interest to note that the equations in which r-d is 
significantly positive the greatest number of times, nine, and signifi­
cantly negative the least, one, are the three equations of Goldfeld and 
Kane. Two of the equations have as their only cost variable r-d and the 
third r-d, (r-d)^  and (r-d)^ . When the additional cost variables f-d 
and g-d are put in the equation, r-d is significantly positive fewer times 
in each equation and significantly negative more times. Also, in each 
equation in which both r-d and f-d appear, f-d has both a larger number 
of positive coefficients and significantly positive coefficients than 
r-d. And, in each equation in which both r-d and f-d appear, f-d has 
fewer negative coefficients and fewer significant negative coefficients 
than r-d. The same is true for g-d when r-d, f-d, and g-d are included. 
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Thus, in the equations which include all three cost variables, f-d and 
g-d conform wore closely to the expected results than does r-d. These 
results indicate that omitting cost variables other than r-d as determi­
nants of borrowing results in a misspecification of the equation. 
Proposition II 
The variable (a) was expected to be negatively related to borrow­
ing. It is included in equations (8), (9), and (lO). It is significantly 
positive two* three, and one times and necatlvc six, two, and three times 
in equations (8), (9), and (lO) respective]y. Without regard to signifi­
cance the number of positive and negative coeffficents are about evenly 
divided. 
The rarity of its significance indicates that, in general, bankers 
are not influenced in their borrowing decisions by the prices of govern­
ment securities in the open market. This is to say that capital gains 
and losses on government securities are not particularly important as de­
terminants of borrowings. If capital gains and losses were important, 
then as the prices of governments fell the banker would not obtain funds 
by selling these securities. He would look to other sources and one pos­
sible source is borrowing. 
This is somewhat limited evidence contrary to what is called the 
"locked-in (19)" effect, i.e., bankers' reluctance to sell securities when 
their prices are below the prices at which they were purchased. If only 
borrowing and selling government securities were available as sources to 
bankers, the evidence would be more conclusive. For example, if a banker 
in need of. reserves could chose only to sell government securities or 
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"borrow and the prices of government securities happened to be below their 
purchased price, he would be "locked-in," and would obtain the needed re­
serves by borrowing. In this case, a nonsignificant coefficient for (a) 
would indicate that this type of behavior vas not evident. 
Bankers have more than two sources. Thus, a banker in need of 
reserves and faced with a capital loss on his government securities may 
not borrow and still be "locked-in." He could chose to buy federal funds 
or sell time certificates of deposit even though the federal funds rate 
and time certificate of deposit rate were above the Treaoury bill rate. 
However, to the extent that a relationship between borrowing and the price 
of government securities is a test of the reluctance to sell securities at 
a capital loss, the evidence here indicates that the "locked-in" effect 
is not an important determinant of borrowing. 
Proposition III 
— Changes in unborrowed reserves were expected to be negatively re­
lated to borrowing. Two forms of unborrowed reserves, current and one ' 
period lagged, are included in all ten equations and unborrowed reserves 
two periods lagged are included in equations (5) through (lO). With only 
three exceptions, all forms of unborrowed reserves are never significantly 
positive and in only one equation is their sign positive four times. 
AU is significantly negative at least 25 times in each of the ten 
equations and AU-1 is significantly negative at least 22 times in each equa­
tion. AU-2 is significantly negative at least 17 times in each of the six 
equations in which it is included. 
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Along with being significant, these variables are quite stable 
from equation to equation for each bank. All coefficients are between 
zero and minus one and for 22 of the banks, in virtually each equation, 
ni < where nj[, and are the coefficients for AU, AU-1, and 
AU-2. For example, bank 1 in Table 1 has -.196 and -.iOT SB coefficients 
for AU and AU-1 in equation (l). In equation (10) the coefficients for 
these two variables are -.205 and -.176 and for ûU-2, -.129. Judging by 
the number of coefficients which are significant and their pattern within 
each bank for each equation, changea in unborrowed reserves are quite in­
fluential as determinants of borrowing. 
; Proposition IV 
Borrowings were expected to be positively related to changes in 
. loans. The evidence here indicates just the opposite. The coefficient 
for changes in loans is positive only once in equations (k), (5), (8), (9), 
and (10), and none in equations (6) and (7). On the other hand, it is 
significantly negative eight times in equation (9), six times in equations 
(b), (5)> (6), (7), and (10), and five times in equation (8). Judging by 
sign alone, it is negative in each equation at least 22 times. Thus, 
while increases in loans create a need for reserves Just as decreases in 
deposits, the results indicate that bankers are inclined to obtain reserves 
for loans from sources other than borrowing, fzid, since a negative rela­
tionship is more prevalent than a positive one bankers must tend to decrease 
borrowings as they increase loans. 
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Proposition V 
Current borrowings were expected to be positively related to past 
borrowings. As indicated by the number of significant positive coefficients 
for past borrowings, the empirical results are quite consistent with the 
theory. This is especially true for borrowings lagged one week. B-1 has 
a positive coefficient at least 32 times in each of .the ten equations and 
•  •  •  .  .  . . . .  •  C ,  •  .  •  •  •  
at least 31 of these are significant. The coefficient is negative a maximum 
of only four times and this is in equation (lO). It is significantly nega­
tive only once. 
For B-2 the number of significant positive coefficients for each 
equation ranges from nine in equation ( 10) to 13 in equations (2), (1|), and 
(6). The number of significantly negative coefficients ranges from nine 
in equations (l), (3), and (6) to 13 in equation (lO). For B-3 at least 
12 are significantly positive and only two are significantly negative in 
each of the four equations in which it appears. The fewer number of sig­
nificant coefficients for B-2 and B-3 reflects the lesser degree of impor­
tance of events as they become more remote in time. Also, as Goldfeld 
and Kane suggest, surveillance on the part of Federal Reserve officials 
may cause past borrowings to be negatively related to present borrowings 
(9, p. 506). This is a result of "surveillance induced transactions costs" 
or possibly increased reluctance caused by surveillance. 
Even so, the negative and significant coefficients for B-2 are 
somewhat surprising. This implies that a bank that has been in debt only 
two reserve periods prior to the current one is so cognizant of Federal Re­
serve surveillance or potential surveillance that it has a negative effect 
on his current borrowings. 
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Proposition VI 
Borrowing was expected to be negatively related to the surveillance 
variables I and ÏÏ, Two forms of these variables ore included in equations 
(8)J (9)5 and (10). Equation (8) has the aggregate level of borrowings I, 
and the number of reserve periods in the last 13 in debt,N, each lagged 
one reserve period. Equation (9) includes each lagged two periods and (10) 
includes each lagged both one and two periods. With the exception of N-1 
and N-2 in equation (10), the four variables are significantly positivn or 
negative less than eight tlmee in any of th_ hree equations in which they 
are included. N-1 is significantly positive 12 times and N-2 significantly 
negative 12 tines in equation (10). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Cost Variables 
As indicated by thé discussion in the previous chapter, the various 
cost variables have quite diverse effects on borrowing., not only among 
banks, but also for different equations for the same banks. Most of the 
variation in signs within each bank is mnonf;; nonsignificant coefficients. 
For example, bank 1 in Table 3 has no sipnificant cost coefficients. The 
signs on r-d and f-d from equation to equation are both negative and posi­
tive. For bank 10, Table 12, the coefficients for r-d are significantly 
negative for equations (6), (7), (8), and (9) and significantly positive 
only in equation (lO). For bank l6 in Table l8, r-d is both positive and 
negative and there are none significantly negative. 
Thus, judging by significant coefficients within each bank the 
variations in signs are much less frequent and the cost variables more 
consistent in their determination of borrowings for each banker. V/hat 
still remains is that the consistent estimates for each banker are not the 
same among all bankers. For example, the coefficients of r-d for equa­
tions (l), (2), and (3) for bank 5 in Table 7 are each negative and for 
bank 7 in Table 9 positive. For banks 5 and l6, the coefficients of r-d 
are significantly negative and positive respectively. Thus, while some 
degree of consistency is found for the coefficient of the cost variables 
within banks, no discernible pattern among banks is evident. 
6h 
This is in contradiction vith what Goldfeld and Kane, (9, p. 511) 
find when estimating their equations using aggregate data. : Two possible 
explanations for this seem apparent. First, is simply that bankers vary 
in their response to the rate spreads because of their own individual 
utility functions but a sufficient number of bankers behave similarily 
and these dominate acgregate borrowing. Thus, in using aggregate data, 
the total response in borrowing to changes in rate spreads is positive 
while individual bankers deviate. 
The second reason is closely akin to the first. The evidence of 
the previous chapter is that interest rate differentials are not particu­
larly influential as determinants of borrowing. It will be recalled that 
less than one-third of all cost coefficients are significantly negative 
or positive in each equation and for all banks. 
Some bankers may borrow without much regard for small positive or 
negative spreads. For these bankers negative coefficients for cost vari­
ables may be obtained. Other bankers may have various thresholds of rate 
spreads below which they will not borrow and above which they borrow what­
ever amount of reserves they "need." There is not necessarily a continuous 
increase in borrowings by these bankers as the rate spreads become larger 
and larger. They merely enter the market at a particular rate spread. 
This type of behavior could produce little statistical significance for 
these borrowers because changes in rate spreads above the threshold level 
do not necessarily change the quantity of borrowed reserves demanded. 
Thus, the positive aggregate relationship could be a result of a larger 
number of bankers borrowing when rate spreads are greater while some bankers 
borrow regularly and without much regard for costs. 
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Quantity Variables 
The effect of previous borrovings and changes in unborroved re­
serves have quite uniform effects on current borrowings for all equations 
within each bank. Borrovings la^ fied one period are almost always signifi­
cantly positive reflecting the inability of bankers to adjust their port­
folios in one week's time. AU, indicating changes in the reserve position 
of the bank is also important. The other forms of these two variables, 
B-2, B-3, and AU-J, AU-2, are important to a lesser degree reflecting the 
lesser importance of events as they becoiuc more remote in time. 
AL is also included in this class of variables. It has only a 
limited number of significant coefficients for each equation and the greater 
portion of these have a negative sign rather than the expected positive 
sign. Because of these results, it is concluded that AL is not an important 
determinant of borrowings. 
Surveillance Variables 
Federal Reserve surveillance may be an influential factor in 
bankers' decisions to borrow. The variables used as proxies for surveil­
lance give little evidence. These variables are the least satisfactory 
with respect to what they are supposed to measure and thus little credence 
is given to the coefficients obtained for them. It is of interest to note 
that both I and N are kept by Reserve officials on a weekly basis. If 
they are used as guides in administering the discount window and surveil­
lance is in part a function of these, then surveillance either has no 
effect on borrowings or these are inadequate measures of surveillance. If 
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they are proper measures then the results here indicate little response on 
the part of bankers to surveillance. 
• The implications for discounting^  as a tool of monetary policy . 
hinge on one conclusion: The impact of the quantity variables, previous 
borrowings and changes in unborrowed reserves are more uniform and pre­
dictable than are the impact of cost variables. If a good monetary 
policy tool is one which initially achieves preeiao and predictable ef­
fects on the commercial banking system then the discount rate as a tool 
is not particularly desirable, i.e., changes in the discount rate are not 
reacted upon in the market in precise and predictable ways. The best indi­
cation of this is the diverse pattern of signs for the cost variables. 
Bankers have different attitudes towards the discount window and some 
bankers borrow at unfavorable rates to obtain reserves. Others tend to 
borrow at positive rate spreads. The net result is a differential effect 
of monetary policy. More importantly, the bankers themselves determine 
this differential effect in their various reactions to discount rate 
changes. 
Borrowing has been shown to be generally influenced by changes in 
unborrowed reserves. When Federal Reserve authorities use open market 
operations or reserve requirement changes they directly affect unborrowed 
reserves. Bankers react to changes in unborrowed reserves by changing 
their borrowings in the opposite direction. Since the exact response of 
bankers at the discount window is unknown, the impact of the other two in­
struments of monetary policy are also less precise. 
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Table 1. Number of positive coefficients si^nificwit'^ at tho .10 level 
Equation 1' 3 \:-,V ; : 5 6 9 10 
Constant 27 
(36) 
22 ' 
(30 
2li 
(33) 
22 . 
(35) 
• •• 23 
(36) 
7 
(22) 
it. 
(20) 
L 
(19) 
3 
(17) 
'  3 
(15) 
B-1 : 32 
(33) 
: 32 : ' 
(33) 
. 32/ 
: (33) 
32 ' 
(32) 
• 32 
(33) 
32 ' 
(33) 
32 '•••• 
(33) 
' . 3 1 .  • 
(33) 
32 
(33) 
"32 
(32) 
BS 12 
(20) 
13 
(19) 
12 
(20) 
13 
(10) 
12 
(21) 
13 
(20) 
11 
(19) 
10 
(10) 
11 
(17) 
, 9 
(17) 
B-3 13 
(2k) 
11» 
(22) 
Ik 
(27) 
12 
(26) 
AU 0 
(3) 
0 
(^) 
0 
(3) 
0 
(?) 
0 
( k )  
0 
(3) 
0 
(1) 
0 
(3) 
0 
(3) 
0 
(1) 
&U-1 1 
i s )  1 (1) 1 (2) 1 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) 
0 
(1) 
0 
(1) 
0 
(1) 
0 
(1) 
iU-2 0 
(2) 
0 
(1) 
0 
(2) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(1) 
0 
(2) 
r-d 9  
(25) 
9 
(22) 
9 
(27) 
3 
(16) 
5 
(19) 
.. . 2 ••• ' 
(11) 
, 2 ' 
(13) 
1 
(15) 
. 2 . 
(16) 
f-d 8 
(2L) 
•••  %  
: (28) 
5 
(22) 
5 
(22) 
7 
(25) 
7 
(2k) 
6 
(23) 
g-d 9 
(25) 
1. 
(2L) 
7 
(2k) 
6 
(23) 
6 
(20) 
(r-d)^ 5 
(20) 
1 
(If) 
3 
(17) 
2 
(19) 
{f-d)2 U 
(IM 
2 
(Ik) 
2 
(17) 
(g-d)2 
(16) 
1 
(21) 
(r-d)3 1 
(25) 
6L 1 
(11) 
1 
(13) 
0 
(Ik) 
0 
(13) 
1 
(12) 
1 
(12) 
1 
(11) 
a 2 
(16) 
3 
(19) 
1 
(22) 
I-l k 
(18) 
5 
(18) 
1-2 7 
(27) 
5 
(23) 
N-1 2 
(21) 
12 
(25) 
N-2 k 
(20) 
2 
(10) 
"Quantities in parentheses are the nunbors of positive coefficients without regard to 
significance. Since 36 banks arc used the maximum number of positive estimates for each 
coefficient in each equation Is 36. 
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Tabic 2. Number of negative cocfflclcnto s: Lgnlfleant" &
 
.10 level 
Equation 1 2 . ^ 3, \ '' 5 •;6 7 8 10 
Constant 0 
(0) ; 
//.OL: 
(0) 
0 
(3) 
0 : 
(1) 
0 
(0) ; (Ik) 
3 
(16) . 
2 
(17) 
: ? 
(19) : 
• 1 
(21) 
B-1 0 
(3) 
- :' 0"' 
(3) 
0 
(3) 
0 
(k) 
0 
(3) (3) 
0 
(3) 
• ' ' 1 
(k) 
B-2 . ; g 
(36) 
12 
(17) 
9 
(16) 
12 
(16) 
10 
(15) 
9 ' '  
(16) 
• 10 ' ' 
(17) 
11 
(16) 
12 
(39) 
' ' 13 
(19) 
B-3 2 
(12) 
2 
(Ih) 
2 
(9) 
2 
(10) 
AU 25 
(33) 
25 
(33) 
25 
(33) 
26 
(33) 
27 
(32) 
27 
(33) 
27 
(33) 
27 
(33) 
27 
(33) 
27 
(35) 
AU-1 PC 
(3M 
25 
(35) 
'A 
(3k) 
S3 
(35) 
27 
(35) 
27 
(35) 
27 
(35) 
27 
(35) 
28 
(35) 
27 
(35) 
AU-2 18 
(3k) 
18 
(35) 
18 
(3k) 
19 
(36) 
18 
(35) 
17 
(3k) 
r-d 0 
(11) 
0 
(Ik) 
1 
(9) 
3 
(20) 
3 
r , (IT) 
% 9 
(25) 
: 6 
(21) 
9 
(23) 
C:.'9.: 
(21) 
. 7 
(20) 
f-d 1 
(12) 
2 
( (G) 
'••• 3 : 
(HO 
• • . • 2 ;  . 
(Ik) 
k 
(11) : 
. 2 
(12) 
' 2 
(13) 
B-d 2 
(11) 
2 
(12) 
2 
(12) (13) 
2 
(16) 
(r-d)2 1 
(16) 
5 
(19) 
2 
(19) 
3 
(17) 
(f-d)2 1 
(22) 
2 
(22) 
3 
(19) 
(g-d)2 1 
(20) 
3 
(15) 
(r-d)3 8 
(11) 
AL 6 
(25) 
6 
(23) 
6 
(22) 
6 
(23) 
5 
(2k) 
8 
(2k) 
£ 
(25) 
a 6 
(20) 
2 
(17) 
3 
(Ik) 
I-l k 
(18) 
3 
(18) 
1-2 2 
(16) 
1 
(13) 
K-1 0 
(15) 
2 
(11) 
N-2 2 
(16) 
12 
(26) 
"Quantities in parenthèses are the numbers of nepatlve coefficients without regard to 
significance. Since 36 banks are used the maximum number of negative estimates for each 
coefficient in each equation is 36. 
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Ttble 3. Rcci'catlcri ccrfl dent a* for SiuiH 1 vtilch hut 10:' wc-i-kn or I'urrf.twirtf bptw.ii Jurmnry 2, 19'' '3 «ml Powrnhnr 21, 19CA 
L Ei^ v^ tlon 6 10 
Conitant 
B-1 
• B"2 
(r-d)^ 
550li.lt 
(l55''.o) 
. (.070) 
.llio» 
(.073) 
5361.3f (idu.l) 
(.071) 
.131' 
(.077) 
50C0.7t 
(mio.i) 
.liroi 
(.071) 
: .iM* 
(.0731 
5123.5' 
(1077.8) 
.Il20t 
(.071) 
.131' 
(.077) 
5l'32.8f 2973.1 
(Ki70.6) (3300.9) 
.3n?t 
(.071) 
(.071) 
(.070) 
(5ll''.9) 
- .37fit 
(.071) 
liiyao. 
(5«s?u.) 
.207* 
(.005) 
.152T .Iklt 
(.071) (.07;*) 
.115, 
(.073), 
33500. 
(57390.) 
.316, 
(.072) 
.095 
(.ooa) 
29(100. 
(5??70.) 
.243» 
( .088)  
.OOk 
(.090) 
B-3 .022 
(.066) 
.025 
(.066) II
 
.lk9! 
(.075) 
AU -.196! 
(.029) 
-.200! 
(.029) 
-.195! 
(.029) 
-.19k! 
(.029) 
-.202! 
(.028) 
-.205! 
(.028) 
..203! 
(.028) 
..1981 
(.028) 
-.200! 
(.028) (.029) 
iU-1 -.107! 
(.030) 
-.105! 
(.030) 
-.107! 
(.031) 
-.105! 
(.031) 
-.OK.l 
(.03k) 
-.167! 
(,03k) 
-.166! 
(,03k) 
-.l6t't 
(.03k) 
-.179! 
(.035) 
-.172! 
(.035) 
AU-? -.097! 
( •O.-'fl) 
-.098! 
( .0.'/) 
-.O'lll! 
(.nrg) 
-.lOkt 
(,0PH) 
-.131t 
1.031) 
-.128! 
1 .0)1) 
r-4 2^70.2 
(5017.1) 
2355.1 
(5039.7) 
-601,1 
(I'lnu.O) 
-1:")6,3 
(BOlk.k) 
-5«k.3 
(i. 'ijyi.o) 1 
-5fkk.3 
lioow.o) 
-9 Ik 7.6 
(if.kl.'J.il) 
-(.'519.1 
(1"1',0.) 
-70/5.k 
(li)l!.U.) 
-15939, 
(11)900.) 
f-d 2978.2 
(5150.9) 
-2k2C.9 
(6105.k) 
-113k.8 
(593k.k), 
-5756.k 
(60('.k.«) 
307.97 
(6130.5) 
5'':. 37 
(6091.6) 
-39''6.6 
(7168.2) 
«-d : 8062.6 
(fl,35.9) 
5203.5 
(I'r.ko.o) 
6980.1 V: 
(ukpy,3) 
7971.2 
(9287,7) 
5827.2 
(2l6'50.) 
(r-d)' 23830.0 
(kkklo.o) 
;.kk2l,.5 . 
(15kkO.O) 
-105k.7 
(19990.0) 
7620.2 
(21580.) 
(f-d)' 713k.1 , 
(57k1.9! 
6k00.8 
(5963.1) 
k931.7 
(6069.0) 
(«-<!)' 3360.6 
(15k80.C) 
1282.3 
(16970.) 
-21R70. 
(1.71 ko.) 
tl ..007 .007 .006 .OOt) .006 .010 .000 
(.036) I.03A) (.0J5) (.035) (.036) (.036) (.036) 
m -26700. .389)0. -39390. 
(63L10.) (63820.) (66050.) 
I-l .036 .030 
(.032) (.033) 
1-2 -.00k ..001 
(.031) (.032) 
N-l 1511.0, 1,287. 
(781.60) (2066.U) 
II-2 1,89.72 -31,30.2» 
(79',.ID (2853.6) 
.306 .306 .307 .307 .351, .352 .357 . 368 .370 .391 
T  17.1,7! Ik.51! 12.kl 10.83 10,58 11.70 8,656 9.26' 8.59! 6.61! 
• 1796k. iSook. leoki. 18080. 17556. 17T'ko. 17fr,'i. 171.59. 17k70, i7ko6. 
"St/mdml errora or rtfrtrfsalon coefficients npf'mr ii: b.,'l<;- ..ijc, cu'.rficl.*nt. '""hrr.* n Mwik spucv app.*nr:i 
variable Is not In th#? equHtlon, An • * l/ni Clriwcc tKt the ,10 l<»v»?î. A t di»not"» alpnlClCfinre <it thm .0^ 
levpl. 
^StAndard error of esttBintf,  
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T*blo L Begrwualott co/'fficltint'!*^ for bank 2 vhlch hui lOl of borrovHr, bictwrcn Jwi»i»iry S, liùz wl Dçc^wber ?l, 19^6 
Equation ' . .2 3.. ' It 
"• 'f, : 'T\". ; ; 9  10 
Conotant 
(173.00) 
«5^.19< 
(180.U) 
605.351 
(109.93) 
63L.5I.I 
(105.52) 
679.001 
(183.81.) 
879.67* 
(366.5'') 
587.30 
(563.06) 
-10890. 
(71125.9) 
-10760. 
(71.31..5) 
.10110. 
(7509.7) 
B-i M B !  
( . 0 6 9 )  
.&93t 
(.069) 
• ,11391 ' 
(.069) 
: .ii99t 
(.069) 
••• M y t  
(.071) 
'.1.711 • 
(.071) 
. i n v t  
(.071) 
.Ii53( 
(.07?) 
.t 'Cf 
; (.07?) 
•  . W f  
(.077) 
B-P ' .060 
(.070) 
\  .071 
(.079) 
.070 
(.071) 
,070 
(.079) 
.090-
(.071) 
.090 
(.oh) 
: . .093 
(.072) 
.083 
(.073) 
.072 
(.07';) 
.07I1 
(.076) 
B.3 -.006 
(.068) 
-.006 
(.068) 
.031 
(.072) 
.021' 
(.076) 
AU -.1271 
(.Ojli) 
-.laOt 
(.035) 
-.1271 
{.03M 
-.1281 
(.035) 
-.lli21 
(.035) 
-.1391 
(.035) 
-.ikOI 
(.036) 
-.1371 
(.035) 
-.1381 
(.035) 
-.1381 
(.036) 
AU-1 -.U7t 
( .Ojli) 
-.1171 
(.035) 
-.1171 
(.035) 
-.1161 
(.035) 
-.1561 
(.033) 
-.1561 
(.03«) -.15^1 (.ouc) 
-.1561 
(.309) 
-.l6ot 
( .o'.o) -.1551 (.OM) 
AU-? -.068" 
(.'JJM 
-,c6yi 
(.C.!M 
-.CÛ3' 
(.'jji) -.068" { . f V : )  -.071.1 - . O C T  (,0^7) 
K-d I P C 6 . 0 I  
(5M.0) 
l?<'7.9t 
05:'.8) 
l)nr.t 
(JI55.U) 
' j i C ' j . p h  
(8c«.o;.') 1U5.9 lljly.L') 
iijja.o 
(111',.?) 
It;:' ';.6 
(i8rj.L| 837.9.' (1161'.?) 
833.1.1, 
(lit?.5) 
ÉL3.15 
(1911.7) 
f-d 251.9? 
(555.99) 
580.55 
(677.39) 
I.7l'.83 
(6'j1.ai) 
973.00. 
(775.19) 
391.51 
(«3.' '7) 
1.21,1.0 
(660.07) 
81.6.87 
(767.85) 
g-d 
-657.73 
(93^.23) 
1068.1 : . . 
(Dll'5.8) 
591.21. 
(113?.0) 
557.97 
(1111.9) 
2LB0.6 
(2310.1) 
-92i?.' '5 
: (1*885.7) 
157.15 
(1710.3) 
81.7.1.5 '  
(2227.5) 
1356.6 
(2291.6) 
(f-d)' 
-569.05 
(636.25) 
-389.59 
(655.73) 
-580.3? 
(668.L8) 
(g-d)® 
-1686.8 
(1696.2) 
-1L89.9 
(17LO.I) 
(r-d)' 625.66 
(5171".8) 
. 
M. 
-.000 
(.037) 
-.01 11 
(.037) 
-.Pll 
(.037) 
-.OIL 
(.037) 
-.006 
(.037) 
-.011 
(.037) 
..OIL" 
(.038) 
' 
13180. 
(823''.0) 
13280. 
(821,3.6) 
12350. 
(83L6.7) 
I-l 
-.003 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.003) 
1-2 -.OOl. 
(.003) 
-.003 
(.003) 
*-1 -20.67 
(I.6.9I') 
-LI,.57 
(211.11) 
11-2 
-29.01 
(1.6.57) 
11. Lf. 
(201.59) 
.371 .371 .371 .371 .387 .386 .393 .1.00 .LOI .LlO 
T  23.33r 19.351 l6.51t Ib.LO: 12.20r 13.56' 10.291 10,60t 9.80r 7.11,1 
i.t.^  19''1. 19l'6. 1951. 1955. I9l«0. 1937. WliS. 1930. 1933. 19''5. 
«rrora of r>^gresslon cwfflcl<fnts Jipp^far In paMntheami ht>low cccfCirlent. Where i  bl/uik spnc-i appear# the 
variable It not incliMfU In the equnMon. An • denotes 8l(ml fleanc at th^ .10 Level. A ^ U-^uotea sipnlflcvic at the .05 
level. 
^Standard error of eattmafc*». 
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T*bli> 5» Hi»grtiivloti coefficients* for bfUiK 3 which hf\'l 100 of bgrroyltiç b.^tw»<rn Jmnmry ?, 19^3 tjul t'e«enb*r 21, 19&& 
Equitlnn. - 1 \ .'- — J — 
. ------
.""•7 '"" 8 
. . .  
" " " 10" 
Conslùii 9'i50.7t 
(2007.3) 
91113.0? 
(ri?3.7) 
10070.01 
(Î30P.7) 
93li3.3t 
(?!??,6) 
9??5.l<» 
(r?oi.7) 
IkOOO.O» 
(1.566.3) 
11.700.0» 
(6')i'0.9) 
155300.» 
(M5W. ) . 
168100.• / 
(90650.) 
223(00.» 
( 101(300,) 
B-1 % .271.» 
(.071) 
.275» 
(.071) 
.265f 
(.070) 
.2fTt 
(.071) 
: .256» 
(.072) 
• .PA'.t 
(.07?) 
.25(1' 
(.072) 
• / .203» 
; (.087) 
VÎJl-» 
(.07?) 
.178* 
(.093) 
• -.006 
(.071) 
"• -.015 
(.073) 
,.010 
(.070) 
•.016 
(.073) 
, .000 , 
1.07:') 
-."01 
(.07?) 
— OOP 
(.07?) 
-.0I.7 
(.073) 
-.037 
(.090) 
-.033 
(.09I.) 
B-3 .03? 
(.070) 
.028 
(.070) 
-.017 
(.071.) 
: ..007,, 
(.076) 
AU -.093t 
(.OÎ.5) 
-.091t 
(.01.6) 
-.078" 
(.01.6) 
-;093> 
(.01.6) 
-.loSt 
(.050) 
-.lltt 
( .01.9) 
-.108» 
(.050) 
-.111» 
(.0I9) 
-.113» 
(.01.9) 
-.106» 
(.050) 
ûU-1 -.123» 
(.01.5) 
-.1??1 
C.oii(i) 
-.net 
l.OliL) 
-.119t 
i.obv) 
-.1531 
i.o>0) 
-.157» 
(.OVj )  
-.153» 
(.056) 
-.150» 
(.055) 
-.155» 
(.055) 
-.11.6» 
(.057! 
fill-? -.051' 
(.O-iS) 
-.061, 
(.0l;9) 
-.056 
(.050) 
-.061 -.063 
(.OW) 
-.053 
(.051) 
r^d 11090.0" 
(OiOy.i) 
llldîl.O» 
(6C1.3.6) (ijfiw.t)) (itiiVO.o) 
-1.077.5 
( iwyj.ij} 10110.0 (13550.0) «155.9 C'lHiO.O) 2?»,10. (11.1.60, ) (11.31.0.) i')T'n. (I'li5]0.) 
f-d 1617.8 
(«797.9) 
581.9-1 
(8PI.5.I.) 
6l.jl..5 
(noof.o) 
8193.1. 
,(!'I.C0,2) 
8733.1 
(%ll..6) 
ens.6 
(8157.8) 
91.98.1. 
(9509.9) 
e-d -1211.0.0 
(luflo.o) 
-19 3% .0) 
(i')tlo.o) 
-21.61.0. • 
(13310.) 
-22570. 
(139.-0.) 
-62500." , \ 
(ji 'kro.) 
(r-d): -56020.0 
(571.1.0.0) 
27810.0 
20720.0 
if 
-7''29.9 
(28790.) 
(f-d|2 
(g-il)® 
(r-d)' 
-ÉKU.i . -Tli'il.T 
(7619.5) (7931.9) 
9860.9 
(roloci.o) 
-leoiio. 
(6070.) 
3k290. 
(2?57y.) 
90610.0 
(61360.0) 
dL -.057 -.051 -.15? -.05? -.06? -.062 ..06l( 
(.OL3I (.Ol<3) (.0L3) (.01.3) (.01*3) (.OU) (.OW,) 
a -l66ino.« .179'iOO.» -235l'OO.t 
(oB-zfO.) (101.700.) (113500.) 
I-l .021 .o;L 
( .Oil) (.Ol>6) 
I-2 -.005 -.017 
(.01.2) (.0W6) 
K-l • 1119.3t 1?63.0 
(567.1) (2738.8) 
II-2 1093.3» -9.''5 
(570.2) (261.1..20) 
R' .12k .125 .IH .133 .118 .11.5 .152 .176 .175 .192 
r 5.62f li.70f l..5flf 3.73t 3.1^' 3.(5" l-BUt 3.1,0» 3.09' 2.kl.» 
«.«.'* 233^5. 23)9?. 23?^?. 231.09, 23316. 2iî05. ?319l.. 23052. 23135. 2319«. 
"standard errors of regression cot-fflelents afi'^'fvr In ptir..rar,e3'f5 bt'low .inch C','_.fflclfnl. Vher^ ti blank apucy ft[.p..ftrii the 
Variable I» not Included In thf e-^uatton. An • dyr.ot-'J otjjnlat th»» .P A • at th^ .05 
level. 
^StandArd errur of estlmnte. 
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6. Ri'MfHtidlun co.'rriciiMitu * for biuik L which hfiil lO of bori'rutr.f. h" 2, 19'*'3 "ii'î IN'ÇL'BiSifr 21 , 1046 
Ei^uation 1 • 3 • •' •: k 6 : 7 . ' '9 10 
Coosivii 701,7.5» 
(17:1.:) 
777.5» 
(1796.Il) 
697:1. at 
(rofli.î) 
8)07.3' 
(19''*.3) 
7350.3' 
(1905.9) 
72.2L.3. 6I10I1.2 
(551,1.,?)• 
.75090, ^ 
(LoCt.o.) 
-601.70. 
(50070.) 
-6371.0. 
( 1.9970.) 
.22it 
(.070) 
• .228» 
(.070) 
.223' 
. (.072) 
.2ir 
(.072) 
.179' 
(.072) 
.176» 
(.072) 
.177' 
(.073) 
.123, 
(.085) 
158' 
(.073) 
, .1711 
(.083) 
B-2 .120' 
, (.072) 
.151' 
(.071.) 
' .123' 
(.073) (.076) 
.153' 
(.075) 
: " ' " .IW 
(.071,1 
.153' 
(.075) 
.117 
(.076) 
>50 
(.087) 
.076 
(.OOf') 
B-3 -.096 
(.069) 
-.106 
(.070) 
-.070 
(.073) 
-.130' 
(.073) 
AU -.071+ 
(.023) 
-.07lit 
(.023) 
..072* 
(.023) 
-.073' 
(.0:3) 
-.081' 
(.0?!.) 
-.001' 
(.0?!.) 
-,ooo' 
(.0.->l.) 
-.071.' 
(.035) 
-.073' 
(.02',) 
-.0(2» 
(.021.) 
âU-1 -.067* 
(.023) 
-.071' 
(,o:n) 
-.OTCt 
(.023) 
-.071' 
(.023) 
-.103' 
(.0.-7) 
-.lotft 
(.0371 
-.102' 
(.0^7) 
-.100' 
(.iVf) 
-.105+ 
i .iv3) 
-.038' 
(.0'?) 
AU-2 -.059' ..OCCH 
(.O.'j) 
-.0591 -.060' 
(.on.) 
-.050' 
(.0;'U) 
-.03R 
(.crLi 
•lev.9 (i6l'0,6) 605.1. (5tO').l) 3:'63.5 (isoeo.) BW'i. (9MI..'.) injh'j. (13'V'.". ) 1 61071, 1160').) 100 J'l. (lan/o.) lY'io.e ( l:. '0/0. ) lOS'l.J (nv:.'U,) 290'% 5 (19PU.) 
t-d -61.51.7 
(6057.2) 
-8372.1 
(7153.3) 
-1.893.9 
(70(8.) 
-7572.2 
(8221..7) 
-1,39.9." 
(7317.'.) 
-2665'. I, 
(727I..8) 
-73.15.7 
(8167.3) 
S d 722.81, 
(9595.2) 
51.3211 
(22170.) 
2209.3 
(10790.) 
-51.87.9 
1101.90.) 
951.5.9 
(227^0.) 
(r-d)» 82(0.1 
(51290.) 
.11060. 
(17570.) 
-75I16.7 
(227(0.) 
-11050. 
(221.60.) 
(f-d)2 6356.7 
(6661.J) 
6963.1 
(6917.6) 
10060. 
(6825.1) 
(s-d)2 
-5879.'» 
(17710.) 
.5826.6 
(17000.) 
{r-d)3 
-I61I.O. 
(5'i3^0.) 
4L .016 .0?8 .026 .Ok'8 ,.0;;7 .03) . .0?8 
(.0:5) (.02i) (.0%) (.02A) (.OJu) (.0?o) ( .0)5) 
» 65^)0. 91.660.• 71890. 
(5hl3U.) (5'j5ua.) ())]%.) 
I-l .017 -.027 
(.03)) (.037) 
I-2 .OTSt .058 
(.03I1) (.037) 
0-1 • lli26.1» 9Ul.lt 
(71.9.05) • (2156.1) 
II-2 779.91. -7903.5t 
(751.78) (2173.8) 
.106 .115 .107 .1:1 .11.1. .139 .Ikl, .163 .171* .Ï5I. 
r k.TZt t.STf 3.36t 3.38f 3.25f 3.50t 2.69' 3.lot 3.091- 3.50f 
• .•.*> 20219. 20172. 20315. 20199. 2001.1. 2001.2. 2011.0. lOVh. 1981.0. 19110. 
"Vitiui'liirJ error» of r'ï.çrennlon co*»fflct'ïntp niip^nr in below efv^h co'-rficl^nt. Whfrc n blunk wpnc,* th».-
yarlnble li not Included In the enu»\t!on. An • «letiot'^a Dl/nl ftdnr# nt thf .10 Irvf-l, A " detiot^s s l^nI fleKn-:» at the .05 
level. 
br, Qt^dftrd error of eotlmfit#?. 
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Table 7» Bejir'-onlon, cc rrlel'Tita'^ for b 'Jik 5 vhlch ti'i'l v/^-kT oT borrowthff bftv»»»»!! Jumohi^ ?, lO<'»V»nid P-jcfml'^r 21 » 19^6 
Equation . 1 ' z 
. ' ' .3 l 'y  . I4 . • V'' •. 
. .  
Conataiit 1511.lit ; 
(5oa.5) 
1527.3t 
(519.31) 
ll 'U.3t 
(550.08) 
ll158.ll 
(W.o) 
ll'73.3l 
(505.56) 
620.09 
(1070 .6) 
-626.81 
(16',5.8) 
-zkoo." 
(12670.) 
-2iiWo.' ; 
(12070.) 
-21130. 
(.15350) 
(.069) , '393 J (.070) 
.3^5^ 
(.070) 
.y-c-i 
(.067) 
,i8ot 
(.06)1 ; (.047) 
.361t 
: (.067) 
.Jliot 
(.069) 
.337» 
(.069) 
.3l'3t 
(.079) 
B 2 .2] If 
(.069) 
.laitt 
(.074) 
; .2l«t 
(.oca) 
.160» 
(.072) 
> .1601 
(.oCh) 
.166* 
(.0' '7) 
: .1537 
. ( .«66) (.069) 
.Ho* 
(.075) 
. l l iO'  
(.076) • 
B:3 .017 
(.070) 
.010 
(.066) 
.015 
(.070) 
.017 
(.071) 
AU -.075t 
(.027) 
-.07ht 
(.0^7) 
-.073) 
(.270) 
-.oau 
(.026) 
-.091? 
(.027) 
..08 ' i t  
(.027) 
-.068t 
(.027) 
- .08)1 
(.027) 
-tOQlii 
(.027) 
-.088» 
(.027) 
AU-1 -.053» 
(.0:7! 
-.053" 
(.027) 
-.0561 
(.037! 
- .Olis 
(  .o?( '0 
-.052" 
( .nrn;  
- .053» 
( .opni 
- .0):" 
( .o: '«)  
- .053'  
(.028) 
- .052" 
( .028) 
- .051'  
( .029) 
AU.2 - .209 
(.02)) 
-.025 
( .OL'l i)  
- .029 
( .0. '5)  
-.02f 
( .0?6) 
- .027 
(,02fO 
- .030 
( .02") 
r>d -i i i i j ï . i» 
(lW:'.k) (IWII.J)  
-V//9,0 
(35' i  •( .! ' )  
-loi ' i jv. l  
( ; 'Ci ' , . i )  
-n 'oo. '  
( mi.9) 
1 : 'C(.y.  f 
( I ' lyv.T) 
.  I' l lCu.t  
C/yi ' . ' .O) 
•99' i0.9 '  
(J(lï.l) 
-96 W.)» 
(M 57.II 
-15l '60.» 
(62')0.a)  
f-d 7301.21 
(17;».6) (?oiio.y) 
(522.(1 
(I9O9.I)  
8(137. lit 
(2;96.0) 
72rf. ' , i  
(2)21.2) 
7W2.5» 
(2101.5) 
BUO.B' 
(2li07.2) 
g-d 2558.0 
(2787.1) 
6972.Il 
(6303/') 
1012.7 
(3l2H.f.)  
; 539.8 . . 
(3107.1) 
771».7 
(8126.0) 
(r-d)® 30960.t 
(15530.) 
8129.1 
(k95l';0) 
IS/CO.f 
(61'51.5) 
8801.3 
(7293.7) 
(f-u)® 
.I^Ull.O^ . . 
(11)69.0) 
-li27l4.Ct •, 
(1922.8) 
11 
U'if -2393.1 
(' '953.3) II
 
(r-d)^ 
-29730." 
(I6I.B0.) 
AL -.U97t 
(.038) 
-.O90t 
(.038) 
- ,0891 
(.039) 
-.O'J'U 
(.03«) 
-.091» 
(.039) 
-.092» 
(.039) 
-.09''» 
(.039) 
• 
27820." 
(iMiO.) 
28150." 
(11.600.) 
21.360. 
(18120.) 
I-I -.000 
(.008) 
-.002 
(.009) 
1-2 .002 
(.008) 
.001 
(.009) 
N-1 -3.60 
(155.65) 
175.83 
(732.86) 
M-2 -3l<.05 
(158.15) 
-231».27 
(716.20) 
R2 
.326 .326 .339 .396 .1.18 .l<02 .k25 .Llk .kl5 .1*31 
r  W.lbt 15.8Bf Ik.39' lb.OU I3.88t iL.k?' 11.77» 11.27» 10.36» T.BOf 
m.e.^ 6009. 6021. 5979. 5729. 565k. 5719. 56l'9. 57U2. 5715. 5709. 
^tanUnrJ errors of r^'^^r'tKicn cri'»frt':('*nts npj^'ir Ln ^«mr^mth''below t-ioi. cj»»frict**riÇ. "hrre n bl»\rk spnce 9pp"n.r» th? 
variable 1» not Inclu-I-d In thf eiutTlcn. An • (l»nioU'N lU'nl flcaric» ivt th»» .10 Wv'^l. A f d-'noton si jtiI Tlcnnc'* it thif .05 
level. 
^Stwiar l error of efttlmate. 
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Table B. Rïgrpîislon coefricl-iit»" for bwk 6 60 vt'chn of boriuwlnn bttvcpri Jwiiry 2, 1!'G] wl r^cmbrr ?!, l?G(j 
Equation . 1 . : '2 • ' 3' 
• ' ' 
: 6 7 . 8 9 , . 10 
Constant l?''7.5t 
(3U.73) 
nkj.st 
(327.83) 
13Sl-7t 
(366.61,) 
1150.0» 
(330.98) 
iLOL.Lt 
(3l'6.27) 
-397.29 
(68A.61) 
-590.90 
(1076.7) 
52710.» 
(28960.) 
.117280. 
(29760.) 
^ 51600.» 
(30300.) 
B-1 .268» 
(.071) 
.:Cof 
(.071) 
.238f 
(.071) 
' .îCjt. 
(.072) 
: , .îciit 
(.072) 
',.231» 
(.072) 
, ' , .329» 
(.073) 
• • .171» 
(.07li) 
.....MX.. 
(.072) 
' .1(6» 
(,081.) 
&-?/ .in7 
(.070) 
.oyo 
.(.072) 
,097 
(.071) 
: .C/li 
(.073) 
: .066 
(.073) 
.0l«5 
(.072) 
.039 
(.073) 
.031 
(.072) 
-.008 
(.076) 
-.010 
(.078) 
B-3 .078 
(.069) 
.06? 
(.069) 
.075 
(.073) 
.067 
(.073) 
AU -.loot 
(.027) 
-.lOU 
(.027) 
-.099t 
(.027) 
-.119» 
(.028) 
-.121» 
(.029) 
-.118» 
(.020) 
-.118» 
(.028) 
-.115» 
(.028) 
-.118» 
(.025) 
-.118» 
(.028) 
ûU-1 -.021 
( .0.^5) 
-.ON 
(. 0?fj ) 
-.019 
(.orr.) 
-.01-3 
(.o?r.) 
-.Ok? 
(.03?) 
-.037 
(.031) 
-.038 
(.031) 
-.0I18 
(.031) 
-.036 
(.032) 
-.01.8 
(.03:) 
AU-? -.036 
(.ort) 
-.030 
(.o:-r) 
-.039 
(.crT) 
-.056» -.01.5 
(:0?T) 
-.059» 
(:0g8) 
r-d SO.'il 
(10V.6) 
-7.9'; 
doll J.;.) (?:"/'. 5) 
-|l)l'.9 
(K/fJ.O) (25jj.y) 
-y/'T,i' 
(:vi<;.5) 
-5^72.1 
lïi-'X-.'ll 
•5171..6» 
(21'W.ll) 
.5158.7» 
(2.'33.9) 
.31,^6.6 
(3I.9I.7) 
f-d 1206.9 
(1100.2) 
1119.9 
(1310.3) 
-k.-'B.aa 
(1255.1') 
-l<3l,.31 
(ikfifl.M 
127.15 
(1259.6) 
-80.09 
(1266.2) 
238.05 
(11,73.0) 
«-d 5071.1» : 
(IBjv.li) 
62I<7.9 
( 1.1)1.?) 
1553.1 
(2193.0) 
2259.2 
(2166.9) 
662.55 
(1.528.3) 
(r-d)® 
-19)9.2 
(9231.5) 
-3820.0 : 
(3392.8) 
-177.1.8 
(1.212.0) 
-2369.7 , 
(Ii231.9) 
(f-d)' I156.I15 
(12l«7.0) 
388.01, 
(1276.5) 
615.63 
(1277.5) 
(g-d)' -1190.7 
(32l.l.«) 
-306.78 
(3263.5) 
(r-d)' -1699.1 
(9853.8) 
61 -.03I' -.0P6 -.033 -.031 -.035 -.OUo» -.03k 
(.OSM (.0?!.) (.0."l<) (.OgL) (.023) (.02M (.02k) 
« -6lUo.* -55OTO. -59960.» 
(33350.) (3^230.) (3l>7'<0.) 
I-l .015t .013t 
(.006) (.006) 
I-Î .010" .006 
(.006) (.006) 
B-1 -121».23 -202.55 
(1I1O.79) (II29.'I8) 
N-2 -107.67 '•7.56 
(lli3.12) (It25.l6) 
R* .II43 .119 .IkS .163 .170 .196 .197 .235 .223 .2'«6 
r 6.26t 5,7l4t l4.a;r k.76f 3.96f 5.2kt 3.90' 4.69' "«.JOt 3.35» 
• 3753. 3750. 3760. 3737. 37kl. 367I'. 3700. 3611. 36L7. 36li2. 
'tjcundftril error» of regr*;a«lcn cc^fficteiits appear Ln par'Tnthesro belgw «açh cooffLcl'.nt. Where a blank »pac»? appears thi« 
variable It not tncluJed In the e-iuntlon. An • denotes olgnlficn/ic- (it the ,10 l^vcl. A * denoteo slfjnlfleence at the .05 
level. 
^Stanflard error of estlmnte. 
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Tsbl? 9. pmgr«(Nfiton for bn/ik 7 vhlrh hii A) wenkm of borrfwin^ b«fLw*»ch Jfin'mry ?* T'eC'-inbel* 21, 
, Equation 1 3 ; , ; • • • ,  )  :  6 • 6 10 , 
Constant I83.3lit 
OklL) 
197.68) ; 
(55.91) 
205.25t 
(63.09) 
203.for 
(56.15) 
223.71t 
(56.13) 
I47.59 
(108.85) 
•70.51 
(170.19) 
-271,1.3 
(.-PV.'.O), 
-260.7 
(2685.1,) 
-3979.0 
(2979.1,): . 
ifilOt 
(.070) 
• .6071 
(.070) 
.6W 
(.070) (.070) 
.57flt 
(.068) 
.570» 
(.069) 
" .557» 
(.069) 
463» 
... (.070) 
.562» 
: : (.070) 
.501» 
(.076) 
B-2 .039 
(.071) 
.081 
(.OOP) 
.036 
(.071) 
.088 
(.001) 
.068 . 
(.068) 
.072 
(.068) 
.051 
I.0G9) 
,078 
(.070) 
.01,8 
(.079) 
.031 
(.079) 
»-3 -.067 
(.065) 
-.062 
(.061.) 
.057 
(.070) 
.03I1 
(.070) 
AU -.16C* 
(.026) 
-.I67t 
(.026) 
-.I66t 
(.026) 
-.185t 
(.027) 
-.210t 
(.027) 
-.208» 
(.027) 
-.208» 
(.026) 
-.209» 
(.027) 
-.211» 
(.027) 
-.212» 
(.027) 
AU-1 -.079+ 
(.025) 
-.0821 
(.0:7) 
-.O0Of 
(.027) 
-.08lt 
(.0:7) 
-.133» 
(.029) 
-.137» 
(.029) 
-.136» 
(.0?9) 
-.135» 
(.Pin) 
-.11,2» 
(.030) 
-.137» 
(.030) 
ûU-2 -.1051 
(.nps) 
-.110» 
(.OP-;) 
-.IIU 
(.00')) 
-.lost 
(.0261 
-.118» 
(.u;'0) 
-.115» 
(.P?0) 
r-4 116.29 
(171.2)) 
111,.26 
(171.23) 
271. W 
(305.00) 
2%. 67 
(26?.70) 
3314.?lt 
(JW.IT) 
-51».C8 
(»M.I<2) 
-I4W.9) 
(»'i.9l) 
.200.3) 
(371.70) 
-523-6 
(376.23) 
.909.12 
iW . I ' ) )  
f-d -1Ï5.25 
(rA.Pi) 
30.78 
(?o6,jii) 
-352.05» 
(197.83) 
-U iM 
(231.80) 
-3''0.27' 
(202,79) 
-32Ï.71 
(202.67) 
-90.8? 
(236.96) 
g-d 1157.57 
(28l4.l»6) 
1080.5 
(667.9) 
; 71,2.71» 
(353.00) 
608.13» 
(3I17.73) 
159l'.0» 
(737.M 
(rnj)® 
.975.28 
(1525.7) 
207.97 
(511.32) 
920.77 
(673.30) 
1186.0» 
(69B.I) 
(f-d)* -338.62» 
(191.69) 
-335.36» 
(195.7I4) 
-31,2.141,» 
1191.79) 
(«-d)' -1,50.614 : 
(519.23) 
-527.1,2 
(529.25) 
(r-d)' 6140.69 
(1620.0) 
4L ..072t 
1 .030)  
-.062t 
(.029) 
-.063» 
(.029) 
..063» 
(.029) 
-.061,» 
(.030) 
-.062» 
(.030) 
-.068» 
(.030) 
312(''.i 
(3171,.2) 
3077.5 
(3188.7) 
1,31,2.7 
(3266.5 
I-l -.001 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
1-2 -.000 
(.001) 
-.000 
(.001) 
1-1 
-3.373 
(18.197) 
101.1,1 
(714.1,2;) 
H-2 
-12.609 
(18.236) 
-105.29 
(72.38) 
.Itltl .I4UI. .It "12 .1462 
.512 .511 .522 .516 .516 .536 
r 31.23t 26.!2t 22,20r 20.98» 20.29» 22.53» 17.1,14» 16.97» 15.61» 11.88» 
b 616.3 616.2 618.7 608.9 582.9 282.3 579.8 583.9 585.2 580.7 
*Sttni!ard errors of regreialon co«»fricl»?nt» appfar in p^rrntlifAf^ below f(&eh co-.-fflclent, & blmnk #p«cç •ppoarn the 
variable It not Inclulfd In the e,%%mtion. An * denotes aIgnlflcmnc^ at th>* .10 A t denoted significance at the ,05 
level. 
^Standard error of estimate. 
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UhU 10. BtKix'Joloti cc.'fflcU'rtta * fur'bttiih 0 vlilch hu'i 8? wr«ko of bnrrrwtnr, h»t«rrn Januaryr, 196l ani |i»cvnh"r 21, 1/166 
Cquiitlon • 1 
- , 
'  3 • •  /. ) 6 / ; •  . 8 /  ' 9 "7,40'/ 
Constant Cll.37* 
(:13.W) 
563.63t 
(SIT.95) 
535.?6t 
(239.80) 
51.'9.O0t 
(253.65) 
601.lOf 
(Z3Z.38) 
309.63 
(I.57.k5) 
120,10 
(717.60) 
3860.5 
(1071.6.1 . 
60I.5.I1 
(10770.) 
'5661.,6' 
(1076(1, ) 
B.;: • 
; (.066) (.069) 
.37«U 
(.068) 
.37^» 
(.070) 
.«AU 
(.067) 
.351* 
(.068) 
.35H 
(.Oh9) 
.3Wt 
; (.072) 
• .MOt 
V (.071) 
.187» 
(.08?) 
B-2 .«TZt 
1.0631 
.ZLkf 
(.073) 
,.2T0t 
(.069) 
.233» 
(.07k) 
, .7011 
(.063) 
, .Zfllt • 
(.060) 
.?72t 
(.070) 
.?OJt 
(.OT'I) 
: .195; 
(.Of)) 
.166, 
(.0(5) 
^3 .073 ; 
(0.665) 
.077 
(.067) (.076) 
.116 
(.076) 
au -.a3ot 
(.038) 
-.2S6t 
(.038) 
-.?30t 
(.039) 
-.SJOt (.029) -.?63t (.010) -.?6U (.039) -.256f (.0''0) -.251< (.039) -.?65t (.039) -.758» (.01.0) 
ÛU-1 -.156t 
(.OM) 
-.15?t 
(.OM) 
-.157* 
(.OM) 
-.15Tt 
(.Okl) (.Oko) 
-,JI.5* 
(.nl'O) (,nw) 
-.?35t 
(.0'.?) 
-.gbLf 
(,01.9) (.010) 
ÛU-.2 
-.U'3-t 
(.oliU) ( .OliO) 
-.W3t 
( .0I4Ù) 
-.ir-fct 
( .olio) 
..lllHf 
I.OW) 
-.157t 
( .Oil?) 
1161.9 
(TW.5) 
UC0.7 100«.> 
(J5CIJ.8) (iii'i.O 
71*7,1. 
(lCei..9) 
-Jl'j.M 
(lliO'J.lj) 
-6 3'1.70 
(i'. 'y.M) 
TA.O-, 
(1W.!),0) 
507.I.!J 
(1W0.6) 
63)..J? 
(21.19.2) 
f-4 717.60 (If-.^ 3) 3l.i.,l.r (fl'/5.iu) 313.Ç5 <8 J'). 3") 663.58 (852.58) 552.?6 (852,."8) 569.89 (977.18) 
g-d 81.8.17 
(1190.9) 
a9?9.3 li-vn.i) -Wo.65 (1'I09.6) 256.1.7 (1319.1) 869.71. (3010.1) 
(r-d)^ 4396.6 
(6198.7) 
•1090.2 
(2183.7) 
870,75 
(2855.1) 
-1191.8 
(291.0.7) 
(Nd)^ 1.81.1.3 . 
(603.31) 
612.31 
(831.30) 
51.6.65 
(818.72) 
(g-d)® 
-1973.6 
{.-'I9I..?) 
i
l
 
(r-d)^  .L879.I' 
(Éf.Z9.0) 
il 
-.027 
(.01.6) 
0
 0
 
-,011. 
(.01,5) 
0
 0
 
• .016 
(.01.5) 
-.017 
(.01.5) 
-.012 
(.okM 
* 
-1.373.'. 
(11960.) 
-6li03.lt 
(11990.) 
-6577.9 
(11960.) 
i-i 
.003 
(.001.) 
.005 
(.OOk) 
1-2 
-.003 
(.OOU) 
-.003 
(.OOk) 
11.3.83* 
(62.12) 
893.5!.* 
(323.28) 
»-2 68.03 
(63.10) 
-761.91.* 
(301..95) 
R' .398 .1.01 .399 .k05 .1.30 .1.30 .1.33 .1.51 .'•55 .1.85 
r :6.i8 22.01. 18.61. 16.65 Ik.58 16.29 12.20 13.08* 12.21* 9.67* 
21.87. 21.86. 21.96. 21.90. 21.50. 2U1|, 2155. 21.18. 21.16. 2381. 
"Btwifluril errorB of r.;>:r<(mtofi co'-'fncitffits «ppsar In pAMnth*.'a«5 below co^-fflctpn':. Vr.rre » blank Bpftc.- appears the 
»»rl«blc 1> not lnclu^.i*J In the «luntlon. An • Ji'notej sU-iitricmici- at tli ' .10 level. A '  lirnntri st^nirU-nnce »t the .05 
levul. 
^Standard error of estimate. 
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Tsble 111 Ion;fflclcn^v fnr b'uik 9 vliirh h^t'I P/) W'Tki ef hnrrmi l.ftvrcu JonuAry ?, 19^3 (ui'l D**c«nibor ?l, 
• Éijumtlon , ; 1 2 ' , 3 k . 5 ^ 6 1.:/, / 6 3 ' 10 
Con»t*nt 233.06» 2^0.15* 2(7.16» 2?8.80t 283.871 111.6? 533.05 f,?™.? 819''.7 TW3.? 
(109.97) (112.06) (IPO.30) (115.63) (115.25) (:'V,'.31) (37!>.2''i) (7715.") (77W.7) (790li.l) 
H-i .Wit .Wf . .Wl .WLt .1,231 .U3lit .Lwf . .'.?U .li?3<, .3501 
(.06?) (.070), (.068) (.OÙPj , (.066) , (.067) (.CC6) (.0(9) (.070) (.07:) 
8-2 .286» .297t ^ .288t .293» .287» ' .287» .206» .26"' .2821 .2li6t 
(.072) (.078) (.072) (.076) (.0(8) : (.069)/ (.O'J?) ( 072) (.077) (.075) 
8-3 ..025 • -.OI15 ' .008 .038 
(.070) (.068) . (.076) (.075) 
tu • . -.099» . -.100» ..096» -.096», -.loit» -.108» -.105» -.lOf» -.108» -.0981 
(.022) (.032) (.0^2) (.0?2) (.022) (.022) (.022)' (.02?) (.023) (.022) 
4U-1 -.063» .063» -.061» -.058» -.099+ -.090» -.091» -.nor, I -.006» -.032» 
(.023) (.023) (.022) (.022) (.028) (.020) (.028) (.023) (.029) (.02?) 
4U-2 -.0lt3t -.0^0» -.nil II» -.oWi -.Ol<l« 
(.0:2) (.022) (.022) (,n:V) (,n?M ( .nn-,) 
r - i  582.06 éïli.iu Jll.9.t» -6;1.96 701.08 -lU'l,.) UOO.7 .lyY.r .uw;.0 157n,k 
(Wo.83) (1.77.01,) (B.'O.U (612.58) (871,.81) (750.65) (119',,6) (f-.'I.Y) (At'l,'':') (l?>?.l) 
f-4 . 1389.9» 796.32» 119l,.8' 818.22" llMl.5' 9^0.1,1" 
(379.1) (1,1(2.16) (1,39.2) (508.55) (1,1.7.."'J) (kl,7.72) (515.71) 
g-d . : - 330.32 -962.99 177.52 297.80, -1P20.3 
(625.91) (11,20.3) (712.05) (707.70) (1681.l) 
(r-d)' lkl,9.9 -3187.6» -3809.9» -Iil82.6» 
(31,13.0) (1119.7) (11,1,9.3) (11,90.5) 
(f-d)® 909.91,» 865.61,» 717.58 
(1,21.35) (1,33.62) (1,1,1.01) 
(g-d)^ 632.80 , 1108.1, 
(1156.5) (1299.5) 
(r-d)' -1,1,07. k (3619.3) 
AL -.057 
(.Oi.3) 
-.051, 
(.01,2) 
-.055 
(.c',3) 
-.051 
(.01,2) 
-.05'' 
(.01,3) 
-.056 
(.013) 
- .068 
(.01.3) 
» -8807.8 
(9701.5) 
-lOlUO. 
(9606.5) 
.9209.0 
(9897.7) 
I-l .001 
(.002) 
.002 
(.002) 
1-2 -.001 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.002) 
I-l 23.52 
( 37.78) 
378.50» 
(11,9.71) 
lt-2 
-3.77 
(38.16) 
-369.1,0' 
(11,6.35) 
R: .578 .578 .592 .608 .636 .618 .637 .622 .620 .651, 
F 5l,.21r L5.00t 1,0.56t 37.82t 33.68» 31,.88» 27.89» 2fi.l7f 23.88' 19.l,2t 
131,.8 135.1 1333. 1309. 1269. 1296. 1271,. 1299. 1305. 1263. 
•sun.UrJ errorj of re .î re «a Ion cocfflcl-ntu Bpptfiir Ir. [, ir>'nth.'ti»r. b.-Uu ..«ck cc-.-ff Irl-ni.. V.li.rre « blank nppeirl the 
v»rl(ible U not tnelu-leJ In the e;u'itlon. An • Uenot.*s sw'nl ficvice it tlin .ic level. A * B ri enncc at the ,C5 
level, 
^Stsndurd error of eatlnate. 
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Table : 1:^ Beif.ri'fialon cvTfflcinnl'i* for bojik 10 whl'M h'l'J 70 of bnrr'iwltip, t^ctwe^n J«;'unry ?, 1963 imd December 21, 1966 
JLV^UHtlen 1 -• y 3 3 • "U , • -5 6 • r . . ,8 . 10 
Conutnnt 691.6u 
(200.981 
673.I'51 
(281:,. 29) 
750.631 
(326.119), 
650.",51 
(?nr,.li 'y) 
723,37' 
( I'U.Vl) 
-1W3.V 
(6VJ.7?) 
-2270.8t 
(v6y.fCi) 
-18230. 
(15.110,) 
-20530. 
(153'iO.) 
-18730. 
(16010.) 
•E-v,; ^ • ( .068) (.069) (.069) 
' .kC'Ol 
(.070) 
• ItSi 
(.066) 
.3211 
:•',:(.070) 
.3101 
(.071) 
.3101 
I .on)  
.303f 
(.07?) 
.2671 
(.080) 
B-2 . fh ' j t  
(.069) 
.23H 
(.070 
\ .2''3i 
(.070) 
. tn \  
(i07t) 
.256) 
(.07") 
, .1811 
(.OÎU) 
, .1761 
(.on) 
.1811 
(.073) 
.175t 
(.075) 
• .I7M 
. (.076) 
B-3 .023 
(.066) 
.006: 
(.067) 
.037 
(.073) 
.032 
(.075) 
6 V  - . 1 1 0 1  
(.021) 
-.not 
(.021) 
-.JlOf 
(.021) 
-.llDf 
(.021) 
-.127' 
(.021) 
-.1111 
(.021) (.021) 
-.1091 
(.021) 
-.107* 
(i02l) 
• -.1021 
(.022) 
ÛU-1 -.0861 
(.o:?) 
-.OlSbl 
(."21! 
-.0801 
( .on) 
-.0»ltt 
( .0^1) 
-.125' 
(>025! 
-.1121 
(,02M 
-.1081 
(.02S! 
-.1111 
( ,02-;) 
-.113+ 
(.025) 
-.107» 
(.025) 
ÛU-? ..Ol'lil 
(.021) 
-.01.2 1 
( .O.'l)) 
-.0591 
(.oru) 
-.01.21 
( .OI'll) 
-,0671 
( .022) 
-.o6ù1 
(.023) 
-ItOll.ï'j 
(ypj.iit) 
-Itw.ll 
l';. '5.6u) 
yii.T" 
i i ' i r i . s )  
-TO-J ' I ,  i  
(lliVJ,7) 
-CUJ , ? l 4  
(:'.•'( 1.1') 
-8nO,2t 
(2,'J1.3) 
-lO'/'O.t 
(ur;,7) 
.82VU.III 
(:'l 'W'.7) 
.8267.11 
(I'M:'.3) 
•11IflO.I 
(liOOi.?) 
f-d 13f,9.l. 
(981 .81.) 
131'». 
(Jl«',.9) 
-Wl.fll 
(1061.1) 
-369.23 
(1272.1) 
-830.31 
(lOyL.o) 
-953.18 
(U"35.0) 
-3iH.51 
(1337.9) 
g.d 70!i5.8l. 
(iefi5.7! 
10110.1 
(3757,3) 
8377.Ill . 
(2360.2) 
.8981'.21 
(23'<1,8) ;  
12000.t 
(1.182,8) 
(r-d)2 
-13L7.9 
(7607.2) 
-1U8.5 
(2703.9) 
3700.2 
(3''13,l<) 
Ii2k7.6 
(3667.6) 
(f-d)2 
-90.52 
(1053.3) 
-l'*5.95 
(1060.8) 
-313.73 
(1085.3) 
(e-d)2 
(r-d)^ 
-77.515 
(7L75.5) 
-2296,7 
(2B5L.7) 
-2206.6 
(3065.k) 
AL .011 .0)8 .019 .019 .020 .019 .018 
(.019) (.019) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) (.018) 
t 18190. 20980. 18160. 
(1«T0.) (U690.) (17570.) 
1-1 -.001 .00? 
(.005) (.005) 
1-2 -.006 -.007 
(.005) (.005) 
lt-1 -15.l<5 L6O.99 
(92.28) (138.2) 
N-2 
H' .It05 .I1O5 
r 27.00; 22.k2r 
335i?. 3360. 
•SlHH'Jiril «rroM of co.'fficiTits appeir In pfvpcntliritfa below i?arh co.îfflclent. Vhnr-î a blH.nk spice appt^ura the 
vtrlibl* 1B not Inciulfd In thp eiiuntton. An • dcnotpt s ignt ricmnrp thç .10 l.fvrl. A ^ denote* «t^nt flctnce at the .05 
level. 
.Lot' .1)12 .Lko .U77 .kSl .LSI 
I'J.lbf 17.nt 15.l8f 19.72; Il..76t lli.75t 
3367. 1357, JWl*. Jiyl'. jl'/j. 31C7. 
-35.51 
(91.97) 
.486 
I3.aur 
lit"). 
-509.76 
(l»2l.3U 
.' '93 
lO.OOt 
3201. 
^^Stwidird error of estlmnte. 
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Tftbl« 13. cwfflclvutK* for b'tnV. 11 vliltfîi hail 67 wcckN of borrowing brlv»»cn ?, 1963 «id D'tc.'nb»»? ?1, V)(i() 
CqUftiiott 
.•V. \ :l,' ' : ' • 7y ' 8 
, , 
. 10 
ConitAnt 
iW3V) 
285.07* 
171.75 
298.00 
(19i.7() 
268.6h 
(170.83) (if/J.ïS) , (3:1:6;). 
U^ I.OK 
(59'i.96), 
-22070. 
{9"'.'!.) 
.11300. 
(9'.":>>7): 
1(1370. 
(lOJOO,) 
B-1 : .5û5t 
(,066) 
.57U 
(.068) 
.56l't 
(.067) 
-, .)7L't 
(.069) 
.525{ (.065) 
-, .519t . 
: (.061.) 
.522t 
(.065) 
.Iibôt 
: (.067) 
.kfl' 
(.068) 
.'.lut 
(.075) 
8-2 .zint 
(.067) 
.zôor 
(.075) 
y .ZkBt 
(.68) 
.2Clr 
(.076) 
.2761 
(.066) 
.279' 
(.061.) 
.27'.' 
(.066) 
.328! 
(.068) 
: . .209' 
(.073) 
.195' 
(.075) 
B-3 -.025 
(.063) 
.067 
(.06?) 
.065 
(.070) 
AU -.1831 
(.03J) 
-.lOlit 
(.031) 
-.183! 
(.031) 
-.l8Lf 
(.031) 
-.220t 
(.031) 
-.223» 
(.031) 
-.220' 
(.031) (.031) 
-.220t 
(.031) 
-.215' 
(.03)) 
&V-1 -.130t 
(.OJL'j 
-.iriM 
(.033) 
-.lîoi-
(.033) 
-.1:01 
(.033) 
-.209» 
(.037) 
-.209' 
(.«37) 
-.206t 
(.037) 
-.207t 
(.036) 
-.2121 
(.037) 
-.209' 
(.037) 
AU-3 
(.031) 
-,1'.3' 
I.030) ( .031) 
-.11.7' 
( .">') 
..159' 
(.033) 
-.162' 
(.0:1,1) 
r-d lO'J.U 
(STJ.d) 
10).11. 
(iTJ.'JO) 
Ï11.3'; 
(1?35.7 
21?. Oil 
(911.k') 
-ITY.TO 
(13X1.7) 
703,1.3 
(113:1.3 
ecv.5B 
(l0«.O 
903.7? 
(1177.2) 
970. 
(1183.2) 
1191.1 
(1950.M 
f-d -26.36 
591.2I< 
375.60 
(691.0,^) 
1.90.73 
(66?.70) 
836.23 
(787.92) 
307.76 
(6<.8.?6) 
523.3: 
(673.55) 
877.53 
(802.60). 
«•d -I0I.1.I. 
(9I.5.9) 
1.7.31. 
(218'..1) 
-355.33 
(1091.2) 
-882.111. 
(1073.'.) 
897.31. 
(21,11.3) 
(r-<t)V 
-1580.0 
(510'i.9) 
575.53 
(17'i6.2) 
582.05 
(2260.7) 
177.36 
(2328.8) 
(r-d)' 
-Lli8.62 
(652.1?) 
•305.90 
(671..51.) 
-270.03 
(685.21) 
(e-i)' 
-1052.0 
(1731.3) 
-1373.3 
(1798.2) 
(r-d)' 1815.2 
(5fi25.3) 
*L 
-.026 
(.051) 
-.038 
(.01.8) 
-.310 
(.018) 
-.01.0 
(.01,9) 
-.031 
(.01,6) 
-.026 
(.01.8) 
-.029 
(.0L9) 
• 
11.290. 
(H2L0.) 
13370. 
(11280.) 
16670. 
(111,60.) 
I-l 
-.002 
(.003) 
-.003 
(.003) 
1-2 
.001 
(.002) 
.002 
(.003) 
*-l 101.51' 
(1.5.96) 
529.15' 
(296.59) 
11-2 69.60 
(1,6.26) 
-1,20.79 
(281.35) 
/ .601, 
.605 .605 .605 .61.5 .6L6 .61,8 
.658 .657 .668 
r 60.lt9t 50.22t It3.8u 37.37' 35.09' 39.".St 29.31' 30.69" 28.01" 20.65' 
2067. 2072. 2078. 2081. 1983. 1975. 1966. 1956. 196).. i960. 
*Stand«r<i errors of rtf.rcHjlm cotCflcl'^ nta «pfvir in pnr>.'nth^ :tej below fach cooffieient. Where a bJnnX space the 
VArimbl* il not Inclu'led in the equation, An • denotes alf^nlflcmicc at the .10 level, A r denotes st^^nlflcince At the ,05 
level. 
^Standurd error of estlnite. 
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Table iL, RegktKui<;n cij.. 'fflciunti.* for bfujl 12 wlilcf h'.ti 65 WL'i. 'kH of borrovlnn b.'t,w"frn J'lnwnry 2, (uiJ 21, 1966 
Equation ••••• 1 , 2 3 • :  5 • (. •/ T :: 9 • 10 
Conotonl lûU.litii 
(111,It?) 
126.731 170.57* ll0.7fit 
( ' .3.7:') 
/  167.7?' 
(I,T.I'8) 
-?2.13 
(98.17) 
-15.86 
(155.1.3) 
-1867.9 
(1676.1) 
-1109.8 
(1676.5) 
: .1699.0 . 
(1691.1) 
B-1 .Tti3t 
(.069) 
.fizjr 
(.069) 
.T6,r 
(.ow) 
/.SfAt' 
(.070) 
, .72X 
(.070) 
.7C3i 
(.070) 
.70:,: 
(.070) 
. .6' '6t 
(.071) 
:  . . 7 ^ 3 ;  
(.071) 
.f-kt 
(.070) 
B-2 ^.sror 
(.069) 
".iiiri 
( .085) (.070) 
• - .1.051 
(.085) (.071) 
-.226». 
(.069) 
-.225» 
(.071) 
..296t 
(.071) 
:-.l.23t 
(.001.) 
-.1.96» 
(.001) 
B-3 .2l.3f 
(.063) 
.235' 
( .06?) 
.Slfit 
(.072) 
.217» 
(.070) 
ÛU -,0ll0t 
(.018) 
-.OkO» 
• (.018) 
-.O3O1 
(.019) 
-.Ol.3t 
(.010) 
..056» 
(.021) 
-.057» 
(.020) 
-.057t 
(.021) 
-.057» 
(.020) 
..066t 
(.020) 
..058» 
(.019) 
au-i 
-.033' 
(.019) 
-.ojy 
(.out) 
-.030 
i.wy) 
-.026 
(.018) 
-.OkSt 
(.0?^) 
-.0571 
(.0:2) 
-.050» 
(.022) 
-.0501 
(.021) 
-.055» 
(.C:'l) 
-.051» 
(.0:0! 
AU-2 -.03"» 
(.0:1) 
-.031," 
( .CL"j) 
-.036» 
-.037" -.01.8» -,Okl» 
(,mo) 
r-d no.1.8 
(1)0.0;) 
57. TV 
(11.6.9?) 
3?T.')5 
(3X7.17) 
-yi'Ci.Ol 
(: 'Jl..-"'j) 
-8,03 
( 3r,l,. 31 ) 
-6II1 ,ll.l 
(31;'.8;') ()0,",lili) 
-70». 3'.» 
(31),)' ') 
.6 ' ;6.8,''» 
(31?. 30) 
-%7,9'/ 
(kOV.OJ) 
f-d 239.10 
(15'. .71.) 
276.77 
(IC9.IP) 
Ilk.95 
(179.1.1) 
110.1.8 
(.-'11. IR) 
231.k) 
(180.99) 
16).19 
(177.56) 
160.76 
(196,kl) 
R-d 516.671 
(2)6.7)) 
503.1.6 
() 'w.)3) 
1.18.38 
(3."1.93) 
'388.31. 
(316.73) 
: I.k7.k6 
(6:).56) 
(r-d)2 179.19 
(13^3.5) 
-385.50 
(1.79.79) 
-71.26 
(612.57) 
21.6,30 
(589.ko) 
: 36.80 
(176.01) 
16.69 
(181.73) 
65.07 
(168.8?) 
(g-4)' 
.778 
(1.65.511 
-79.98 
(1135.30) 
(r-d)' 
-580.96 
(11.12.8) 
• 
&L -.021. 
(.025) 
-.017 
(.026) 
-.020 
(.025) 
-.019 
(.026) 
-.Oil. 
(.021.) 
-.020 
(.021.) 
..Oik 
(.021.) 
• 
1969.2 
(1906.2) 
1152.2 
(190I.,6) 
1696.9 
(1883.9) 
I-l .002» 
(.001) 
.001» 
(.001) 
1-2 .002» 
(.001) 
.002» 
(.001) 
lt-1 65.11.» 
(25.12) 
357.37» 
(73.25) 
N-2 6.12 
(25.30) 
-321.2k» 
(71.k;) 
B' .It31 .L65 .1.33 .1.7k .I.5U .1.63 .1.63 .1.91. .509 .572 
T 29.991 28.50, 21.38f 21.95r 16.Ok, le.SOr 13.73» 15.51* 15.15' 13.73» 
536.9 522.1 538.7 520.3 532.8 526.9 531.0 515.7 509.2 ksi.e 
"standard errors of re^^rcsslon cOfffUlenf.s appear in piipcnthoa'.-a b»?low cach un'.'frirlfnt. Where a blink spacf appear: the 
variable U not included In the e«%uatlon. An • denotes sl/'nl flctince i».t the ,10 level. A • denotes sir.nt ftcvice at thr ,05 
level. 
^Stsfldard error of estimate, 
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Tubl» 15» co'-fflflctiin for t-fuik 13 whtç^ hml ti'* Pf bot-rf" 1 biïtw.'çn JfviU'iry 2» X9^J (uul 21, VjCC 
Ct^UKllun "'l'- : z : ' '3' . 6 i/... ••• » ;•  10 : 
Constant, lilli.jCt 
(1^5.19) 
li26.0ff 
(1118.97) 
38';. 08» 
(171.96) 
Ii51.15t 
(151.91') 
1(02.17t 
(155.90) 
-l'29.l'8 
(322.02) 
-liiio.ei 
(51''.911) 
1,1,68.2 
(61,30.0) 
1,800.8 
(6558.2) 
I
f
 
My:/': 
:53u: 
(.070) 
. .JU't . 
(.071) 
. .53:) 
(.071) (.071) 
.50'" 
(.072) 
.i>57t 
(.072) 
. .IlliO» 
; (.073) 
.Ii3i» 
(.072) 
.1,21» 
(.073) 
: .360» 
(.000) 
B-? .loL 
(.073) 
.117 
(.081) 
.110 
(.07l<) 
.319 
(.08.?) 
.IW 
(.oyk) 
.120' 
(.072) 
.118 
(.073) 
.075 
i.ôlM, 
.101 
(.079) 
,07\ ' 
, ..(.030) 
- .026 
(.070) 
-.026 
(.0(0) 
..006 
(.075) 
' ..063 % 
(.077) 
4U -.193» 
(.0l»l) 
-.mt 
(.okl) 
-.19'" 
(.OLI) 
-.205» 
(.0l'2) 
-.232» 
(.OW) 
-.215» 
(.0l'2) 
-.212» 
(.Ol'S) 
-.221,» 
(.Olil) 
..216» 
(.0l<2) 
-.215» 
(.01,1) 
4U-1 -.130) 
(.Ok:) 
-.131t 
(.01;;?) 
-.130t 
(.Ole) 
-.136» 
(.dc) 
-.Plk» 
(.052) 
-.205» 
(.050) 
-.203» 
(.051) 
-.206» 
(.oso) 
-.218» 
(.051) 
-.1991 
(.051) 
4U-2 -.1091 (.nLP) 
-.not 
( .olil ) 
-.109» 
( .OliP) 
-.lliM 
( .OM) 
-.117» 
(,ol|li) 
-.090» 
(.01,1,) 
t'i 91'2.10' 
(533.00 (5!'3.23) 
IMI .0 
tlu'fl.J) 
1516.0» 
(Oli'.l') 
2159.g' 
I1C07.1) 
-17».I 
(9'/ ' .  3) 
-tni'6.7 
(165''.9) 
503.5 
(Id 
3(36,5:' 
(1071.1) 
67.23 
(1716.2) 
t-4 .li05.fi (511.2) 
-579.7 
(626.2) 
-1613.1» 
(588.0) 
-1596.11 
(695.0) 
-lTi8.7t 
(586.6) 
-iWC.!» 
(588.8) 
-11,51.0» 
(693.7) 
g-4 2656.81 (669.5) 
2371.3 
(1981.5) 
iU5.9 
( It'll?.0) 
1531.6 
(1"56,2) 
-263.6 
(2,'67.0) 
(r-d)® 2067.2 
(lili3J.O) 
-609.0 
(1550.8) 
1065.2 
(2015.7) 
-65.87 
(2050.7) 
(f-d)^ -109.7 (582.2) 
.316.8 
(568.6) 
-377.11 
(590.70) 
(g-d)^ 539.3 (1517.7) 
1602.3 
(1605.7) 
(r-d)3 -3090.5 
(U72U.0) 
-.OÎS ..020 -.011 -.012 -.012 -.011 7"®^^, 
(.026) (.026) (.025) (.0;6) (.025) (.025) (.025) 
-56%!,. 6 -5992.0 -7933.8 
(70fl0.lt) (7251.1') (7618.9) 
I-l 
s
i
 
.005" 
(.003) 
1-2 .005* (.002) 
.003 
(.003) 
H-1 116.37 (1,3.07) 
1,75.60» 
(256.80) 
N-2 29.72 (LI,.05) 
.1,12.82» 
(21,8.55) 
f? .Ul6 .1,16 .1,18 .123 .Uli3 .U68 .I170 .I19U .1,83 .508 
T 28.20» 23.',2' 20.10» 17.86» 15.33» 18.93» Ill, .12» I5.5lt- 13.611+ 10.61,» 
1781,. 1788. 1790. 1766. 1765. 1721. 1730, 1691. 17 U. 1693. 
•Bt«/i<JnrJ errors of rcgr.-oslnit cocfl ict.!nts aupoiir In par..>nth. :cj bslcw c^r'i co-fflrl»n'.. W)irre a bliwk »p*r., «Pr*» th« 
«jrUblr 1« not Inclu.le.l In thr «-iimtlrai. An • .l'natea slgnl rUiwL-.,- ut thr .10 le"»!. A t .Icnot»» slrntftcwce at the .Oj 
level. 
^Stun'SftrJ error of ejtlnate. 
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Tftblt 1<J. HfgrYAwloM cocfflclentd" for bonk ik vhlcU h«ul C3 wcekg of borruwin#; betwcth JfUiuiry 2, 19<l3 and DeccmbT 21, IjGû 
Equation 1 : • z '• •,3 •• Il 5 7 • 
• 
. ,10 
Conntant jw.i'O' : 
(ïflz.lis) 
kdl.O? 
(263.79) 
190,06 
(327.8?) 
251.I'll 
(260.26) 
166.05 
(301.65) 
353.75 
(628.115) 
107.95 
(990.17) 
13820. 
(166)8.) 
2330O, 
(16501.)., 
21750. 
(1691.0,) 
.Usa* 
(.065) 
• ,378» 
(.068) 
,lil7t 
(.065) 
V .iBItt 
(.066) 
. '•37» 
• (.061.) 
'  .127+ 
: (.061.) 
.I.2A+ 
(.065) 
.I12I1+ 
(.068) 
.357+ 
(.060) 
.316 + 
(.071.) 
fc-2 .38lt 
(  .Oi f j ]  , .3)1* (.071) 
.38lit 
(.066) 
.32Jt 
: (.OÛÛ), 
. .30ot 
(.065) 
.382 + 
(.565) 
.381+ 
. (.066) 
.389+ 
(.070) 
.335+ 
, (.071) 
.321+ 
(.0/1.) 
B-3 .127» 
(.066) 
.ILW 
(.065) 
.Î17 + 
(.07lt) 
. .21.5 + 
(.076) 
6U - ,Ul i  
(.o?3) (.026) 
-.12Uf 
(.026) 
-.IjSt 
(.026) 
—Hot 
(.020) 
-.m» 
(.028) 
-.139+ 
(.028) 
-.1I1I+ 
(.028) 
-,llt^+ 
(.028) 
-.H3+ 
(.020 
iU-1 -.092t 
(.0?6) 
-.09'»* 
(.026) 
-.090t 
(.026) 
-.087+ 
(.02)) 
-.090» 
(.031) 
-0.91+ 
(.031) 
-.089+ 
(.031) 
-.090» 
(.031) 
-.lOlit 
(.031) 
-.101+ 
(.03?) 
AU-2 
-.010 
{.0?6) 
..Oil 
(.0:'^;) 
-,0o8 
(.0:1) 
-.008 
(.0?7) 
• «030 
(.028) 
-.035 
(.028) 
r-d 2W.9i; 
(1030,7) 
-1W.0Ï 
(iOl/P.5) 
1877,2 
(2090.2) 
-3e<)9.i" 
(IX'0.7) 
-l4;o.2 
(3319.7) 
-3175,1 
(19]' ' .0) 0152.8) 
-3it ' '6.; '  
(; 'Q13.9) 
-39)0.6+ 
(mil. 9) 
-1780.6 
(ï '0/,3) 
f-d 3026.5• 
ms.s) 
2953.5+ 
(1200.3) 
2793.2+ 
(1177.7) 
3162.2+ 
(13811.2) 
27") '1.5 + 
(1223.8) 
2919.9+ 
(1199.6) 
351.9.6+ 
(ll.oO,2) 
22.1.0 
(1675.3) 
22L7.5 
(1828.3) 
: ->132.71 
(Ifl'lt'..?) 
-66.15 
(lAPi.Lo) 
26I13.8 .. 
(1.11.1.8) 
(r-d)^ 6153.7 
(65'<6.2) 
-2559.6 
(2963.5) 
-1088.9 
(3907.1) 
-786.60 
(3931.1.) 
(f-d)® 
-210.37 
(1125.8) 
37.98 
(1159.3) 
11.6.18 
(1161.9) 
(g-d)' 
-2577.2 
(2967.8) 
-3526.2 
(3037.8) 
(r-d)^ lOOkO. 
(9077.8) 
AL 
-.086t 
(.026) 
-.085' 
(.027) 
-.081,+ 
(.027) 
-.087+ 
(.027) 
-.086+ 
(.027) 
-.081+ 
(.026) 
-.085+ 
(.027) 
• 
-15270. 
(18790.) 
-25950. 
(18630.) 
-2li760. 
(19130.) 
I-l 
.002 
(.005) 
.007 
(.006) 
1-1  
.001 
(.005) 
.000 
(.005) 
*-l 
-33.lie 
(106.11) 
151.78 
(235.08) 
11-2 
-175.67" 
(106.33) 
-362.65 
(228.liB) 
.559 .567 .56k .607 .599 .597 .601 .599 .617 .626 
r  ;o.26f 36.23» 37.62t 28.88» 31.97+ 2I1.OO+ 23.77+ 23.52+ 17.18+ 
3I<82. 31.60. 3'>8l. 3311'. 3362. 3363. 3372. 3382. 3315. 3320. 
^Standard errors of rrgrcaalon cocHicIents appror in pircnth'îses below each coofficicnt. k'hpr'^ a blwik apace appeara the 
variable is not Included in the e^untlon. An • denotes slj^ntflciwc* at the ,10 level. A ^ denotes atfnifleancc at the »05 
level. 
^Standard error of estlmtte. 
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Ttblt n. Ilegi-OBBlon coffrlclMits* for bank 15 vtilcli h'jcl 61 v^cko of borriivliift betvcnti Jiumary 2, IVé3 «nJ December 21, 1966 
Equation 1 ; ^ 2 3 ; 5 ' •  (  T : • » .9 
Constant 2009.lit 
(1,11.95) 
1780.fit 
(1,31,.72) 
2051,.7t 
(1,72.1,1) 
ii 
2114.6t 
(1,52.80) 
1129.9 
(92',.69) I
I
 
.J8120. 
(1579".) 
-IMPO. 
(1601.0.) 
-2131,0. 
(16700.) 
,»-i;V ' . !2 l f  
(.072) 
.230t 
(.072) 
.2:it 
(.072) 
.238t:, 
(.073) 
.211,+ 
(.071,) 
.197 + 
, (.071,) 
,m+ 
(.071,) 
.153' 
(.070) 
.195+ 
(.071,) 
.156' 
(.089) 
B-s' y 
-.061,. 
(.072) 
. -.088 
• (.073) 
-.061, 
(.072) 
-.092 
(.071,) 
-.055 
(.072) 
..056 
(.072) 
-.077 
(.072) (.07l<) 
; -.109 
(.078) 
-.123 
(.079) 
8-3 .112 
(.070) 
.120' 
(.071) 
.120 
(.071,) 
.095 
(.076) 
AU -.053* 
(.021) 
-.051t 
(.021,) 
-.053t 
(.021) 
-.050t 
(.021) 
-0.71+ 
(.026) 
-.072+ 
(.026) 
-.073+ 
(.026) 
-.071+ 
(.026) 
-.072+ 
(.026) 
-.072+ 
(.026) 
AU-1 -.01,5' 
(,o;!i) 
-.Okl' 
(.0:1,) 
-.01,5' 
(.025) 
-.038 
(.035) 
-.075+ 
(.0:9) 
-.078+ 
(.029) 
-.OBlt 
(.OM) 
..076t 
(.020) 
-.078+ 
(.029) 
-.079+ 
(.020) 
4U-2 -.05l,t 
(.0:6) 
-.01,8+ 
(.O.-'b) 
-.061+ 
(.o;-b) 
-.otVit 
(.0:6) 
-.ObOt 
(.027) 
-.0b9t 
(.027) 
-1670.5 
(1360.1,) 
-iUfl.3 
(ij%.i) 
-101,2.2 
(i 'yi'fl.e) 
-13J?.7 
(2170.7) 
-1)57.9 
(3Vfl'.U) 
-361,6.8 
(2Ûjl,.l) 
-7878.0* 
(VCM.O) 
-LlliO.A 
(3027.7) 
•3719.6 
(3125.1) 
-7913.5 
(5100.1,) 
t -d -183.62 
(11,06.3) 
687.38 
(1727.6) 
-1253.0 
(1668.5) (1P5I,-1) 
-I0O5.7 
(1681.0) 
-1020.3 
(1673.1) 
121.76 
(1965.1,) 
t - i  • H 13110.+ (5Ï00.5) 1,139.8 (2695.1,) 3781,.2 (28I,I,.0) 13850.' (fD95.1) 
(r-d)® 
-1682.1 
(1211,0.) 
1111.1 
(1,330.9) 
9710.2' 
(5605.5) 
8650.2 
(58311.0) 
(f-d)^ -11,36.6 
(1602.6) 
-730.98 
(1639.7) 
-698.30 
(1658.1,) 
(g-d)' -8736.3+ -8079.5» (1305.6) (liliSl.O) 
(r-d)^ 795.07 
(12910.) 
AL -.026 -.007 -.003 -.006 -.003 -.005 -.008 
(.027) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) (.028) 
• 19770. I60L0. 2llili0. 
(17200.) (I7W0.) (17930.) 
I-l .001 .001 
(.008) (.008) 
1-2 —.001 —.001 
(.008) (.008) 
mi »32.5ft 378.&1 
(209.83) (675.39) 
: 2 295.I'll -58.12 
(211.0L) (653.20) 
n' .077 .088 . .077 .093 .lOL .106 .130 .127 .136 .157 
r 3.30t 3.191- 2.31't 2.51t 2.2Ut 2.56t 2.38f 2.31t 2.30t 1.91f 
• kgis. I1699. L9k2. 14912. 1*908. 1,689. 1,861. k870. 1858. 1,862. 
"stftndArd errors of rcgreatjloa coeffletcnts mrpi^ar In p^ronthcsea below each corfflctcnt. When? a blnnk apice iippearB the 
v&rlable Is not InclU'lcd In the equation. An • denotea slpytlficfwice at the .10 level. A ^ denotes fllgnlflcance nt the ,05 
level. 
^Standard error of estimate. 
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Tabl, is. BiTisrcsiilDn confricl'nlB* for bNiK 16 wlitrt) hr\'l 57 vc.?jiB of borr'Mlnff b«tw<firn Jmnumry 2, 1963 nnd Dccertib^r 21, 1966 
E(|U«tloii 1 
•  - •  
. 5 "• : 6 9 10 • 
Censtsnt 9/6, IV 
(73.kg) 
. 217.67+ 
(7k.kg) 
273.231 
(83.16) 
, 21k.lilt 
(77,27) 
30q.o3+ , 
(80.86). 
227.27 
(lkm.79) 
;; k6l.7k« 
(258.k» 
.1352.8 
(61196.3) 
il 
-302,50 
(6jô6.3) 
.B-1 .787r 
(.068) 
.833» 
(.066) 
, .705» 
(.067), 
. .83k+ 
(.070) 
.7611+ 
(.070) 
• .783+ 
(.070) 
.763+ 
(.070) 
.7'!?; ; 
(.071) 
.82k + 
(.071) 
.81,7 + 
(.072) , 
P.2 , -.190+ 
(.068) 
-.016+ 
(.0116) 
-.201+ 
067). 
-.363+ 
(.087) 
..175+ 
(.070) 
-.1961 
(.071) 
-.170+ 
(.071) 
..208+ 
1.07k) 
..357+ 
(.008) 
• . ..266+ 
(.093) 
.208+: 
(.068) 
.207 + 
(.069) 
.20k + 
(.07k) 
.195+ ; 
(.073) 
iU -.027+ 
(.010) 
-.026+ 
(.010) 
..026+ 
(.010) 
-.025+ 
(.010) 
-.025+ 
(.Oil) 
-.025+ 
(.011) 
..026+ 
(.011) 
-.026+ 
(.011) 
-.026+ 
(.011) 
-.OJkt 
(.011) 
lU-1 -.029+ 
(.010) 
-.027+ 
(.010) 
-.029+ 
(.010) 
-.027+ 
(.010) 
-.0311+ 
(.01?) 
-.033+ 
(.012) 
-.03lit 
(.012) 
-.031+ 
(.012) 
-.0)2+ 
(.012) 
-.029+ 
(.013) 
4U-2 -.005 
(.Din) 
-.005 
( .010) 
» »oo^ 
( .01(1) 
-.005 
1.010) 
-.oofl 
(.010) 
-.008 
( .010) 
r-d 106.70 
(2kC.U?) 
76.69 
(:'ku'.oi) 
IOC9.3» 
('jl'>.H) 
ko. 3') 
(JWJ.IÔ) (Cua.oj) 
-37. ?l 
(',1".BV) 
ikiw,.;.» 
('Jro.95) 
.101,.'1, 
(Jl'll.flv) 
70.3k 
(515.jO) 
1395.k" 
(S15.3k) 
f-d 30.96 
(251.96) 
-25U.I16 
(313.10) 
I..3'' 
(31".on) 
-HI.91. 
(362.ko) 
-39.92 
(322.30) 
he.90 
(316.97) 
-73.87 
(359.69) 
e-d 120.78 
(k3k.li5) 
-k97.7li , . 
(966.Br) 
• 3k2.55 • 
(Sk'i.OO) 
-33.5k 
(526.07) 
-507.5k 
(1037.5) , 
(r-d)^ 2205.k 
(2lk5.6) 
' :-20li7.5t 
(771.13) 
-2372.71 
(998.81) 
-221k.0+ 
(987.k7) 
(f-d)^ k98.7C» 
(293.02) 
Ii96.k6 
(303.70) 
333.16 
(301.07) 
(g-d)î 172.20 
(775.kl) 
201.55 
(76k.15) 
(r-d)^ -'1232.6* 
(2277.3) 
AL .003 .006 .OCT .005 .007 .003 .007 
(.Oil) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.01k) 
t 1775.3 15''7.9 602.?1 
(7103.9) (6993.9) (6871.7) 
I-l -.001 -.000 
(.001) (.001) 
1.2 .000 .000 
( .000)  ( .001)  
N-l 7.!03 -'•39.57+ 
(52.kO) (171.76) 
11.2 Ik.70 398.29+ 
(51.76) (167.36) 
B' .II75 .'•99 .197 .500 .500 .k76 .500 .k50 .500 .537 
T 35.81+ 32.67+ 27.63+ SU. l 'J t  19.03+ 19.61+ 15.77+ Ik.68+ lk.6kt 12.00 + 
886.1 ___ ,867.9 871-9 872.2.__878^9 Mi._Z 860.j 
*Stiin<Jarcl «rrors of répression coefficients «ppenr in p»ir»»ivth'î5».5 b'»Iov e<ich cocfflelcnt. Vherf » bîvik sptce appt^f i rs the 
varitble is not Incluleil in the equation. An • dcnot»?» slmlftcutc'î at thf .10 A + denotes significance at the ,05 
level. 
^Stardard error of estimmte. 
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Tftbln 19» R««r«89lou TLcUnt»^ for buiik 17 which had 5^ wt'«Ku of borroving butween Januiiy 2, 19(33 wnJ Dçct*œber 21, 19^6 
Equation ;i , / : S  . V 3 ' I* . 5 . ' .6 \ 7 , „ 9 10 
Constant Hil.SJt 
(iiii.oai lOJ.Tfit 
nfi.Tst 
(50.Ï3! 
93.Bit 
( h . l h )  
157.kit 
(i.7.?6) 
-.k; 
97.50 
126.55 
(156.IS) (3523.9) 
1057.' '  
(3li82.l) 
833,5k 
(3377.3) 
.SIl7T 
( .OTO) 
.<T3t 
(.069) 
; . 6 3 Ô J  
(.071) 
- ,  . 6 6 9 *  
( .069) 
: .619^ .63ot 
(.070) 
• ; . 6 w  
(.072) 
.591* 
(.07?) 
.633* 
( .070) 
.637* 
( .076) 
, -.053 : 
( .on) 
'..2;5f. 
{.08i) 
' ..112 
(.072) 
-.?6lt 
(.081) 
..119" 
(.071) 
•  - .106 
(.070) 
• • • 
(.072) 
• -.l<7t 
(.07I1) 
;;-.?70t, 
(.082) 
-.?73* . 
(.093) 
B 3 
(.069) 
.2119 r 
(.068) 
.205* 
( .07I1) 
.200* 
(.076) 
AU -.0Sl4 
(.015) 
- .021 
( .OIL) 
-.023 
(.015) 
-.038f 
(.017) 
-.039t 
(.OlP) 
- .037+ 
(.018) 
-.037t 
( .018) 
-.036» 
( .018) 
- .038* 
(.018) 
-.037* 
(.018) 
AU-1 -.016 
(.015) 
-.01? 
(.oiM 
-.015 
(.01)) 
-.010 
( .oiM 
-.021 
(.018) 
-.021 
i  .Olfl)  
-.020 
i .olS) 
-.021 
( .015) 
-.019 
(.017) 
-.017 
( .018) 
AU-2 - .OU 
(.oll i)  
-.010 
( .OIL) 
-.009 
( .01:1 
- .010 
(.Oltl)  
-.013 
( .Oll i  )  
-.013 
( .015) 
r-d -5?.B1 
(lliC.liT) ( lL?.89) 
3I15.OO 
(325.07) (Pgli.)?) 
?.C3 
(3011.38) 
-716.?7t 
(301.06) 
- P t P . H ' i  
(lv).7f) 
-7l<0.75f 
(30S.5C) 
-701,81'* 
(2V7.18) 
.313,80 
(W5.63) 
f-d 329.18* 
(ll<7.12) 
259.13 
(182.08) 
167.63 
(178.70) , 
iLft.ia 
(208.68) 
2ni.07 
(181.85) 
260.78 
(177.73) 
210.50 
(209.97) 
«-d 367.11k ' 
(251.93) 
'  -63.06 
(578.05) 
267.89 
(329.81.1) 
1614.21 
(318.39) 
-2.12 
(ézz.Lô) 
(r-d)® 
-989.05 
(1290.3) 
-606.11» 
(1'83.1?) 
-670.26 
(627.75) 
-587.68 : 
(62k.99) 
(f-4)® 129.61 
(171.20) 
95.OL 
(176.01,) 
103.73 
(177.72) 
(g-d)® 293.03 112.ko 
(163.69) (159.96) 
(r-d)3 L18.60 
(1360.2) 
AL 
-.015 
(.011) 
-.01? 
(.011) 
-.011 
(.011) 
-.011 
(.012) 
-.010 
(.011) 
-.013 
(.011) 
-.013 
(.011) 
» -I82lt.8 
(3810.8) 
-1199.8 
(3765.3) 
-879.32 
(3860.2) 
I-l -.000 
(.001) 
-.000 
(.001) 
1-2 .000 
(.001) 
.000 
(.001) 
N-1 6lt.l2* 
(26.ko) 
-k7.28 
(97.19) 
lt-2 39.10 
(24.51) 
81.85 
(92.59) 
R: .362 .399 .368 .I>18 .389 .387 .393 .k06 .k31 .I136 
r  22. l i  l i t  21.80* 16.31* I7.50t 13.30* 13.61* I0.33t 10.86* 11.09* •  T.93* 
I.e.* 525.2 510.9 525.2 505.1" 520.1' 519.9 521.2 516.0 50(5.0 510.9 
*Stviiltr«l «rrors of regression coefficients appeur In parcnth'tscs below each coefficient. Where n blank space appears the 
variable la not Included In the equation. An • denote# sl^ni flcanec at the ,10 level. A * denotes significance at the ,05 
level, 
^Standard error of estlmatr. 
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Tablv 20. Be^riMiaioii co«fflel«ntu* for tiuik 16 which httil 53 veiKu of borrovinc Jwiunry 2, 19^3 and Dtfccmber 21, IPGC 
.Equatlou 1 , Z •• ... 3 y , k , 5 6 7 . 8, 10 
Conotani 319.99 
(251».55) 
372.51 
(2)3.35) 
393.113 
(292.É6) 
Ii52.1i9' 
(265.13) 
356.î6 
(201.23) 
51<1.5Ï 
(603.53) 
-iiya.3i 
(9?T.!6) 
.. -9819.3 
(1101.0.) 
-13260. 
(11090.) 
-17110. 
(13000.) 
B-1 .862» 
(.070) 
.856» 
(.069) 
.860» 
(.070) 
.862» 
(.069) 
. .833» 
; (.071) 
.832» 
: (.071) 
.62.1t 
(.071) 
, .813» 
(.071) 
.6:61 
(.072) 
.8l£t 
(.074) 
; .063 . 
(.070) 
.  .1891 
(.091) 
.CCC 
(.071) 
.180» 
(.090) 
.083 
(.071) 
.067, 
(.071) 
^ .092 
(.071) 
; .060 
(-071.) 
.153" 
(.092) 
.142 
(.093) 
B-3 -.136» 
(.062) 
-.132» 
(.062) 
-.129* 
(.075) 
V -.112 
(.075) 
AU -.1891 
(.025) 
-.190» 
(.021.) 
-.190» 
(.025) 
-.200» 
(.025) 
-.218» 
(.026) 
-.213» 
(.026) 
-.209» 
(.ore) 
-.200» 
(.o^i'O 
-.208» 
(.026) 
-.200» 
(.027) 
W-1 -.085» 
(.020) 
-.089» 
(.027) 
-.087» 
(.020) 
-.OBI1» 
(.027) 
-.108» 
(.031) 
-.109» 
(.031) 
-.1121 
(.031) 
-.110» 
(.031) 
-.10?» 
(.031) 
-.107» 
(.031) 
4U-2 
-.058» 
(.057) 
-.055» 
(. onr, ) 
-.061» 
(.0371 
..056» 
-.03s 
(.030) 
-.041 
(.Oï'j) 
f-il 1107.0 
(895.2) 
937.0 
(UVO.I.) 
l'Sll',0 
(19:'U.9) (1362.k) 
6®. 8/1 
(2207.6) 
1376.1. 
(179I..I1) 
-39.37 
(291)5.6) 
00.56 
(193'"'. 3) 
797. M 
(1933.0) (3?02.8) 
f-d 1.3.0,1. , 
(896.29) , 
-263.1.3 
(1128.2) 
45'..30 
(1076.7) 
199.77 
(1283.9) 
2)6.91 
(110(1.8) 
30I..79 
(1105.9) 
-329.64 
(1301.0) 
g-d 
-390.22 
(1556.7) 
(I.I1B7.I) 
(3550.7) 
2269.1. 
(231.9.0) .. 
II 
8011.5» 
(4447.2) 
(r-d)' -1(1.91.8 
(7380.5) 
23.1.0 
(261.3,0) 
2752.9 
(3I.II.0) 
4227.5 
(3806.5) 
(f-d)® 886.53 
(1039.1.) 
11.03.0 
(1090.0) 
1235.6 
(1105.7) 
(e-d)® 
-1.1.73.2 
(2901.3) 
-4196.9 
(2899.7) 
UC23.2 
<7265-7) 
AL -.055t -.051* -.051' -.Ok)' -.050» -.01)9» -.Ol<7« 
(.026) (.027) (.027) (.027) (.0?7) (.027) (.027) 
» 11700. 15130. 18360. 
(12l>00.) (121.50.) (13230.) 
I-l -.007 -.008 
(.005) (.005) 
1-2 . 002 . 001, 
(.005) (.005) 
*-l • 91.23 72.18 
(93.17) (529.59) 
*-2 126.20 40.33 
(91.61) (51.6.96) 
R® .659 .862 .859 .865 .866 .865 .867 .668 .869 ,873 
T 2l0.8f 205.2t 170.7t 156.3» 121..3r 138.2* 10k.Ot 105.18» 97.08* 70.72t 
• 32)4. 322't. 3268. 3205. 3216. 32lL. 3212. 31,31,9. 3151_ 
*St«n<!ar(l errors of rf^reeaion coefficients appear in pfirfntheaes below e&rh coefficient. Where a blank «puce appe&rs the 
variable Is not Included In the equitlon. An • denotes el^niflcance at the .10 level. A * denotes significance at the .05 
level. 
^Standard error of estieate. 
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Table SI. RvBix-nuion coofflclmk»" for biiiik 1'; whlcji hod Ii9 weokn of bornultiK bftwvcn J1111U1117 ?, 1963 nnd fcc-ttbcr ?1, 1966 
E^uitloji 1 • 3 • Il « 7 8 9 10 
Constant 255.0» 
(iZk.Z) 
207.5' 
(1211.5) 
lOh.l 
(II13.8) 
137.2 
(126.5) 
272.6t 
(133.8) 
-53.8 
(?09.'') 
100.6 
(l-SJ.J) 
-3160. 
(2977.) 
.31l'l. 
(aOlili.) 
.3I1O6. 
(3119.) 
B-l , .800», 
(.008) 
/917» 
(.ouy) 
,8671 
: (.ti-if) 
. : .9001 
(.06*1 
.jyci (.071) . .796» , (.071) .795» , (.07?) , .755» : (.073) .763» (.067) •T2?t ,.(.075) 
" ..103 
(.071) 
, -.ïW» 
(.0';ii) 
-•o'-'S : 
, (.070) 
>.S51», 
(.09M 
: —01.3 
: . (.073) 
-.01.7 
(."TM 
- -.01.6 
(.0711) 
-.026 
(.075) 
. -.27''» 
(.088) 
' -.291» 
(.088) 
B-3 .1561 
(.067) 
.not 
(.066) 
.305+ 
(.069) 
.317» 
(.071) 
Ay 
-.155f 
( .02U) (.03k) 
..l'i2t 
(.02I1) 
-.137» 
(.02lt) 
-,ltf » 
(.026) 
• -.it'ftt 
(.026) 
-.163» 
(.026) 
-.167» 
(.026): 
-.l6ot 
(.02M 
-.lUt 
(.02li) 
ÛU-1 -.0014» 
(.Ol'n) 
-.070» 
(.025) 
-.0751 
(.025) 
-.071» 
(.025) 
-.not 
(.030) 
-.121» 
(.030) 
-.116» 
(.031) 
-.118» 
(.030) 
-.137» 
(.029) 
-.123» 
(.029) 
AU-2 -.CG3» (.o:G) -.Of,7; (,OlV,) -.nf'iit (,P2{i) -,06st (.0;;6) -.10]» (.026) -.096» (.026) 
r-d )1«.9 
(k%,g) 
2r9.3 (hyh,'/) l 'fu.3' (yi'O. ) -U5J. (V'J.I 6I.M 11075.7) .9.V.5 I'JO'J.B) 300.0 (ll«51,M (vM.I') -901.6 (9UI.I) nec. (IL51.) 
r-d 1152.t 
(l<55.) 
785.0 
(5W.8) 
568.1 
(538.?) 
656.9 
(6:'9. 'y) 
9Vl|.f' 
(561.9) 
9?9.<3" 
(528.1) 
1018." 
(603,6) 
g-d 762.3 
(762.1) 
51.0.) 
(1722.1) 
-3I1I1.O . 
(939.'") 
, I19.I4I 
(8/;5.fl9) 
.2562. 
<2033.) 
(r-d)"* 6201. 
(3903.) 
-2151. 
(1385.) 
-I8ni. 
(1785.) 
.I|03lt.» 
(1775.) 
(f-d)® 207.5 205.2 757.7 
Olk.O) (509.7), 
(g-d)®' • • -lltO.3 :: 1075. : ' 
(1355.?) (lL62.) 
(r-d)' -937k.t 
(kl77.) 
4L ..006 .006 .003 .006 .00) .007 ,013 
(.0?9) (.0.?9) (.0,-!9) (.029) (.0?9) (.027) (.027) 
m 3373. 3163. 3965. 
(3381.) (3236) (3720.) 
I-l .005» .OOlt» 
(.00?) (.002) 
1-2 .007f .0071-
(.002) (.002) 
N-1 • U.76 315.1 
(52.53) (238.k) 
N.2 -7^.99 -367.1 
(1.9.91) (229.3) 
.691 .700 .703 .710 .713 .711 .713 .721 .7''9 .76L 
P 68.71» 76.51» 66.22T 59.55» I18.OU» 53.10» 39.69» 11.07» 113.63» 33.22» 
• .e.*" 1591, 157k. 1570. 1556. 1553. 1555. 1561. 15i-l. IL65. lW,l. 
"standard errors of r'?Kr'?35lcn cotîlflclents app.-ir In parentheses he low each eo.»fftcifnt. Whvre a blank space appears the 
variable tn not tncluJO'l In thn equation. An • (irnoff^s ol^niricmncv at the ,10 lev^l. \ f 'l-notes strnlflciince at the ,05 
level. 
^Standard eri-or of estlr.ate. 
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T*bl« ?2. Rugreaolon ciwfflcli'iit»*. for biuA wlilch hul Vi vcrta of borrovlne Jonunry ?, 19''3 Dfcrnb-r PI, 
EluKtlon , r...; • î ; • , 3 - V. • 5 • 6 ' ^ 7 : . 8 .. < ' 9 ' 10 
Constiuit J37.l7t : 269.)3f 71-80 , 107.77" .8?.96 ?06.C3 107.72 .I66I1.I4 -2?J5,5 
(99.OM (10".39) !109>05) (91.??) (!0?.5'>) (?n.7?) (^^O-SS) (5yi3.7) (??o?.6) (5575.Ii) 
B-l .)90f .)7Ct .))Zt . ..ioir . . ; ...lif'it .'•50t .. .I68r ,I>5M .'<35t : 
(.OC9) (.0(9) (.0A7) (.0(9) (.071) (.071) (.07?) (.07?) (.071) ; (.OBO) 
8-3 .009 .071 . .000 .0(7 .013 .007 -.01? .010 V"' .056V ' ' .C'O 
(.071) (.OB?) (.072) (.079) (.072) (.07?) (.073) (.075) (.080) (.CBl) 
8-3 '..113'%.' ..not-. ' -.075 : ...063 ' (.0(6) (.nCU) (.072) (.07'!) 
4U ..:7?f -.?76* ..?60t -.?C3f -.275f -.27^' -.?73t -.871+ • - .SCP.f  
(.032) (.032) (.032) (.03?) (.033) (.032) (.033) (.033) (.032) (.033) 
4U-1 -.157> -.IfCt -.lli3t -,l66t -.21bt -.?15t -.20kt -.2llit -.2101 -.199!-
(.03(5) (.03')) (.035) (.oj>) i.oii.") i.oii.,'1 i.oi':') ( .o'ls) (.oii;-) (.o'o) 
AU.2 -,OPU -.0P7* ..Ofllit ,.08hl -.070' -.066" 
(.oiil.) (,n,llil (.0311) t.MT) (,037) 
f -â l5:'l.flt If'i.l 't Ifuli.vt 1,21,2:' 34 -37'».!, .?Rr].ti| .l 'Vi.î" .Wil,92 
(U17.6) (WLD (7)1.13) (57).UI (hl'i.07) (710.M (11^':'.)) (H03.30) (805.5I). (13'''7.k) 
f-(J l',79.3t injh.lf 10)2.9- 713.? 1071.5» 9f,1.37t 679.02* 
(373.V) (1,1.5.1) (117.9) .('•R'l.e) (liflï.B) (I.7L85) (527.pl') 
>-d B2B.0 • -Pf-li.li 918.55 12l,6.5* -IOII1.7 
(60«.ft) (in.a) (7,^9.08) (710.Il) Ù7H2.6) 
(r-d)" ' 11830.Ot . . -327.99 : : -751'.l . . -I'32.39 
(31«.3) (1105.0) (ll'lf.?) (1576.7) 
(r-d)® 1101.65 198.5 ; 135.33 
(l'Oit.63) (l'15.B) ' . . (120.66) 
(g-d)' 1720.6 2019.5 
(110?.li) (1316.9) 
(r-d)' -13l'30.0t 
(3331.8) 
4L -.016 -.006 -.009 -.009 -.013 -.011 -.001 
(.01.6) (.016) (.016) (.01.6) (.01.6) (.01,5) (.01.6) 
« -177.30 2132.5 3839.5 
(6til,1.0) (61.11..1) (7006.B) 
I-l -.001 .000 
( .002) ( .002) 
1-2 -.oolit -.ool." 
( .002) ( .002) 
K-l -5.90 -1.27 
(1.6.75) (199.112) 
lt-2 9.93 -W.liT 
(1.5.63) (20,3.1.9) 
r' .588 .591. .620 . 621. .630 . 632 .639 .633 .61.1. .651 
F 56.58r 1.8.08r I5.63* kO.Skf 32.92f 37.02" 28.17» 27.^1,' 26.1.6» 19.18» 
1291.. 1280. 1250. 12L6. 121.2. 1236. 1231'. 12^5. 1229. 123I.. 
"stundarJ errors of refr^fMslon coefficients appoiu* In piirenth^oes brlow ench coefficient. L'hère m blantt •ppe.ir» the 
variable Is not Included In the equation. An • «Icnoteo «l»T.tflciviee at the ,10 level. A f <l-not»fii slrnlflcnnce at the ,05 
level. 
^Standard error of estlnAte, 
9h 
T&bl* Ï3. Peçrvîialon co'^fflclenti* ^  for bonJ* 21 wtiU'h hni 1,2 wçvkfï of borrotfltif, b»twi;,.n Jannnry 2, 1963 wi '! Iieccmber 
tqiMtion 2 : ;V : 10 
Conitiint 2».99f 
(96.51'') 
236.If . 
(97.9'i3) 
: 205.10» 
(112.72) 
167.51' 
(39.92) 
109.33 
(1U3.05) 
55.38 
(231.27) 
-'•'15.79 
(357.1,7) 
Ill,',.29 
1,5a?.f 
-190.91 
(1,595.9) 
-336I1.6 
(11030.9) 
B-1 .•iBTt 
(.0T3) 
.•.«St; 
(.073) 
.1,661 
(.073) 
•5091 
(.071) 
.5071 
(.071) 
V .''95t 
(.073) 
' .5011 
(.073) 
5001-
(.071,) 
.5001 
(.07I1) 
.5I1OI 
(.082) 
B-8 .iLz" 
(.073) 
,.1831• 
(.082) 
- .138" • 
(.071,) 
.156' 
(.001) 
.097 
(.071,) 
.123' 
(.073) 
V .079 
(.071,) 
.131" 
(.077) 
.lli8« 
(.083) 
.091 
(.086) 
: • .06 It (.072) 
-.07W 
(.071) . ..076 (.079) 
: -.071 
(.083) 
AU ..ISlit 
(.035) 
-.lli7t 
(.030) 
-.151,1 
(.035) 
-.153" 
(.036) 
-.1511 
(.037) 
-.1651 
(.036) 
-.1551 
(.037) 
-.1661 
(.037) 
-.1571 
(.038) 
-.11181 
(.030) 
ÛU-I -.1001 
(.035) 
-.107* 
(.036) 
-.1001 
(.036) 
-.1121 
(.035) 
-.1211 
(.olii! 
-.1261 
(.CM) 
-.126» 
(.PVI) 
-.1281 
(.0!;D) 
-.1231 
(.C!,2) 
-.1261 
(.0!i3) 
AU-2 -.or<i 
(,0]'') 
-.031 -.036 
-.031 
(;033) 
-.010 
(.0)6) 
-.027 
r-d 859.08t 100.M 
(LlV.OV) 
1156.51 
Vibi.Vj)  
-3'!n.: '9 
(C.OO.'(ti) 
-875.8 
i.y) 
-711.9" 
IÏ."|J.5.') 
-1%3.I, 
(U',J.2) (799.57) 
•566.00 
(808.63) 
-2196.0' 
(1303.3) 
f-d 111,3.1 
(35''.5«) 
71,5.6: • 
(1,28.51') 
liCO.yi 
(1,21'. 38) 
716.50. 
(1,91.91) 
lu6o.2t 
(II3II.55) 
101,3.?» 
(Il 35.Ill') 
717.01 
(503.60) 
e-d 270.57 
(539.OU) 
2390.7' 
(1379.0) 
' lilL.27 
(97?.07) . 
152.87 
(967.1.1) 
2716.2' 
(1636.8) , 
(r-d)^ , ki.g', 
(3100.3) 
23.97 
(1085.20) 
16II,.3 
(11,19.0) 
2135.1 
(1533.3) 
(f-d)® 73^.09' 
(1,15.1,6) 
898.2y» 
(1,30.23) 
877.701 
(I'll 11.68) 
(e-d)® 
-1768.6 
(lOglt.l) 
li 
(r-d)^ 710.62 
(3209.6) 
AL -.025 
(.031) 
-.021, 
(.031) 
-.023 
(.031) 
-.031 
(.031) 
-.025 
(.032) 
-.021, 
(.032) 
-.031 
(.032) 
• 
-1,51.50 
(5203.7) 
250.61 
(5221.1,) 
3218.Il 
(51112.7) 
I-l 
-.000 
(.002) 
-.000 
(.002) 
1-2 
.001 
( .002) 
.001 
(.002) 
N-1 
-20.89 
(60.97) 
-232.75 
(2^2.OL) 
N-2 
— 
13.36 
(62.07) 
260.30 
(238.91) 
.liltU .1,1,8 .1,1,6 .1,77 .",85 .1,76 .'•93 .1,77 .1,80 .502 
r 37.7''» 26.731 22.561 22.251 18,21,1 19.65» 15.51,» 111.51,1 13.1,81 10.351 
#,e,^ 12)2, 1251. 1257. 12.25 1220, 1228. 1217. 1237. 1238. 1227. 
*i>tAnd\rd errera of regr*i*mlor, co'îfflcl'întrt «ippoar In hclow ench coofriclerit. Where* a blank spac^ appemr* the 
variable 1B not inclU'kd In the eiiuattoa. An • denotes slpntflcvice at th" .10 level. A f di^not^s sl^rnlflcance at the ,05 
level. 
^Standard error of estlnatc. 
•f^vajîc» jc jojj» pJopuif^Sq 
SO' «M'-t ;* -3UVDIJÎUJ1« G6)ou^p ,  V 'l-A-T OT ww; ÎV wsmisij iui?^« g6:ou#p ,  uv 'uai;vnba jq; ui lO" «1 
vt4) a:,»de )|uw%q v '3U9p)jj^d qai * A3%*q s«<s«'q;u^jvd svi^pUJ*'^^ jo (uojja 
•Ztu 'inc 'cetc •oinE 'lElC 'IIIE 'lt2E '02i£ •8T2E •1%lE , '••• 
4t|f« 410 "IZ 4«'n 41%'9% 4>|£'12 490'6% 410'OE 4C9'12 4£I'01 4£4*9E i 
66i- 064- 024' £04' 161' 16l' 244- 9(1* %44* £61" 2" 
(iC-69'l) 
96-Ui-
((O'IIT) 
06'%;- 2-11 
(6i'T8l) 
91-ÔU 
(629%:) 
'16'292 %-ll 
(500-) 
41X0* 
((00') 
UIO' 2-1 
(500-) 
000'-
(400') 
100' X-I 
(•OUIT) 
•OllTl 
(•OStSI) 
•oiseï ('0699%) '0121% . 
(ico-) 
COO'-
((30) 
600'-
(920') 
%00' 
(120') 
900' 
(120-) 
400" 
(120') 
900 ' 
420' ) 
ç.OO'-
(2-4E69) 
•0600%' 
If 
(S'inet) 
ei-6U 
(0'9iOE) 
X0'619- j(P-») 
(T-élOI) 
6T 099-
(9'64%X) 
('2tE%-
(422%%) 
l'90C%-
(n'twE) 
T6«2 
(||'9%6C) 
%'91(1 
(l'4E0E) 
9'4602 
(l'E219) 
8'1116 eC") II 
, (0'eC9t) 
00'08g-
(I'9%0t) 
ti'9El£ 
(6-249%) 
ClQoz , V-» 
(y-Bizi) 
16-5CX 
(fl'Tttl) 
6B-61 
(4'T6U) 
C4-4iit 
(2'CJO£%) 
.wr« 
(%'Ol%t) 
or •/,/.<-
(0'D%2t) iL-CU (19'6l«) (?«•- p-j 
(9'&'l<!'.) 
tVf.nçi,;-
(9'J.«I) (C'i;u2£) 
•l'Tôi/ir î'COCi!-
(O'MCS) 
ClhCT-
iO'fW 
fO'9«-
) (î'f.J02) 
t'Oltt-
(Oi'Ufl) (IS'W- (WBCfi) D'Egi;- f'j 
(CcO-) 
OEO'-
(fieo') 
Ol"0'-
(600-) 
coo'-
(W) 
eoo* 
[M') 
%00'-
(620') 
100' 2-nv 
(U0-) 
*121'-
(ûEO') 
+62f-
(2£0') 
+'|2f-
(5f0-) 
412%'-
(2C0-) 
412%'-
(2E0-) 
412%'-
(120-) 
4160'-
(020') 
tie%— 
(120-) 
4860'-
(020') 
4E%0'- %-n» 
(930') 
42it-
(520-) 
4CU'-
(020') 
4%fl%*-
(020-) (820') 
•ei%-
(820') 
491%*-
(920-) 
'19%'-
(l'EOE) 
461%'-
(420') 
499%-
(120') 
4«ir- nv 
(090-) 
46U' 
(190') 
t1t£' 
(290') 
42%E' . 
(190'),. 
4%%£* f-ï 
(6i.O') (9W) , 
4C0t'- : 
(EW) 
%ox'-
(tW) 
:|i(0'-
(TiO') 
510'- , 
(TW) 
110- , , 
(610*) 
4212'- , 
(890*) 
Cio*-
(fllO') 
4012'-
(890*) 
£10-. ; 
(flO') 
tt%9' 
(990') 
4259' 
Ciio') 
4909* 
(210-) 
4E99' ^ 
(SIO*) 
4199* \ 
(210*) 
4419* 
(490') 
4E21' 
(890') 
4019' 
(190') 
4:21' 
(990*) 
4919* : : %.« 
(•OUlt) 
'09601-
. ('093ET) 
'Oien-
(•OtI'|%) 
•09091-
(O'OOOl) 
%£'«E9-
(2l*0'|9) 
12'%4%-
, («'962) 
4%«'%6S 
(%1-l4î) 
i9'£cn 
(il'Eoe) 
ll'TEl 
(<9'812) 
6Î'66E 
(95*092) 
*16*964 »u«i«uoa 
or ' « ' ^ • ' 9 , , 9 , i <i £ '  ^ z' \\ .I .uo%5*nb3 
996: Ma j»qq»5aq puv [96! 'Z iKi.iA^aq Suif,tuj0^ JO aC P«M ipTI" :Z Vmq Jo; ^ «ViaïaUJ-'Os iiotiiii«8na *i« «xq»! 
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Table 2% Hwgrcûnton cn<»fficl';iila'* for b'uik 73 wtilch h'i'l 35 ut'C'ko c r bvt'ccwin*; b(.'tw<>oi) Ji uu 
E'^U&lloM '' l/\ : :,2 3 11 5 6 ' .7 
CcnoiAtit 318.19t 
(151.37) 
299.78» 
(153.1*0) 
376.16' 
(17li.90) 
563.50» 
(157.15) 
330,1'Iff 
(16L.80) 
656,90' 
(362.19) 
568,99 
(561.73) 
B-1 • .mi 
(.069) : 
Mfi 
(,070): 
. L6l*l 
(.069) 
. .I'78l-
(.070) 
: ' .k77t 
(,070) 
."iTaj. 
(.070) 
" V . •.lt77V' 
(.070) 
B-2 
(.070) (,077) 
,?.-7t 
(.070) 
,207' 
(.078) 
: .216» 
(,070) (.070) (.071) 
B-3 .036 
(.069) 
.029 . 
(.069) 
AU -.O02f 
(.021) 
-.082t 
(.021) 
-.O02t 
(.021) 
-,oyot 
(.023) 
-.0%f 
(.orM 
-.oyi't 
(.orU) 
-.095» ' 
(,02'') 
AU-1 -.052t 
(.O.'l) 
-.0531 
(,ori) 
-.052t 
(.oa) 
-.05Ct 
Î.O??) 
-.061'f 
(.(..••M 
-.0621 
(.OJl) 
-.063t 
(.œ>) 
AU-0 -.OK! -.012 
(.orr) 
-,011 
(.0:2) 
r-a -yOi.fiii 
(5l'5.T;) 
-2».77 
(51»).OV) 
ivL,)y 
(1163.5) 
-1W7'),I 
(M,58) 
-975,1':' 
(J3l'5.3) 
-3»3.7'! 
lUi'j.l) 
?(11,91 
(1"W,3) 
f-d 681.69 
(555.l'Ù) 
1311?.3' 
(683.8) 
110.;.Il» 
U'jyM) 179f'.5f (773.5) 
g-d -1068.5 
(yïi.ïu) 
-11,7.66 
(%15).'') 
(r-d)® 
-35011,0 •; 
('1752.'') • 
li'ilt.53 ! 
(1710.2) 
3k8.31 
(22l'9.9) 
(f-d)® 
-939.II."? 
(632.30) 
-799.09 
(61,9.82) 
(g-d)' 
-972.51 
(1701.9) 
(r-d)^ 3338.8 
(5038.9) 
8 9 10 
11310. 6179.9 101(00. 
(8357.6) (03kl'.?) (9657.8) 
.|iR2t • .;oif 
(.071) (.072) (.007) 
.237t .205t .IPSt 
(.073) (.078) (.080) 
• , .079 : V " .08; 
(.07«) (.077) 
-.093* -.092t -.09'it 
(.02I') (.02I1) (.02li) 
-.060t -i06lit -.067t 
(.025) (.025) (.025) 
-,010 -.015 -.Oil 
(.f.'?3) 
39.91 .8.16 
(l%76.8) (127;.5) (ï^flo.y) 
1102,1' 13l<5.ot l6l8.7t 
(671.7li) (669.6) (802.02) 
-iBjli.i -2188.6» -2166.; 
(1227,5) (1210.8) (20U7.7) 
-919.90 
(2523.5) 
-8111.21 
(658.60) 
168.87 
(1885.M 
àL -.015 
(.023) 
-.017 
(.023) 
-.017 
(.023) 
-.019 
(.023) 
-.016 
(.023) 
-.015 
(.023) 
-.017 
(.023) 
• 
-11510. 
(8079.5) 
-8221.'i 
(9065.6) 
-10370. 
(10250.) 
I-l -.001 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.003) 
1-2 .003 
(.003) 
.003 
(.003) 
K-1 -72.52 
(62.08) 
-281.89 
(329.'•7) 
*-2 -78.59 
(61.73) 
185.81, 
(315.52) 
R® 
.I158 .k59 .l'6o .''63 .1,71 .168 .1,76 .V75 .'iflO .1,90 
r 33.50» 27.661 23.83' 21.09' 17.16r 18.96» 11,.1,5» l't.k2t 13.50» 9.88t 
1926, 1930. 1933. 1931. 1929, 1928. 1929. 1930. 1926. 1931,. 
*Stand»r4 errors of r^^rc talon ceefflclpn'.s «pprar In rnriTithi's-.'-i h?low encli co,!fflclent. 'Jhors « blank spnc< «pp^aru tli* 
YarUMc lit not Inclu-leJ In the eiiun'.lon. An » dcnotuu sl.'r.lflc'iiicr k'. tn,, .10 l,!vrl. A • iI'T.h'.pj slrnl ficur.d! it ths .05 
level, 
^St&ndmrJ error of Pittrat?. 
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Table ?$» B«grcu'«lort coefrtcleiitn* for btutk zL whl c^ h*4 ?.f> vccku of borrowing betvefin JuiuiLi-y 2, 1963 *nd Lvcembit/ 21, 19C6 
Equation. ,1 ; 2 - 3. , 'à . 5 , fi • T . •• • ,8 • 9 ••• . 10 
Constant 3ltO,12t 
(103.i<2) 
3B0.0ltt 
(lOd.lié) 
It22.82t 
(123.8?) 
382.61, t 
(111.56) 
373.29» 
(116.02) 
531.63» 
(£51.68) 
, 1196.56 : 
(387.35) 
-7955.8 
(8738.6) 
.381I1.O 
(E6L8.2) 
.liW,1.6 
; 9097.1 
\ : .ox (.070) .072 (.071) .051 (.070) .000 (.071) .060 (.070) .059 (.070) .053 (.071) ! .067 . (.071) 1 .057 (.071) -.056 (.009) 
B-2 • .I57f 
(.070) 
.l63t 
(.070) 
.150t 
(.070) 
.161+ 
(.070) 
.158t 
(.070) 
.l62t 
(.670) 
• • • .153* 
(.011) 
, .not 
(.07P) 
/ .1911 r 
(.071) 
.159» 
(.073) 
'-3 -.105 
(.070) 
-.106 
(.070) 
-.072 
(.072) 
•.010 
(.073) 
w -.001 
(.006) 
-.002 
(.006) 
-.000 
(.006) 
..ooU 
(.006) 
-.007 
(.007) 
• -.006 
(.006) 
-.006 
(.007) 
-.cog 
(.007) 
-.006 
(.006) 
. -.008 
(.007) 
AU-l -.OOk 
(.006) 
-.00 It 
( .our?) 
-.003 
(,on6) 
-.OOk 
(.POf>) 
-.01» 
(.007) 
-.011 
(.007) 
-.011 
(.007) 
-.011 
(.007) 
-.010 
(.007) 
-.010 
(.007) 
AU-2 -.011" 
(.0C6) 
-.oia» 
(.006) 
-.OIS» 
(.006) 
-.OU" 
(.00)-) 
-.ou» 
(.0061 
-.009 
(,OPh) 
t-d -3!)'t.9C 
(371.90 
-1155,07 
(373.52) 
12.?) 
(7';0.ly) 
-509.?3 
(58).k) 
-271.71* 
(903.e.!) 
•185.57 
(761.73) 
389.61 
(1237.5) 
-Ii0.7l( 
(773.96) 
-2^;'.72 
(7f.'Ain) 
-17:'. 55 
(ir'W.c) 
t-i *''.53 
(382;10) 
473.a? 
(1.68.13) 
}',-a.o6 
(U03.93) 
763.26 
(532.02) 
6lB.o? 
(I182.I19) 
li'S.iS 
(17^.22) 
652.«7 
(551;88) 
t-i -551.85 
(635.20) 
23.01 
(ll«70.5) 
-1038.9 
(71'..>«) 
-786.67 
(70L.39) 
; -513.l<7 
(I5l'5.7) 
(r-d)® 
-SlOl.9 
(3325.0) 
-155.92 
(1172.3) 
-ll"9.13 
(1518.0) 
I19I1.20 
(1580.5) 
(f-d)2 
-k76.25 
(I4I10.89) 
-375.86 
(I<56.73) 
-285.69 
(WU.ll) 
-693.16 
(1176.3) 
-62U.52 
(1221.7) 
(r-d)' 3972.5 
(3552.8) 
AL •.005 
(.OOL) 
-.006 
(.005) 
-.005 
(.OOU) 
-.006 
(.005) 
-.OOk 
(.OOL) 
-.OOU 
(.OOU) 
-.005 
(.005) 
a 
i
f
 
5315.9 
(9586.7) 
5836.6 
(10150.) 
1-1 .002 
(.002) 
.003* 
(.002) 
1-2 -.000 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.002) 
m-1 -106.119 
(86.30) 
It86.29t 
(216.92) 
V-2 -I6l.lt0« 
(87.38) 
.6lli.26t 
(2k6.05) 
.039 .050 .01.6 .056 .069 .065 .076 .088 .098 .130 
f 1.60 1.72 1.36 l.kL l.li2 1.51 1,30 1.53 1.59' 1.53" 
1332. 1327. 1333. 1330. 1328. 1327. 1330. 1321. 1317. 1311. 
errors of wgrraolon co'îfrtcUnts «pp«*ar In par-întheAcs brlov eacli co'îfflclrnt. Where n blunk $pmce sppfnra the 
variable is not Included In the e^untion. An • denot'^a «i^nlflcance nt the .10 level. A t denoti«»3 slrnlflcvncc at thr ,05 
level. 
^StanJ^rJ error of estlnnte. 
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Table 27» Peerf?f.lon cjçfrl LM'•nts'* fnr hmk C) whirif N'til w'cKti of boiTfivlnr t ' jMiu-iry ?, lo^'3 nri<I 21, loAG 
U-d)' 
(r-d)-" 
Equation -, X -, . :2' ' . ' \ 3  ; •  .  ;u 5 :  6 -, T 10 
Con#taMt 219.39 
(US.69) 
Ï00.61 
(11.3.51) 
-23.53 
(l"3.6j) 
. 2li9.8l" 
(IU.8L') 
252.33 
(156.39) 
-13.7.27 
(363.10) 
173.77 
(557.68) 
.62850.» , 
(22550.) 
i
 
i
 
B-1 .635 f 
(.070) 
.630t 
: (.070) 
.6lot . 
: :  (.070) 
, .6li8t 
(.071) 
.633» 
(.072) 
. .62';» 
(.072) 
.610 
(.073 
V ; .soil» 
(.07/) 
: ,.5113» 
^ : . ,;(.075) 
-.5001 
;; (.076) 
B-2 .01.5 
(.0(5) 
-.031' 
(.067) 
. .  .023 
(.071.) 
-.OIC 
:(.OGG) 
.0^5 
(.076) 
. .036 
(.076) 
.022 . 
(.077 
-.05? 
(.076) 
-.073 
(.on?) 
-.086 
, (.0"',) 
B-3 .123" 
(.07' ') 
.135" 
(.071.) 
.058 
(.079) 
.037 
(.086) 
ûU -.oa6f 
(.012) (.012) 
-.021» 
(.012) 
-.0&7f 
(.016) 
-.051» 
(.010) 
—O'jOl 
(.016) 
-.015 
(.016 
-.Oil]» 
(.015) 
, - .0I13» 
(.016) 
-.038» 
(.016) 
dU-1 -.OCL" 
(.012) 
-.0J0» 
(.0:2) 
-.018 
(.012) 
-.wf. 
(.012) 
-.031f 
(.OIL) 
-.03?» 
(.Oil) 
-.o.-s 
(.oili 
-.027» 
(.013) 
-.02')» 
(.013) 
-.023" 
(.013) 
-.020' 
(.0]:') 
-.OPO 
(.012) 
-.016 
(.012 
-.016 
(.011) 
-.020" 
(.012) 
-.013 
(.011) 
r-d )lW.4t 
(67k.7) 
im.V 
(CCI.71 (11';),2) 
3o:'ii.ot 
('>•;'. 1) (no;',11 
2272.0» 
(1101,0) 
l.)l.2.f. 
(l6ill.'->) (lti'fl.5) (li)')'),G) 
SlP.Cl 
(1757.0) 
f-d 
-153.If 
(608.55) 
355,?' '  
(705.9' ') 
-261,67 
(683.76) 
-2bf,.28 
(779.(9) 
-ill 11. 32 
(07.118) 
MC.U 
(736.11)) 
.704.56 
(760.81) 
g-d 1100.0 
(938.81) 
. -98U.2I, , 
<200V.7) • 
135 11. Il 
(1076.0) 
1173.1111 
(1069.0) 
20I18.3 
(2238.1) 
(r-d)^ 15190.0» 
(11883.1) II
 
585.95 
(217I1.7) 
3769.0 
(2li53.li) 
(f-d)' -Il <17.70 •671.51 -851.66 
(C?J.77) (6U2..'1) 
2)73.L 
(1716.i) 
(fi85.92) 
-S33.0? 
(2036.>•) 
-15660.Ot 
(5129.?) 
AL ..OliL'r -.OliOt -.039" -.036" -.030 -.032' -.02) 
(.0?0) (.OL'O) (.OJU) (.020) (.010) (.oro) (.019) 
« aiJOO.t 76030.t 71320.t 
(76580.) (29880.) (29530.) 
I-l -.007t -.009t 
(.00?) (.003) 
1-2 -.000 .002 
(.003) (.003) 
loiM* 
(217.72) 
«-2 556.03» -311.50 
(237.21) (69I1.O8) 
.679 .683 691. .691 .691 .692 .698 .729 .7lk .737 
T 83.72t 70.e;r 63.55t 5k.li3f 1,3.23f 1.8.5kf 36.77t kg.91» 36.L;» 28.90t 
19 W. 193-'. 1903. 1919. 19:7. 1918. 191'% 1H13. 1869. I81L. b 
*î)t»ird.iril error-, of r^-prt-aciofi coeft IcI.-iita upp'-iir In pfir.fnl^ .-j.r, UcMv .-.icli Co.*fflcl^nr., '/here 1 kliutk space appearo the 
Variable Is not lnclU'l»?il In th»» AM • lirnotru uU'nl ficuic»' at .10 lovçl, A - -l-fnotes al^nt t'leance at the ,05 
level. 
be Standard error of eotlnu^e. 
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TiibU'.JO. Hcci'coiilon co^rrirlTit'i* for blink WhtT^ hnd IB vrrki 01 r b'jrrc'yin(^ Vetwen 2& 1963 ajrl l>'ceB]b'!r 21, I9C6 
tijuntloii 1 • ' z •• • 3 : V \5 • 6 ,8 V r 111 
Conalwit 61.1";' 
(36.01) 
57.38 
(37.09) 
9'i.9ïl 
(liî.MO 
1,8.79 
(38.33) 
1,3.65 
(1,0.19) 
-11,0.95 
(92.98) 
-256.36» 
(11,0.35) 
5681.3' •; 
(3.-Tj.0) : 
-
 
1 
5366.9' 
(3210.2) 
B-1 : .8.-31 
(.or.0) 
./ .8371 
(.070) 
V .81,:'t 
(.067) • (:Mo) 
V .767' 
(.070) 
jkjt 
(.070) 
.725'' 
(.071) 
.737' 
(.070) 
, • • . 7 5 3 '  (.072) (.079) 
B.2 ..win 
(.ofiy) 
..2li6t 
,(.01)0) 
..190f 
(.068) 
-.2501 
(.009) 
-.11,9* 
(.0(1) 
-.159' 
(.070) 
-.1001 
(.069) 
-.131" 
(.073) 
..216» 
(.090) 
-.167' 
(.087) 
B'3 .067 
(.072) 
.071 
(.072) 
.057 
(.071,) 
-.03', 
(.080) 
AU 
-.005 
(.01?) 
-.OPÛ 
(.01?) 
-.001' 
(.015) 
-.001 
(.013) 
-.on 
(.oiM 
-.013 
(.013) 
-.010 
(.013) 
-.01', 
(.013) 
-.013 
(.on) 
-.011, 
(.013) 
ûU-1 -.038» 
(.012) 
-.0391 
(.012) 
-.OJbt 
(.01:.) 
-,oj';t 
(.Oi?) 
-.053) 
(.013) 
-.0531 
{.013) 
-.01,91 
(.013) 
-.052» 
(.013) 
-.052» 
(.013) 
-.0L7t 
(.013) 
ÛU-? 
-.037f -.031,1 
(,on) 
-.0321 
(,011) 
-.0331 
(.013) 
-.033' 
1,013) 
-.029' 
r-d Wi'f.i'V 
iiCi.'At 
3'J5.C0i 
(iru.yi) 
ll 'j.yi 
iim.i'J) ïOi.iil (.Mfl.tlj) 53. go isyi.io) •L'0,1.9 (;"io.?d) -HJJ.TC il'-jl.l-S) .57.;!, (:"/).81) •jouo.Si (MO.3) 
r-d 95.3!, 
(11,2.1,9) 
223.50 
(170.57) 
-98.53 
(lbl|.39) 
-1,7.01' 
(191.77) 
-172.5'î 
(167.6,?) 
-36.63 
(167.96) 
-121.35 
(191.75) 
g-d 553.121 
{Jli!i.29) 
817.11 
(530.76) 
620.09* 
, {3r.l.P6) 
kOl,.5l, 
I35I1.21) 
589.53 
(LlO.lL) 
(r-d)^ 
1
1
 
6511.75 
(1,31.00) 
1205.60f 
(51,8.11,) 
1207.2» 
(5L2.08) 
(f-d)® 
-203.99 
(162.38) 
-21,6.3,? 
(165.59) 
-3''6,75t 
(168.17) 
(e-d)^ 
-7.20 
(1,33.83) 528.97 (WB.lL) 
(r-d)^ 3858.3f 
(1297.1) 
tl 
.013 
(.011) 
.013 
(.011) 
.OIL 
(.011) 
.013 
(.011) 
.013 
(.011) 
.OIL 
{.Oil) 
.013 
(.010) 
* 
-631,5.3' 
(3581.9) 
-6520.0' 
(3576,0) 
-6L17.L* 
(3LB3.9) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.002» 
(.001) 
1-2 
.001 
(.001) 
.001' 
(.001) 
K-1 
-50.56 
(37.38) 
327.73» 
(I6L.O6) 
N-2 
-60.09 
(37.55) 
-L03.26» 
(157.93) 
.59k .596 .615 .599 .619 .623 .637 .635 .637 .671 
r 57.93' L8.381 l»l,.70t 36.",81 3l.35t 35.6Lf 27.9Lr 27.72' 25.65» 20,95» 
501.6 501.8 1,91.0 502.0 1,92.2 1,88.2 1,82.8 1,81,.0 L8L.1 L67.2 
'standard errors of regreaolcn corffLclent» tipponr In F'trTit.lies'::. t».'lov each co.fff[clent. a blwik <pnce 
variable ts not tnclud..»! Iti tli'î e^untlon. An • denotes al^nt flCH:ie.» at tli« ,10 level. A * denot^o slijntficfincc at 
level. 
app'ars the 
the .05 
^ôtandird error of estimate. 
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T*bl* 29. RrgmBlon cosfriclenlii* for bsfiX 11 which hml Ik wwk» of borrowtny, betw»rii Jiuiuuy 2, 1963 mnil Dec«mb<r ÎI, 1966 
I q u a t l o n  , 1 ; .  -  , 3  L  .  '  5  6  T  '  8  .  '  9 ' / .  1 0  
ConêUBt Ul.ST LT.2: 61.33* 32.l'l' 52.11 . -SZT.It • .203.5'V 27T6. .. 3950. 32BÎ. ' 
(29.Ill) (."9.55) (35-11) ( 30.11) (32.39) (75.0) (113,1) (IHT-) (338?.) (IksS.) 
B-l . .B3ltt .832t .835* .T8Tt .7''9' .TVjt .7)0+ .Jofr .659 + 
(.067) (.068) (.068) (.068) (.069) (.068) (.069) ; (.068) (.070) (.071") 
.,t-3 -.179» -.121 -.179» -Ijlt -.150t . -.1761 ..176t ..IQlif ,-.070 -.111 
(.066) (.087) (.066) (.087) (.070) (.068) (.069) (.OfM (.085) (.089) 
8-J .,069 -.092 • ..159» -.158t 
(.068) (.068) (.07?) (.07I1) 
4U -.Oli6t -.Oli'lt -.Oli7t -.0l'2t -.062+ -.059t -.060» -.056» -.053+ -.052+ 
(.OIL) (.OIL) (.OlV) (.OIL) (.016) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.015) 
4'J-l -.072+ -.073+ -.072+ -.OOOt -.108+ -.108+ -.106+ -.106+ -.108+ -.108+ 
(.OIU) (.OIL) f.Olli) (.OIL) ( ,0191 ( .Old) (.010) (.010) i.OlÔ) (.013) 
AU-2 ..0L2+ . .0I17* ..0L3I -.0L7+ -.0L6+ -.oLLt 
(.OIC) (.01(1 (.nil,I (.OIL) (.o;C) (.016) 
t'i 76.91 90. M L09.0» .1?5.7 195.5 -70).L+ -610.L» -752.0+ -7'3<),l+ -676,3' 
(113.05) (113.«1) (2LL.3) (175.8) (208.5) (232.7) (363.(0 (2*3.8) (269.L) (iBf.l) 
f-d 188.1 199.3 -88.76 -30.35 -lOL.l -9L.89 -32.52 
(117.5) (ILO.O) (129.23) (152.9L) (1)2.6) (131.92) (152.79) 
*d 7L8.0+ 679.1+ 786.3+ 76L.7+ 776.7* 
(200.1) (L25.2) (271.1) (252.9) (L'lj.o) 
(r-d)' -326.3 -L32.5 -73.62 190,L 
(906.8) (352.3) (1.36.17) (k60.8) 
(f.d)* -01.Ll -93.L; -Tfi.30 
(129.38) (130.20) (130.28) 
(,.J)' L8.5L -86.23 
(333.72) (363.23) 
(r-d)J -218.3 
(1051.1) 
*L .023» .022* .0?3« .018 .020* .021* .023' .023» 
( . 0 1 2 )  ( . 012 )  ( . 012 )  ( . 0 1 ? )  ( . 01? )  ( . 012 )  ( . 012 )  ( . 012 )  
• • -3323. -L661. -3879. 
(3812.) (3780.) (3859.) 
l-l ..001 -.000 
(.001) (.001) — 
1.2 -.000 -.000 
(.001) (.001) 
«-I -2.992 ' 202.9* 
(33.37) (105.7) 
H.2 5.6L7 -163.8* 
(32.353) (9C.?) 
, .556 .561 .56L .571 .5149 .612 .613 .616 .625 .636 
r 50.07+ Ll.çif 36.18+ 3.->.73+ 27.6L* 33.95» 25.21+ 25.55+ 2L.37+ 17.9L+ 
, . k L02.2 L02.2 L0I.8 398.5 393.1 381.1 383.L I81.8 378.3 .377.9 
*tItKndard erre-ru of m^rreoaton coefflctcnts appetr In pap-ntheofl# bi»low fmch coefficient. Wlicre a bloiik sp^ce «ppe&r« the 
vtritbl* is not included In the e>)UAtton. An * denot*;» significance %t the .10 level. A ^ denotes signiricmCQ at the »05 
level. 
^Btend*rd »rror of estimate. 
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Tabic 30. Begr*ooion cocfficittnts ® fur biuik 26 vhlc!t htt.1 111 wwko of iiorrwlni; Jananry I963 «n<î. Dcc<*wbTr SI,  I966 
Equation 1 2 • 3 0 
~ : 
, f . 
• • •;' 
« , 9 : 
Conotimt 3Z.2Ï'" 
(18.63) 
26.:% 
(18.56) 
••Z.OS' 
(22.07) 
SI.SO 
(18.98) 
32.L) 
(20.98) 
-jsa.3o+ 
(47.81) 
-78.03 
(72.53) 
337.11 
(1I121.8) 
1126.2 
,(lli03.l) (1%.% 
B-1 
<Si 
•.600) 
(.060 
.759 ^  
(.066) 
•; .77Ch 
(.068) 
• .717+ 
(.076) 
.651+. 
(.076) 
.6569+ 
(.072) 
.710+ 
(.072) : (!O74) 
B-2 . • -.096 \ 
(.068) 
-.2(11 
(.086) 
-.0«9 
(.069) 
-.260+ 
(.066) 
-.098 
(.073) 
-.109 
(.070) 
-.113 
(.071) 
-.117 
(.073) 
• .2lt2+ 
(.08!,) 
-.«48+ 
(.065) 
B.3 .J97f 
(.065) 
.189/ 
(.066) 
' ,200+ 
(.070) 
' :  . 1 6 4 +  
(.071) 
AU - . lO ' f t  
(.018) 
-.b96t 
(.018) 
-.106+ 
(.010) 
-.0961 
(.018) 
-.106+ 
(.018) 
-.105+ 
(.018) 
-.101+ 
(.018) 
-.1072+ 
(i017) 
-.100+ 
(.017) 
-.104+ 
(.017) 
AU-l  -.083+ 
i .o io)  
- .OÏ3t  
(.OlS) 
- .oBat  
(.018) 
-.072+ 
(.013) 
-.087t 
(.0S3) 
-.097+ 
( .K Î )  
-.089+ 
(.0:3) 
-.086+ -.089+ 
(.022) 
-.084+ 
( .P?l !  
AU-C -.008 
(  .Ol ' j )  
-.010 
( .010)  
.,012 
( .019)  
-.013 -.023 
( .mo)  
-.032" 
( .o in)  
r-il 
-5.30 
(10.53) 
-PPJl 
Uy.iV 
116.92 
(I52.5I') 
-161.07 
(107.60)  
-51.7;' 
(177.9^)  ( iLv .80)  
•533. 
(?3'l.li7) 
. ( i r . i i i f  
(10. 
M'iM 
(161.39)  
-53?.Cat  
(2 ' '9 .56)  
f-d 120.94 
(711.22) 
nil.82 
(90.23) 
-7.26 
(811.22)  
-65.:8 
(100.31) 
-I16.71 
(86.90) 
X2.iS 
(84,70) 
-T<i.99 
(97.65) 
g-d l<lilt.6lit 
(126.03) 
161.96 
(575.19) 
572.65+ 
(1112.36) 
312.61+ 
(139.59) 
265.03 
(322.04) 
(r-d)® 
-Iiii3.3a 
(582.59) 
-192.08 
(213.59) 
-165.119 
(268.7k) 
-19.81 
(281.42) 
(f-d)® , 35.23 
(86.65) 
25.98 
(86.99) 
«.54 
(83.59) 
(g-d)® 287.07 
(227.58) 
182.92 
(253.47) 
(r-d)^ 286.80 
(577.37) 
AL -.006 
(.013) 
-.010 
(.01k) 
-.008 
(.013) 
..008 
(.013) -.007 (.013) 
-.001 
(.012) 
.000 
(.012) 
t  
-5I13.I12 
(1676.9) 
-II179.6 
(1655.2) 
-604.62 
(1827.6) 
%-l 
-.001» 
(.000) 
-.001+ 
(.000) 
1-2 
.001+ 
(.000) 
.001+ 
(.000) 
B-1 2k.53 
(2&.19) 
165.49+ 
(76.73) 
N-2 
-22.17 
(21,.40) 
-173.11+ 
(73.90) 
R: .538 .559 .5kO .565 .5k8 .57lt .579 .583 .600 .625 
r W.lTt lil.56t 32.9Lt 31.62+ 23.L6f 29.Oil + 21.86+ 22.26+ 21.95+ 17.18+ 
256.2 251.1 256.8 250.6 256.5 2I18 .6  2k9.2 2I17.8 243.2 238.5 
"standard errors of regression coeffLclenta appev in pmrunthfgfs bclov etch coefficient, Wh^re a blmnk space appears the 
variable lo not Included In th»* e<iuatlon. An • denotes slgniflcmnce at the .10 level. A t denotes significance at the .05 
level. 
^Standard error of estimate. 
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Table 31. Kegtrottlon coefrlcleutu" foe biu»k which had 10 uce/ui of torruwlttg brtvet'» Jflrt'Jity ?, iy$J ttni tVc^nhor ?1, 1946 
Cquatioa ' ./ 1 \ 2 / f , •  f i  ' ,  ;  •; 7 8 ' 9 . 10 
CoQitant ill .OS iB.Bd) 10.87 (5.60) 17.65 (10.55) 13.77 (S.fc) îS.lilit l9.tCo) .2L.78 (:r.7l) -13.15 (3)i.?l) 
7.50 
(503.01) 
, 55.2« 
(li?2.15) 
100.33 
(528.52) 
8-1 .656t 
(.066) 
.TitSt 
(.068) 
.6Wt 
(.066) 
.7li8t 
(.060) 
.650» 
: (.066) 
.6li0t 
(.066) 
. .6li2t 
(.066) 
.6il2t 
(.067) 
.73lt 
(.070) 
.717t 
(.072) 
B-2 ^ ..3kkt 
(.065) 
-.500t 
(.078) 
.. ..357t 
(.066) 
-.lijot 
(.078) (.066) 
-.JliSt' 
(,066) 
, -.351.; 
(.006) 
-.35U 
(.067) 
.—1861 
(.079) 
».li8i,f 
(.080) 
B-3 • ' .2k7t 
(.069) 
• .236t 
(.00;) 
.225+ 
(.070) 
. " .Îl8t .• 
(.072) 
tii 
-.005 
(.003) 
-.005 
(.003) 
-.005 
(.003) 
-.oopt 
(.oolt) 
-.olot 
(.coll) 
-.oost 
(.00 11) 
-.009t 
(.obii) 
-.OlOt 
(.001.) 
-.009t 
(.00k) 
-.009t 
(.00k) 
6y-l -.poat 
(.003) 
..cost 
(.003) 
..post 
(.OOJ) 
-OOTt 
(.003) 
-.009* 
(.005) 
-.009" 
(.005) 
-.009' 
(.005) 
-.009" 
(.005) 
-.009* 
(.005) 
-.008» 
(.005) 
AU-2 
-.003 
(.OQIl) 
-.OOP 
( .OOii) 
-.OOP 
( .ori'l) 
-,onp 
i .01)'.) 
-.00;? 
( .ot'.) 
-.OOP 
(,vvk) 
ir-d JT.liO 
(33.93) 
3;i.ïo 
(33.01) 
l:'%3:.t' 
(73.03) 
TJ.WO 
(51.671) 
1RS.nit 
(e«(.73) 
-IS.CY 
((9.77) 
81.50 
(11:'.19) 
-20. fi? 
(71.21) 
11.18 
(69.55) 
e?,90 
(113.7k) 
f-d -3I1.3I1 
(33.51) 
-26.92 
("12.311) 
-7'l.20» 
(•10.55) 
-58.25 
(I17.87) 
-77.11' 
,(1.1.89) 
-59.77 
(ko.69) 
-58. K 
(117.98), 
& d IJY.Iift 
(59.10) 
102.51 
(131.80) 
131.56» 
(73.31) 
62.65 
(70.70) 
55.50 
(152.32) 
(r-d)® 26.98 
(298.60) 
-178.10» 
(107.IT) 
-115.77 
(137.20) 
-106.35 
(1110.55) 
(r-d)2 
-3.96 
(39.92) 
.B.0II7 
(lil.2l<) 
3.82 
(kl.25) 
-a.ooo 
do',. 86) 
2.93 
(108.55) 
(r-d)' 
-2113.33 
(317.1'') 
• 
AL 
-.008t 
(.003) 
-,OOBt 
(.003) 
-.008 
(.OOk) 
-.ooat 
(.003) 
-.ooat 
(.001.) 
-.007' 
(.OOU) 
..oo6« 
(.00k) 
a 
-32.03 
(51.8.00) 
-8k.77 
(535.87) 
-128.k6 
(566.67) 
I-l 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
1-2 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
1-1 1.50k 
(3.950) 
.238 
(9.075) 
1-2 
.586 
(3.6k6) 
-.206 
(8.996) 
I? .3k6 .386 .360 .lioi .376 .378 .383 .381 .kl2 .kl7 
r 2l.02t 20.65f 15.75f l6.36t n.(6t 9.91t 9-78t 10.25f 7.351 
121.8 lia.k 121.2 117.5 120.5 120.0 120.lt 120.8 118.0 119.0 
*Stiindvd «rrors of rfgrcsoLon co«îfftcl«ntB appear In p»rvnthrsr3 below each co«?rficl«nt. Where a blank space appears the 
variable 1b not Included In the e'lu.itlcn. An • denotes algnlflcmrce at the »10 level. A t denotes significance at the .05 
level. 
^Standard error of estimate. 
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Table 33. ReefïDulon cocfrlîl '-nt 'i' for bnnlt 30 vhlch h ml 9 vcrko of borrowing b-tvi-rn Junuiiry ?, 19133 ui") D-ci'nbcr 21, X'j66 
Equation 1 S • 3'/ : • 
. ' ' • '' • 
. 5 6 7 ^ .8 9 10 
Constant 11.57+ 
(5.39) 
12.18+ 
(S.k?) 
11.08" 
(6.1k) 
l?,06t 
(5.68) 
16.31+ 
(6.1.5) 
6.15 
(13.90) 
17.13 
(21.58) 
219.k8 
(287.19) 
205.68 
(313.00) 
-60.78 
(260.75) 
B-1 -.oltV 
(.070/ 
.-.0^3 
: (.070) 
-.069 
(.071) 
^ -,0!t3 
(.070) 
. -.05k 
(.072? 
•, -.036 
(.072) 
-.05k' 
(.073) 
--.Ilfit, 
(.072) 
, ; "..106 v: 
(.078) 
-.191* 
(,062) 
Z-2 .O'lh 
(.070) 
.ok: : 
(.070) 
' ,00k 
(.070) 
. .P''3 , 
(.070) 
.027 
(.071) 
• .038 
(.072) 
.030 
(.073) 
-.137» 
(.071) 
-.olio 
(.079) 
-.105* % 
(.063) 
B-3 -.056 
(.071) 
: -.057 
(.072) 
: ..127 
(.079) 
-.002 : 
(.063) 
AV .003 
(.002) 
.003 
(.002) 
.003 
(.002) 
.003 
(.003) 
.002 
(.003) 
.002 
(.003) 
.002 
(.003) 
.001 
(.oos) 
.002 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.002) 
AU-I ,.005+ 
(.00?) 
.0051 
i.oo^') 
.005+ 
i.uui') 
.005+ 
i.OtV) 
.003 (.003) 
.00k (.003) .003 (.003) .003 (.00,^ ) 
.00k 
(.003) 
.002 
(.00;) 
AU-2 -.003 
( .Ciil?) 
-.00? 
(.OC:') 
-.003 
(.OO,-) 
-.002 -.002 
(.nn?) 
.000 
r-d 38.52' 
(20.78) 
kO.kD» 
(70,9k) 
110,20' 
(kli,%) 
30. kk 
(32.95) 
109.7')+ 
(52,12) (kL',W) 
Ilk,71 icj.yi) 110.57+ (kl,?6) 63,83 (k6,06) 92.90' (56.2k) 
f-d 1.69 
(21.3k) 
9.9k 
(26.11) 
-6.75 
(25.59), 
12.51 
(30.16) 
15.31 
(23.95) 
-1.35 
(25.90) 
31.57 
(23.7k) 
g-d 15.16 
(36.1k) 
.703 : 
(81.182) 
.150.28+ 
. (kU.pS) 
-kk.8l 
(k9.97) 
-12.1k 
(71.19) 
(r-d)^ 220.66 
(179.50) 
-96.07 
(66.97) 
-95.26 
(85.91) 
-16.ko 
(69.28) 
(f-d)' -i6.m: . . 
(2k.li5) 
-16.13 
(25.28) 
25.00 
(20.52) 
(g-d)^ -5.9k 
(6k.67) 
-92.03* 
(52.98) 
(r-d)3 .378.6k' 
(193.36) 
4L .000 -.000 . 000 ..000 -.003 . 000 -.OOJt 
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.00?) 
• -191.70 .195.89 97.22 
(315.07) (3l<3.01) (281.71) 
I-l .000 .000 
(.000) (.000) 
1-2 -.000 -.000 
(.000) (.000) 
J-l 61.52T 181.521 
(9.60) (16.1,6) 
N-Z 25.91+ -138.13* 
(11.86) (17.kl) 
R® .053 .056 .085 .056 .071» .057 .07L .225 .086 .I158 
r 2.20» I.9I,» 2.61+ l.liU 1.5I4 1.30 1.28 U.62t 1.38 8.67t 
i.e. 73.69 73.76 72.77 7k.13 73.79 7't.27 7k.16 67.66 73.88 57.68 
"StAndard errors of reprçnslon coefficients upptar In p'ir.fnth.îsc5 be lew edch coefficient. Where a blank spicj appeura the 
variable 1B not Included In the equation. An • denote» significance ut the ,10 level. A t denstes significance at the .05 
level. 
^Standard error of estimate, 
101+ 
Table 33. Reerconlon cOTffU(cn».ii* for kaiik 31 vlilch hnd 8 v«e)i» of VorrovlnK bclvci-n Jiuiiif-ry ?, 1963 «id IVcrcibcr SI, 196C, 
kywtion 1 2 / k ' ,5 ••• ' . c : 7 8 •' 9 • 10 
Constant ^2li.3T, 
(15.50) 
20.06 
(15.18) 
iLkl 
(18-37) 
18,11 
(15.99) 
12.75 
(17.310 
97,6]* 
(1)0.1)9) 
Ii.l6t 
(6i?.77) 
391.38 
(900.09) 
1.1.5. i-s 
(669.06) 
381..67 
(9l5.£')) 
B-l .Syiit 
(.068) 
.filiSt 
(.070) 
.568f 
(.068) 
.652; 
(.071) 
,-590; 
(.069) 
: ' .592) 
(.069) 
• .577t 
(.068) 
:,5704 
(.069) 
.605* 
(.072) 
. .600+ 
(.071) 
B-2 ,-.269t 
(.068) , : -.397! (.079) (!o68) 
• ,-,1-OU 
: , (.000), (.069) 
-.3061 
(.069) 
..318t : 
(.068) 
-.329* 
. (.06?) 
..Lilt 
(.079) , ( .07i>) 
B-3 • .l8ot 
(.070) 
.iBlf 
(.070) 
.12I.V 
(.07?) 
.010 
(.073) 
AU 
-.006 
(.DOT) 
-.005 
(.007) 
•"iOOb 
(.007) 
-.005 
(.007) 
-.006 
(.007) 
-.006 
(.007) 
-.OOC 
(.007) 
-.006 
(.007) 
-.005 
(.007) 
-,006 
(.007) 
AU-1 -.006 
(.00%) 
-.OOC 
i.mi) -.006 (.OOf) -.006 (.007) -.006 (.000) -.006 (.003) -.007 ( .00.1) -.007 (.001) -.007 (.007) 
-.003 
(.007) 
AU-3 -.00] 
t.007) 
-.001 
(.OCT) 
-.001 
(.OUT) 
-.001 
(.007) 
-.001 
(.007) 
-.001 
(.007) 
r-d .i?3 
(59.58:') 
-1.58 
(58.76) 
-joi.B'; 
(1^6,6:!) 
-pa.ot' 
(9I1.0:') 
piio.nj" 
(6.3JI  IPi" ' . } }  (K'3.8j) ( W.M) 
81.00 
on.. 5") 
911,00 
(li '1,7'. ') 
Î9.61 
(ir'Q.)v) 
f-d 22.08 
(61.18) 
5%I5 
(75.33) 
100.1.7 
, (72.90) 
87.78 
(811.52) 
6>..l)3 
(73.5M 
63.33 
(72.78) 
1.3.90 
(81..00) 
«-d -209.1.8! 
(kw.9)) 
-638.L^t.. -11)9.75 
(113.53) 
-153.91 
(110.15) 
-1.03.10 
(?50.ni) 
(r-d)® 269.Ii5 
(525.521 
36II,97* 
(189.IU) ''Oh.OJ (2I1O.OO) 
57.66 
(21.0.25) 
(r-d): 
-k5.32 
(69.88) 
-78.82 
(71.20) 
-61.22 
(76.55) 
(g-d)® 1)26.02+ 
(186.08) 
261.10 
(190.31.) 
(r-d)' 56.69 
(557.39) 
HaxS 
(HaxS) 
SL .003 
(.007) 
.002 
(.007) 
.002 
(.007) 
.003 
(.007) 
.001 
(.007) 
.003 
(.007) 
.00.? 
(.007) 
• 
-36S.I13 
(1066.8) 
-1)59.71 
(1053.5) 
-319.31. 
(1081.6) 
I-l -.000 (.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
1-2 -.000 
( .000) 
.000 
(.000) 
K-1 1,6.67» 
(19.91) 
-101,1)1* 
(59.76) 
K-2 58.26» 
(20.02) 
11.6.36» 
(61.15) 
.286 .309 .297 .311 .299 .303 .327 .325 .351 .377 
r  15.86t lk.70t 11.81» 10.99' 8.25* 9.35? 7.7kf 7.66» 7.891 6.22» 
#.*.* 211».5 ail.5 21L.O 212.lt 215.2 21I1.? 21%.0 212.3 208.8 207.3 
•stwidnrd errors of rcgrcjslcn wfflcltnt^ »pp»Ar In par»r .tho;i.;n tuloï tcch cc»fflcl.>n'.. Whrre « btwik »pncr «ppeara th« 
«rUble U not Included In the «lUnllen. An • denot-s utiinirtciuicr the .10 lrvt:l. A r driiot»» slgnlfUanc-! at the .05 
level. 
^Standard error of esttinatr. 
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Tftbl< 3^. Begreonlon çoefflclcnta'' for bmiK 3? which hi'î T weeks of fcorrvwln/j between Jwiuiry 19^15 end PcPTib^r 2J., 19^6 
Equation 1 2, 3 5 6 . 7 fl 9 10 
Censtaiit 168.21' 
(91.91) 
II13.65 
(91.69) 
120.1,8 
(110.22) 
123.33 
(95.58) 
IkO.Ill 
(103.77) 
265.71 
(238.117) 
186.3) 
(375.00) 
-5002.0 
(l| 315.7) .35611.8 (11203.3) -1(299.7 (L569.5) 
Ï-1 •.5fiif: 
(.060) 
.6oiit 
(.070) 
' .55?t 
(.066) 
.5931-
(.071) 
.5''?», 
- (.070) 
.Çl'-t 
(.070) 
• .SliCIt 
(.070) 
' .53«» 
(.071) 
.;7ct 
(.072) (.086) 
B-2 -.271t 
(.OC7) 
-.357+ 
(.078) 
. -.269» 
(.069) 
-.3k6f 
(.079) 
•-.2ii«1 
(.071) 
-.SliTf 
(.071) 
, -.21171 
(.071) 
-.239* 
(.07I1) 
. -.335t 
(.000) 
-.336t 
(.oôj) 
B-3 ' ' .157t 
(.071) 
: .158! 
(.071) 
,17lif 
(.073) 
:.l89t 
(.075) 
AU .003 
(.011) 
. .001 
(.011) (.011) 1:%!) 
.003 
(.012) 
.003 
(.0)?) 
; .003 ' 
(.012) 
.003 , 
(.012) 
.003 
(.01?) ,:S 
&U-1 -.011 
(.011) 
-.015 
(.011) 
-.011 
(.011) 
-.016 
(.011) 
-.oia 
(.013) 
-.019 
(.013) 
-.019 
(.013) 
-.020 
(.013) 
-.022» 
(.013) 
-.023 
(.Mk) 
4U-D -.011 
(.011) 
-.01? 
(.011) 
-.01? 
(.OIP) -.013 ( . n i l )  
-.013 
(.011) 
-.013 
(.015) 
r-d -167.3 
(3'j2.3) -17^.9 (3I18.9) 
.)1Q.R 
(75.-'.3) ('/'«.0) 
-7')L) 
(11/.' '.6) -17:'.9 (Y.'V.H) 
-Lfl'.O 
(ii'iii.e) 31)9. OL' (r...J.07) 
•j 'iD.Oi 
(H.'U.7C) 
13Î.)6 
llj'11.9) 
f-d 193.9 
(361.5) 
31*3.6 
(U6,M 
339.3 
C-311,1) 
. 1.1,9.? 
(512.2) 
I1I6.W 
(1153.50) 
53:J.92 
(yiO,36) , . 
51.0.87 
(515.27) 
g-d 
-328.3 
(COO.7) 
-18.81 
(1I.:L.3) 
-615.15 
(718.50) 1
1
 
-1116.5 
(1667.7) 
(r-d)' 23kl.2 
(3132.7) 
520.7 
(1125.3) 
602.0 
(lL)2.7) 
53k.71 
(1596.0) 
(f-d)® 
-215.5 -182.8 -2k3.51 
(116.2) (I13L3) , (1*33.50 
(g-d)® -213.9 3(2.Ik 
(ll.'i'.S) (1258.7) 
(r.d)3 -2055.3 
(3325.6) 
4L .007 .007 .OOn .007 .009 .011 .011 
(.009) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.010) 
a 6101.0 I17I18.2 53011.2 
(I1955.7) (It8v9.5) (5368.8) 
I-l -.OCO -.002 
(.002) (.002) 
I-2 .002 .003 
(.002) (.002) 
B-l . -76.3: -192.22 
(136.03) (1181.97) 
II-2 -187.70 -15.07 
(135.09) (L75.70) 
.260 .278 .262 .281 .-'69 .269 .270 . 275 . 30k ,309 
r 13.92f 12.'>5f 9.96t 9.55' 7.11' 7.92t 5.88» 6.0lif 6.38» lt,59t 
I.,.*» 1267. 12)). 1272. 12)0. 1276. 1?73. 1232. 1277. 1255. 1267. 
^Btnndird errori of n-'srcnalon co'^mrlrnta appofir In b.flow etich cocfflci.»nt. Whrpf & blmnk gpacf Appears thg 
variable is not included in thir equntton. An • denotrrs sli^-nifica.)''»* at th? .10 lcv.;l. A t d^noliso significance at the .05 
leTCl. 
^StandfirJ error of estimfitc. 
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Table 35. Hegi'eaiilod coufruuiitii * far bunk 33 vhlch hufî 5 wccku of-borrcvlnr. b'.'twc''n January ?» 19(^3 nrc#"rh'.r 2 1, 1966 
C<iufttloa 1 1 . 3 : v. ' 6 . 7 8 9 V: 10 
Constant !9*O0 
12-53 
17.38 
(u.r.8) 
M.52t (111.85) 
10,(A 
(12.99) 
?0,27 -72.69* 
(3?.61) 
.28.18 
(IS.99) 
11131.6 
(9(7.71) 
ljrO.7 
(978.0) 
lOliO.J 
(loUi.o) 
b-1 -.Oil* 
(.071) 
-.013 
(.071) 
•-.0Ï9 
(.071) 
-.032 
(.071) 
..017 
(.072) 
' '-.0C7 
(.071) 
-.073 
(.07?) 
-.090 
(.072) 
-.0?!' 
(.072) 
-.101 
(.073) 
..Ol'i , 
(.071) 
-.013 
(.071) 
-.Cr '<5 • 
(.071) 
-,0?? 
(.071), 
-.015 
(.071) 
-.072 
(.072) 
-.086 
(.073) 
-.0711 
(.073) 
-.09I' 
(.073) 
-.080 
(.OOlt) 
.OBO 
(.071) 
.060 
(.07?) 
. /' .008 
(.071.) 
.002 
(.075) 
AU -.002 • 
(.poll) 
-.002 . 
(.00'') 
-.002 (.00 It) -.000 (.005) , .000 (.005) -.000 (.005) -.000' (.005) -.002 (.005) -.002 (.005) -.001 (.005) 
ÔU-1 -.003 
{.ooli,) 
-.002 
(.ooli) 
-.003 
(.OOH) 
-.063 
(. 00*. ) 
-.obr 
( . 00'. ) 
-.003 
(.001) 
-.00? 
(.OClij) 
-.OOlt 
(.00b! 
-.ooli 
(.ooli! 
-.001» 
t .ocili) 
AU-2 .001 
( .oo'i) 
.000 
( .co'i! 
.000 
( .'J'.'M 
-.000 -.001 
(.OOL) 
-.001 
( .ooll) 
r.d 12,(1? 
(k7.7?) 
SO.'):' 
(I17.CÈ) 
160.93-(lutf.Py) -Tl.'y'i (73.87) 50.30 (11B.71) (•17.21) (157.97) .3(0.711 (105.67) -353.0:4 (100.36) 
-rLG.Li 
(1.7;'. 35) 
f-d 97.19f 
(k9.;6) 
109.25" 
(10.51); 
17.lO 
(56.97) 
25.39 
(67.65) 
18.51. 
: (60.33) 
, . lC.(.0 
(59.93) 
20. L6 
(68.21) 
g-d 239.37» 
(65.52) 
60.66 
(1K.3I) 
315.21t 
(91.29) 
319.39» 
(95.13) 
: 172.17 
(232.31») 
(r-d)^ 
-337.78 
(389.15) 
-210.35 
(112.13) 
-197.76 
(IPO.83) -196.31» (226.79) 
(f-dl* -13.92 
(55.33) 
-39.91 
(57.51) .29.67 (59.80) 
(g-d)* 1^9.16 
(153.21) 138.1,7 (182.70) 
(r-d)' 108.18 
(38?.1.0) 
AL .002 
(.006) 
.00? 
(.006) 
.001 
(.006) 
.001 
(.006) .002 (.006) 
.001 
(.005) 
,002 
(.006) 
» 
-lbU2.8 
(IO7L.3) 
-15L'3.9 • 
(1075.9) 1 
-1157.2 
[1160.3) 
I-l 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
1-2 
-.000» 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
R-l 
-20.26 
(22.19) 
-33.36 
(66.1.1») 
m 2 
-17.55 
(22.01) 
9.19 
(66.07) 
m' .OOk .012 .019 .03? .0^2 .066 .075 
.087 .092 .10? 
F .152 .385 .5l'2 .805 .81.1. 1.532 1.289 1.52 I.L9 1.17 
i.e.^ 173.7 173.1' 173.2 172.5 172.5 169.9 170.k 169.3 169.? 170.6 
Standard erron» of rcgrcBslon coefficients «ipp-jar In pir>*nthfT»*6 bclov «jtioh co*»fflclent. Where % bliink space eppean the 
v&rlable is not included In the •<iu#itlon. An • ftenot»'5 stgni flcano»» at the ,10 levîl, A * d»?nnt^3 sl^nîflcftnce at the .05 
level.  
^Standard error of estimate. 
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Tiible 36. Xvtin'CDioii coi'fflclcntn " for biinX 3I1 wlltrh ho'1 of bi.irru«tnr, b'.tv^rn Jiuiimry 2, 10^3 w1 Iw-cpmbT 211 , 1966 
Equation • • 1 ' , ' -2 • 6 • . y'T/'/. "8 - •• 9 10 
Cbnstftiit U.ltS 2.1*9 
(U.rj) 
5.17 
15J'7) 
2.57 
. (It.kl) 
L.8t IP.lR 
(!!.?:•) 
19.72 
(;«,73) 
-275.72 
(236.85) 
-171.88 
(223,71) 
.171.kfi 
(257.79) 
B-1 .2l<7l 
(.007) 
.23^1 
(.007 ) 
.21171 
(.007) 
.2j'lt 
. (.007) (,007) ' \ (.007) 
.iLôr 
' (.00,1) 
.21.5» 
(.001) 
.231,f 
(.007) 
.:3iit 
(.007) 
8-2 \ ..0581 
(.007) 
- ,ofjM 
(,007) 
, -.05B1 
(.007) 
:, -.ociu' 
(.007) (.007) 
. / .05m 
(.007) 
-.0501 
(.OOfl) (.008) , 
-.061. t 
(.007) 
..Q6I11 
(.007) 
B-3 .038t 
(.007) 
. .0381 
(.007) , 
r .037t 
(.007) 
.037t 
(.007) 
AU -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 : 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-,000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.0(10) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
W-l -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
( .000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
I .000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
i.opo) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
AU^S -..OCIO 
{.U'w) 
-.000 
(.000} 
-.000 
(.000) 
-,0:;0 
( .O'JO) 
.000 
( .e"t;) 
,000 
r-il -1.1? 
(17.57) (16.32) 
-7.''IJ 
iriM-) -I.V (2X8:') -R.90 (It3..1,') 6, a (30.U) (27.71) (59.70 
-lb, 3' '  
(k'j.9'.<) 
-8,61 
(38.2") 
-11.1? 
IC6.9'J> 
t-i 
(16.62) 
3.30 
(22.0.7) 
7.59 
(21.25) 
10.31 
(25.19) 
9.7e 
(21.95) 
5.52 
(20.35) 
6.37 
(2I..32) 
1-4 -21.15 
(30.1.5) 
-51.56 
170.35) 
5.55 
(38.65) 
3.26 
(35.63) 
-.93 
(79.89) 
(r-d)® 
-117.55 
(155.72) 
3.08 
(56.12) 
-30.86 
(72.80) 
3.19 
(7k.32) 
tf-d)' -5.27 
(20.eu) 
-6.1.7 
(21.52) 
-2.91 
(20.55) 
<g-d)' 21.1.9 
*55.75) 
It.67 
(55.15) 
(r-d)^ 55.3lt 
(165.36) 
AL -.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
( .000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
& 308.92 
(253.18) 
191.51 
(239.03) 
191.73 
(268.95) 
1-1 .000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
1-2 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
9-1 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
N-2 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
R* .850 .672 .850 .87.; .851 .851 .851 .852 .872 .872 
r 225.» 223. t 159. f 166, t 110.» 123.t 91.» 91.85t 99.86» 70.?l.t 
• 63.17 58.6k 63.k8 58.Çl* 63.91 63.67 6k. 12 63.91 59.58 60,38 
*Stend«ir(l errors of regression eo«îfricli»nt5 appear In p^rvnthfbelow cuch ecefflclent, Where a blvik spHc« ap^e&ra the 
variable Is not Included In the equitlcn. An • Jenotea ntrnl fi.iftnc» the .10 IcvpI, A f denotes al»j;n! flcincc it the .05 
lewl. 
^Standnrd error of eatlrate. 
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Tab 11* 37» Pepreflulon cc.'fftctrnt'}* for VarH 35 which had k vmkM of borrowing b«?lw*cn Jinunry 2, loC) *n'l ti*c«Mb*r 21, 1^66 
EquAtiou 1 2 3 : b 5 6 7 e 9 10 
Cenitknt 6.19' 
(3.68) ',90 (3.éO) 
-li.yS 
(11.12) 
6.85* 
(3.73) 
1.97 
(3.61) 
10.37 
(9.6") 
3fl.7Vf 
(13.65) 
II 
577.53* 
(316.17) 
-21(0.63 
(350.12) 
B-1 .£Clt 
(.OCT) i.oCy) .583t (.065) .fiWt (.063) " ..«5t • (.067) .!96f (.06?) .66lit (.068) .T;of (.070) ; .671f (.067) 
B-J ..jUflt 
(.067) 
-.JOllt 
(.030) 
..366t 
(.063) 
-.505t 
, (.000) 
-.359t 
(.062) 
' -.357t 
(.067) 
-.30Ot 
(.000) 
.. -.365t 
(.000) 
-.513} ; 
, (.0B0) 
-.531t 
(.077) 
Ï-3 .2351 
(.070) 
V .23Bf 
(.06,) 
; .2li2t 
(.071) 
.180» 
(.060) 
AU • .003 
(.003) 
.001 
(.003) 
, . .003 
(.003) 
.001 
(i003) 
\ .002 
(.003) 
.002 
(.003) 
: .001 • 
(.003) 
.002 
(.003) 
.001 
(.003) 
-.000 
(.003) 
4U-1 .001 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.003) 
.001 
(.003) 
-.01,11 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.OOll) 
-.003 
(.OOll) 
-.OOll 
(.coll) 
-.003 
(.poll! 
-.OO'l 
(.OOll) 
-.005 
(.OOll) 
4U-S -.00k 
(,0V)) 
-.00', 
(,noi) 
-.00? (.DOi) -.00k (.003) -.ook (.003) -.OOll (.003) 
r-4 -?2.1S 
(ikyj) .18.93 (Ij.yu) 
-illt.SSf 
(29.30) 
16.10 
(21.BY) 
-57.77' 
(W.iM 
17.96 
(yo.96) (W.ei) 
10.10 
(i'';.5o) 
11.89 
(.-3.50) 
-35.00 
(1(3.90) 
t-d -29.001 
(It.02) 
-72.184 
(16.1,6] 
~2iM 
(17.29) 
-66.5?f 
(10.03) 
-32.lt5« 
(18.05) 
-1(1.831 
(17.39) 
-37.96! 
(18.00) 
: d -5.66 
(2li.53) 
.1011.1481 
(51.82) 
-37.25 
131.2?) 
-9.33 
(29.91) 
-151.29t 
(58.13) 
(r-d)- 585.161 
(122.13) 
55.59 
(k2.33) 
-55.27 
(51.31) 
-kit.26 
(52.11) 
(f-il' TO.llf 
(15.38) 
52.36f 
(15.32) 
56.911» 
(15.1(3) 
(g-d)® 175.56t «a.eiit 
(kl.ll,) (Ii2.75) 
(r-d)' -510.20t 
(127.9W 
AL .000 
(.002) 
.001 
(.002) 
.000 
(.002) 
.001 
(.002) -.000 (.002) 
.000 
(.002) 
.001 
(.002) 
a 
-675.56* 
(302.66) 
-621.85 
(300.06) 
310.9k 
(k03.77) 
I-l 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
1-2 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.OOC) 
1-1 k.70 
(11.93) 
27.25 
(26.kl) 
11-2 
-7.97 
(11.55) 
-k2.0k« 
(25.52) 
/ .sw .378 .1(18 .391 .H8 .361 .k97 
.373 .kl6 .529 
r 20.6or 19.95t 20.12» 15.671 15.63r 12.20t 15.T3f 9.k5f 10.ko» 11.56» 
».*.* 50.81 It9,5l» l(0,O3 I19.25 1(7.Ik 50.58 k5.2k 50.52 1(8.89 I»k.k6 
^Standard error» of regrerislon coeffLct«*nta In psrvnthf-yi belnw each coefflclfi t. Wh<?r«> a blank mpace appears the 
variable 1» not included in thtf «qu/ition, A/j • 8l<?niri:ancp at the .10 levf 1, A f d»»notM ficarc# at the ,05 
level. 
b Standard error of estimate. 
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Table 38» P^grenulon comfflclpntg'^ for bnnk "iC vbt'>. hm,! 2 vcfka of bvirvwinp between Ji-ituury 2» 194% tX'cember 21, 1^466 
CAn9t(\nt 
B-1 
Ï-Î 
B-3 
(r-d)' 
E^uattott 11 
(II.COS) 
-.033 
(.0(5) 
.370t 
(.0(5) 
li.lilB 
(11.«3?) 
-.0^8 
(.IM) 
.3T14 
(.065) 
(.3?M 
-17.53 
(13.587) 
-.090 
(.0(7) 
.3:Mt 
(.0C5) 
3.883 
(12.MG) 
-.095 
(.HO) 
.31381 
(.066) 
.IfiO 
(.3?6) 
.313 
(13.909) 
21.266 
(30.00?) 
33.245 
("17.016) 
-.C31 , ..033 • -.03; . 
(.065) (.ofill) (.066) 
, .36kt 
(.065) 
.369t 
(.0-5) 
.361» 
( . 0 6 0 )  
.71.118 
(G3).li2) 
..(I'? 
(.065) 
.371t 
( . 0 6 5 )  
-82.335 
(639.57) 
(.US) 
.363t 
(.065) 
.kU 
(.327) 
-]100,1+ 
(It38.5) 
-15li.S • 
(673.3) 
-.?0« 
(.150) 
. .3574 • 
(.069) 
.399 
(.331) 
AU -.005 . 
(.005) 
..005 
(.005) i
l
 
-.003 . 
(i006) 
-.003 
(.006) 
-.003 
(.006) 
-.003 
(.006) 
-.OOU 
(.006) 
..ooll 
(.006) 
..ooll 
(.006) 
AU_1 ..ooll 
(.005) 
-.ooll 
(.005) 
-.005 
(.005) 
-.ooll 
(.005) 
-.011+ 
(.orC) 
-.Ollit 
(.006) 
-.Ol!l + 
(.006) 
-.011.+ 
( .006) 
-.016+ 
(.006) 
-.016+ 
(.006) 
6U^2 -.017+ (.fw) 
-.017+ 
(.wi;) 
-.017* 
(,"r.n) 
-.017» 
(,no>) 
-.018+ 
(.005) 
-.015+ 
(.005) 
r-d 135.7t 
(W.L) 
Uf.pf 
(W.7) 
e.i.C'j 
(96.2I1) 
155.3» 
(72.1) 
81.36 
(10';.Oi) 
157.?' 
(W.?) 
156.3 
(ILV.O) 
)iin.6 
(I'V.fl) 
157.9 
(97.6) 
II17.I 
(156.2) 
f-d -10.62 
(l<5.90) 
l.l..7i' 
(56.50) 
1.3.16 
(5I..91) 
59.70 
(6II,C2) 
33.119 
(55.85) 
!iC.2i 
(56.05) 
51.92 
(65.03) 
«-d -58.19 (77.20) 
.116.9 
(179.5) 
-16.67 
(85.17) 
-31.35 
(81..87) 
.71.66 
(191.73) 
(r-d)V 1307.0+ 
(Loi..3) 
82.58 
(1II2.52) 
11.70 
(IC8.I.5) 
7.96 
(1911.20) 
(f-d)® 
-39.61 
(52.05) 
-I13.OI . 
(53.95) 
."15.89 
(511.73) 
(g-d)® 59 I15 
(1I16.I.I) 
69.93 
(155.33) 
4L .005 .007 .007 .007 .007 .008 .007 
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.006) (.006) (.006) (.006) 
& 110.Ii 122.1 221. Ii 
(659.9) (702.0) (7^9.8) 
1.1 -.000 -.000 
(.000) (.000) 
J.2 -.000 -.000 
(.000) (.000) 
n-i .000 .000 
(.000) (.000) 
H.3 .000 .000 
( .000) ( .000) 
,197 .193 .230 .201 .2LI, .2L3 .21.6 .21.9 .253 .259 
r 9.71+ 8.10+ 8.76+ 6.13+ 6.52+ 6.92+ 5.19+ 5.26+ 3.60+ 
».«.*" 162.1 162.1. 158.6 162.9 159.3 156.9 159.9 159.6 159.6 I6I.O 
"standard error:, of r*y,rtf.:ototi coefr.cl'.'nt;* appoir tn p'ir.-MithcG.u below e^rh coefficient. Vhere a blvik sp'ice appears the 
«allable 1(1 not. Included In the «nuatloii. An • d-motes siEnlflcuice at the .10 level. A + denotes alrnlflfanc» at the .05 
level. 
^Sttt;id*rd error of eatimale. 
